We have studied several such arrangements. To illustrate some of the issues we believe are crucial to understanding their costs and benefits, consider the following real-life case:

XYZ Corporation (the real name of the company has been withheld) started selling pharmaceutical over-the-counter (OTC) products in 1978. They have a variety of such products that they sell today. They rely heavily on electronic interfacing at various levels with their buyers in order to drive efficient supply chain management.   XYZ was introduced to EDI in 1985. Their basic EDI process is fairly simple. Customers enter orders via EDI by sending UPC codes and order quantities to an electronic mailbox with a specific customer ID. Orders are retrieved four times a day, and after being screened for consistency, are translated and sent into XYZ's order processing system. Currently, there are over 160 customers who use EDI for ordering. 70% of their dollar volume of orders comes in electronically, and 50% of the total number of orders use this system. The benefits of the simple EDI system have been immense. Delivery times have been cut from an average of 21 days to an average of 5 days. Customer order problems, which used to take 24 hours to handle, are resolved in less than an hour. The EDI system is handled by customer service representatives, who, instead of entering line items manually, now have more time to focus on advertising, selling and forecasting.  However, there are some concerns with this system. Customers like to use the same UPC each time they order, and do not keep up with changing product types and packaging sizes; hence, a fraction of the orders tend to be for products that are no longer in existence. It is difficult to handle specialized product features, and promotional products, due to the information gap between the customer and XYZ.   XYZ has solved these problems and achieved further operating improvements using VMI (vendor managed inventory). For instance, one of their retailers allows them to hook the EDI system into the retailer's inventory system. This allows them to view POS data - XYZ controls the stock in the retailers stores. This eliminates the information gap discussed earlier. This information also has cross-functional value, as it allows XYZ to generate superior demand forecasts. It has increased the number of inventory turns by over 300%. Another of XYZ's retailers does not allow this form of VMI, but gives XYZ access to their POS information; this information is targeted at helping XYZ's marketing and sales divisions make better forecasts, and to give XYZ the option of replenishing stocks continuously. XYZ also manages a whole category of OTC pharmaceutical products for one of their retailers; this provides XYZ with valuable information about competing pharmaceutical companies' sales and promotion patterns.  The benefits to XYZ should be immense; however, their managers do not feel that there is any tangible net value from these advanced systems. The efficiency of their logistics management and their marketing strategies have improved; however, these benefits seem to be outweighed by the fact that they operate on stringent and expensive supply schedules, and are saddled with a number of the ordering costs that the retailer used to bear. In short, as one despondent manager put it: 'The retailer seems to have extracted all the benefits of our partnership'.

The case raises a number of interesting points. We focus primarily on the following issues:

• How much information should a firm share? If sharing information generates value, one might argue, then why not share all relevant information available ? At least two observations are of consequence when examining the question of up to what level must one build these relationships:

 
• The sharing of information also affects a different dimension of the buyer-supplier relationship: the relative bargaining power of the two parties.
• The nature of the information shared may influence the strategies of departments outside operations and supply chain management; also, it may affect the competitive position of the buyer or supplier with respect to their own industry rivals.
Based on our field studies, in §2 we describe the impact of different levels of information sharing on the operations, sales and marketing strategies of an organization.
 
• If these arrangements are indeed value creating, then a question which arises is how can IOIS relationships be sustained. For instance, a supplier may get tremendous operations and sales strategy improvements if permitted to access point-of-sales information; however, the buyer may not gain significantly from this arrangement. In a case like this, one would expect a contract of some kind to ensure that the information is shared on a continuous basis, and that the value created is shared in a satisfactory manner. In §3, we model the contracting process, and demonstrate that, though the supplier creates more value, the commonly observed buyer-takes-all outcome often emerges.

Existing work in the area of inter-organizational information sharing has covered a fairly wide range of topics. The earliest articles which indicated the shape these sharing relationships may take were by Cash and Konsynski (1985), and Clemons and McFarlan (1986). The impact of EDI on buyer-supplier relationships has been studied by Wang and Seidmann (1995) and Riggins and Mukhopadhyay (1994). Bensaou and Venkatraman (1995) study interorganizational relationships in the U.S. and Japan, and develop and test a model based on the fit between information processing capabilities and needs. Clark and Stoddard (1996) discuss the cross functional value of EDI and continuous replenishment arrangements in the grocery industry, and discover, among other things, that inventory reductions occur for both buyer and suppliers. Their study is based primarily on four cases, descriptions of which can be found in Clark, Croson, McKenney and Nolan (1994), Clark and McKenney (1994), Clark and McKenney (1995) and Schiano and Clark (1995). Whang (1993) examines whether a seller should share queue information with a customer. The ability to share information across organizations creates a move towards more transactions with fewer suppliers, and this is explained in part in Clemons, Reddi and Row (1993). The impact of IT on co-ordination and bargaining power is studied by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993) and Clemons and Row (1993). An interesting case study of IOIS can be found in Clemons and Row's 1988 study of the Economost system at McKesson Drug Company (this is a popular case in MBA courses for illustrating strategic information systems). In related work, Henderson (1990) studies the relationships between IS and line managers. One of his findings - that a critical determinant of partnership is mutual dependence on distinctive competencies and resources - is particularly  relevant to the IOIS relationships we model. An interesting study of the impact of the potential incompleteness of contracts involving information assets is done by Brynjolfsson (1994).

2. THE LEVEL OF INFORMATION SHARING
The diversity of information content, and the numerous sharing options makes it seemingly impossible to classify the nature or level of information sharing. Our field studies have indicated that a number of different sharing arrangements are possible. For example, some suppliers share inventory position information of the products a certain supplier sells them. This information may be transmitted daily, or weekly; the level of detail also varies. There are suppliers who see the store-level day-to-day point-of-sales (POS) information; there is a great deal of variety here as well - some see only product UPC's and quantities, while others have access to temporal sales distribution and customer profiles. Other buyers transmit order quantity, payment and cost information using EDI - this is a situation where the volume of information exchanged may be great, but its impact on the operations of the firms are relatively low.

If one examines information from another perspective, the problem simplifies a great deal. We treat the level of information shared not based on what its exact content or volume is, but rather, based on the impact it has on the operations, sales, marketing and production strategies of the parties that contract to share the information. Using this view, one can classify IOIS arrangements into four categories, based on the level of impact the shared information has on the buyer and supplier (Figure 1).

The first level involves increased cost-and-time-effective exchange of transaction-level information (like order quantities and prices) through EDI. The second level involves sharing select operational information (such as inventory levels) in order to exploit superior expertise across organizational boundaries, and improve operating efficiency. At the third level, the information shared has strategic value to the party that receives the information. Finally, at the highest level, the information adds both strategic and competitive value to the party that receives it.

2.1 Exchanging order information
Many IOIS arrangements do not involve sharing firm-specific operations information; they merely improve logistics processes through efficiency gains from EDI. We treat this case - where the companies exchange ordering information - as our base case. (Figure 2)

This is one of the oldest and most widely prevalent forms of IOIS, and is aimed at reducing transactions costs and the duration of order cycles.

At this level, both parties gain from reduced order cycle times (which reduce inventory levels). The value gained is not joint; each party improves efficiency independently, and hence there are no value sharing issues. There is the issue, however, of information technology costs. One party may find it cost-effective to invest in an EDI system that enables these improvements; the other may not. However, both need to invest in the system in order to transact electronically. Prior studies have analyzed this situation (see, for instance, Wang and Seidmann, 1995) - subsidies are a common solution to this problem

2.2 Sharing operations information
Information is often shared to leverage on the superior expertise, or operational economies-of-scale of one organization. This occurs when one firm owns valuable information, while the other firm possesses the ability to use this information. An example of this is vendor managed inventory (Figure 3).

For instance, a buyer shares aggregate inventory position information with its suppliers; this enables suppliers to manage the inventory of their own products at the buyer's site. Suppliers are better equipped to perform these duties, for the following reasons:

Efficiency gains are not restricted to inventory cost reductions. In our case in §1, when product specifications, packaging specifications or packaging quantities changed, an order sent with an outdated UPC would generate rework. When new products were introduced, there was a similar problem. Moving to VMI eliminated these difficulties. However, the buyer's costs of ordering and order fulfillment are now borne by the supplier..

What does the supplier gain ? Their internal operating efficiency gains are minimal at best. However, one benefit that may not be immediately tangible (if it exists) is that the supplier's relative bargaining position for its transactions with the buyer may improve. Since it is has superior knowledge of how well or badly its product is doing on a regular basis, the information asymmetry it faces reduces; it may therefore be able to bargain for price schedules that are more favorable.

It is likely that the contracts underlying these sharing agreements will include value sharing agreement between the buyer and the supplier. Alternately, there could be a penalty for non-VMI suppliers. This penalty could range from a complete shut-out ('we do business only with suppliers who manage their own inventories in our stores' - implies a strong bargaining position on the buyer side, despite the apparent gain in power by the supplier as described in the previous paragraph) to some kind of price advantage that the buyer passes on to the supplier. Our discussion in §3 provides insight into some these issues.

2.3 Sharing strategic marketing information
It is becoming common for organizations to share brand-specific information which provides strategic benefits to one of the organizations, and also leverages on their superior expertise. This occurs when one organization owns information that it can derive little independent value from, but which another can use to generate operational benefits for the company it receives the information from, besides garnering strategic value for its own sales and marketing departments. For instance, a retailer possesses POS (point-of-sales) information on all the products it sells. This information is not of much value in isolation; however, a supplier can make superior demand forecasts by analyzing detailed transaction level information from many retailers. This form of information sharing is used in the efficient customer response, continuous replenishment and quick response systems models (Figure 4), common in the grocery and fashion retailing industry. ).

The model has been discussed for many years now - supply chain management has always striven to move towards a system where consumer purchases 'pull' goods through the chain, rather than suppliers 'pushing' them. Its scope has been widening over the last couple of years, extending to industries as diverse as brewing and forestry. For instance, after capacity gains of 5% at no extra cost from an EDI system, Bass Brewers has recently started experimenting with a VMI system.

 Since inventory positions can easily be derived from POS information, the operational information that was the topic of §2.2 is also being shared. Hence, all the benefits that accompany VMI-type situations still exist. However, this information is of a much higher level of detail than inventory aggregates. - it can be used by the supplier's sales and product development groups for improved demand forecasting, promotion scheduling and segment-specific forecasts. According to the director of worldwide sales forecasting at Eastman Kodak, such region specific and tactical demand forecasts are increasingly becoming a major role of sales (Chase, 1996). Reduced demand uncertainty also improve the internal inventory management of the supplier.

The benefits described above may indicate that the buyer can induce suppliers unwilling to enter into information sharing agreements described in §2.2 by offering them access to information that is of strategic value. However, when this information is available to the supplier, the relative bargaining power of the buyer is reduced further . For instance, in the POS example above, the supplier now knows not only gross product movement figures, but also the details of what prices the buyer charges consumers, any local demand patterns and the schedule of promotions - this puts the buyer at a significant disadvantage when negotiating supply terms.

2.4 Sharing strategic and competitive marketing and sales information
At the highest level of information sharing, it is possible for a buyer to allow a supplier to access broad market information that provides the supplier with strategic and competitive benefits. This occurs when one organization possesses information that it can derive little independent value from, but from which another can derive internal strategic production benefits, as well as competitive sales and marketing benefits. The competitive benefits are with respect to intra-industry rivals - this information does not give the supplier additional competitive advantage over the buyer, but over other suppliers in its own industry. Category management is an example of this situation (Figure 5).

The retailer endows one of the suppliers with inventory management responsibility over all the products supplied for that category, and provides them with the relevant POS information. This gives that supplier strategic benefits (from improved demand forecasts), competitive benefits (from sales and demand information about competitor's products), and will enable superior inventory management. It also reduces the buyer's operating costs tremendously - not only are all order management costs eliminated, but the buyer deals with only one supplier per category, and hence has a significant reduction in information technology costs.

On the face of it, the supplier also gains tremendously when provided access to this information. Not only are all the benefits of §2.3 present, but the supplier can track the sales of competing products in the category, and use this information to improve the sales strategy of their own product. Since there may be a time lag between the category manager generating an order, and a competing supplier receiving it, inventory costs of competing products will tend to be higher, and hence the category manager gains a cost advantage as well. The tradeoff appears to be increased transaction costs for the supplier, who manages, orders and monitors product movements of a whole category of products.

In this section, we have discussed the sources of value creation when two companies share information at different levels. In §3, we examine how this value will be shared by the two firms.

3. Competitive analysis of value sharing: Why the 'buyer takes all'
We model a market with one buyer (B) and two competing suppliers (S₁ and S₂). Each supplier k manufactures one product, called product k. We examine three situations - no information sharing, VMI with POS data transfer (continuous replenishment), and category management.
 

3.1 General Framework for Analyzing Value Sharing
As discussed in detail in §2, the value from information sharing is generated by the following factors:

1. Operational savings for the buyer: If the buyer shares demand information (POS) about product k with supplier k then this results in cost savings of i_k for the buyer. These are the savings from reduced inventory and ordering costs described in §2.2 and §2.3 (See ch.4 and 5 of Nahmias, 1996, or Linwood and Montgomery, 1974, for more discussion on inventory costs)

 

2. Strategic sales and marketing revenue for the supplier: If supplier k has exclusive access to demand information about product k, then the supplier gains an amount s_k (as described in §2.3). If both suppliers have access to their respective demand information, then they both gain qs_k. q lies between 0 and 1, and represents the competitive environment; q close to zero implies a highly competitive supplier market, and q close to 1 implies a very low degree of competition between suppliers. The remaining gains of (1-q)s_k per customer are captured by the consumers.

 

3. Competitive marketing revenue for the suppliers: If supplier k has access to both its own demand information, and to that of supplier j, then supplier k gains competitive value of c_k, and supplier j loses an equal amount (these are the competitive revenues described in §2.4). Strictly, this is not value creation, as it is a zero sum situation; however, if B and S_k contract, they are jointly better off by this amount (even though S_j loses, it still represents value addition for B and S_k)

 There are also the following transfers made, depending on the nature of the information exchanged:

1. Bargaining power transfers: If supplier k has access to their own demand information, then the buyer loses b_k - this reflects their loss in bargaining power (as described in §2.2 - §2.4). Supplier k gains this amount b_k.

 

2. Contractual payments: When B contracts with S_k, there is a transfer payment of p_k from S_k to B. This could be a dollar payment, or a reflection of one of the parties bearing administrative costs that the other used to bear. p_k can be negative.

1. No information exchange
2. VMI between B and S₁
3. VMI between B and S₂
4. VMI with both S₁ and S₂
5. S₁ as category manager
6. S₂ as category manager

3.2 Inducing one supplier to be a category manager
We first examine the case in which the buyer wishes to make one of their suppliers a category manager. The value that is generated from this arrangement is s+i+c. In the absence of competition, one would expect them to share this value equally (that is the predicted Nash bargaining outcome; see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, Chapter 22). It is achieved through a payment of p = b+ 0.5(s+c-i) from the supplier to the buyer.

 However, the buyer has two competing suppliers, and can potentially get more value from the supplier through creative contracting. Let the payment from the chosen supplier to B be denoted p_C1. The following result follows:

Proposition 1: The transfer payment p_C1 is strictly less than the sum of the gain in bargaining power, potential gain in strategic value and twice the potential gain in competitive value, i.e., p_C1 <b+s+2c

(All analytical proofs and extensive forms of the subsequent contracting games are in a technical appendix, available from the authors)

 Proposition 1 follows from the fact that any payment which is greater than or equal to b+s+2c will leave the supplier with a residual value less than -c_. The supplier can do better by not contracting; hence, a contract not satisfying this condition will definitely be rejected.

Interestingly, however, the buyer can negotiate a payment very close to this bound. Consider the following sequence of events:

1. The buyer offers one of the suppliers a category management contract for a payment of p_C1.
2. If the contract is accepted, then the negotiation ends. If not, the buyer offers the other supplier a category management contract for a payment of p_C2. The other supplier either accepts or rejects the contract.

Proposition 2: If p_C1 <b+s+ 2c, and p_C2 >b+s+c, then there are two equivalent rational outcomes of the contracting game described:
1. B offers S₁ category management at p_C1 and S₁ accepts the offer
2. B offers S₂ category management at p_C1 and S₂ accepts the offer.

(By rational outcomes, we mean subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE); the reader is referred to any text on game theory -- for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, ch.3.5 -- for a discussion of this equilibrium concept).

 Intuitively, the result follows from the fact that if the value of the payment p_C1 satisfies the first inequality, the first supplier (say, S_k) has to accept the terms of the contract (payment of p_C1); not accepting them will make that supplier worse off (when the other supplier S_j accepts subsequently). The second inequality ensures that the threat of the buyer to offer the second supplier the contract at p_C2 is credible

This result shows that the buyer can not only extract all the value created from the supplier, but also an additional amount almost equal to the competitive value generated for a supplier from gaining access to the information. In a sense, the supplier gets all the inventory savings, all the strategic value generated by S₁, loses no bargaining power, and extracts the competitive value of the information from both the suppliers!!

We state a simple follow-up proposition; it follows from Propositions 1 and 2.

Proposition 3: It is possible for the buyer to get any total value that is strictly less than, but very close to, s+2c+i. However, the buyer can never get a total value greater than (s+2c+i).

This proposition indicates the maximum value a buyer can get from a category management arrangement; as mentioned earlier, this is more than the actual value created (which is s+c+i) from the information sharing arrangement.

3.3 Inducing both suppliers to manage their inventory
We now model to a situation where the buyer wants both suppliers to manage their own inventories. At first glance, the nature of the desired outcome (that both suppliers independently contract with the buyer) leads one to believe that there will be genuine value sharing in this case, and the buyer will not end up extracting everything from the suppliers. However, this is not the case in practice, and the next result shows why.

Consider the following sequence of offers. All payments are from supplier to buyer.

• Stage 1: The buyer offers both suppliers individual VMI contracts at a payment of p₁ = p₂ = p_V
• Stage 2: If both accept the contract, then the issue is settled. Otherwise:
• If one of them has accepted, the buyer offers that supplier a category management contract for a total payment of p_C1.
• If neither of them has accepted, the buyer randomly offers one of them a category management contract for a payment of p_C2

Proposition 4: If the following conditions are satisfied:

1. p_V < s+b+c
2. p_V <p_C1 < c+min{p_V, 0.5(s+b+p_C2)}

•  B: 2i-2b+2p_V
• S₁: qs+b-p_V
• S₂: qs+b-p_V

A result similar to Proposition 3 is now stated.

Proposition 5: It is possible for the buyer to get any total value that is strictly less than, but very close to, 2qs+2c+2i by inducing both suppliers to adopt VMI. However, the buyer can never get a total value greater than (2qs+2c+2i).

Again, we note the phenomenon of the buyer gaining more than the value created (2qs+2i) from the sharing arrangement. Now, Propositions 3 and 5 have indicated how high the value extraction of the buyer can go in each of the two situations. Any rational buyer faced with these choices goes for the better option:

Proposition 6: If q > 0.5(1 - i/s), then the buyer prefers VMI; if q < 0.5(1 - i/s), the buyer prefers category management; if q = 0.5(1 - i/s), the buyer is indifferent.

 Since we know the maximum feasible payoff to the buyer in each game (from Propositions 3 and 5), comparing these figures yields the result. The first implication is that ceterus paribus, as the level of competition in the supplier market increases, the buyer is more likely to prefer category management. Also, as the level of strategic value that the supplier can generate increases, category management becomes more likely. Finally, as the level of inventory savings for the buyer increases, VMI becomes more likely.

Note that the magnitude of competitive rent c is not a part of the decision; this is because the buyer can extract this in either case. However, it is a crucial determinant of whether a buyer will want an IOIS at all - as c increases, the benefits to the buyer increase.

 The modeling framework in §3.1 allows for a much deeper analysis of other situations as well (imbalance in size, asymmetric information) that are unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. We defer the description of this analysis to a forthcoming, more detailed research paper.

4. Summary and Insights
Corporations have long been aware of how information systems can allow them to operate across organizational boundaries; however, there has not been much research into the competitive implications of these IOIS arrangements. There has also been significant concern on the part of suppliers who see no tangible benefits accruing to them from different information sharing arrangements. Our study offers the following insights into these long-standing concerns.

1. The impact of IOIS relationships is not merely operational; they can alter supplier marketing and sales strategies, and shape competition in supplier markets.
2. It is possible for a buyer to extract all the competitive value of information from each supplier. Therefore, it is worthwhile for buyers to collect as much information as possible that is of competitive value to their suppliers - they need not actually share it - a realistic threat of potential sharing is sufficient.
3. In a supplier market with many competing suppliers of similar size, VMI is likely to be the best policy for a buyer; though category management may offer higher operational savings, a buyer can do better by extracting competitive value from the suppliers with the threat of CM.
4. The following factors increase the operational savings that a supplier expects from an IOIS relationship:
• High inventory cost rates
• High demand uncertainty
However, the supplier should examine the competitive factors involved in these arrangements, before being tempted by large (and often illusory) cost savings, as the buyer could end up getting all the value from the arrangements.
5. Buyers should target suppliers who have the characteristics described in (4), as they are likely to be tempted by the prospects of high savings - since these savings are likely to accrue to the buyer, these are better firms to share information with. The same holds for highly competitive supplier markets.
6. Partnering with suppliers (as advocated by many supply chain management information systems vendors) is unlikely to be optimal for the buyer in many situations. There is little reason for buyers to be worried about loss in bargaining power when they share information; through creative contracting, they can regain any power they apparently lose.
7. A supplier in an IOIS relationship is unlikely to benefit from the relationship, or accrue any of the value generated; however, it may still be necessary to remain in the arrangement, to avoid further losses. A supplier who breaks even on a VMI or category management agreement, is probably doing as well as they can.
8. As I.T. enables buyers to use and share information more effectively, they are bound to be able to 'pull' more and more from suppliers. Hence, suppliers may do well to negotiate long-term VMI contracts with buyers. Even if these contracts generate little or no apparent present or future value, they are insurance against what will only become a less favorable market for them. This is particularly true in highly competitive markets; if a buyer possesses competitive information that is potentially very valuable to a supplier, this is not a sign of the supplier benefiting a lot, but a predictor of all suppliers losing a lot.
9. As the cost of processing and sharing information drops, as is evidently has and will continue to do (More's Law, Gilder's Law), two related occurrences are very likely:
• The volume of information that a buyer collects (and can potentially share) will increase
• The strategic and competitive value of this information to suppliers will increase
In the light of our analysis, this spells more profits for the buyer, and more value extraction from suppliers.

References

1. Bensaou, M. and Venkataraman, N. Configurations of interorganizational relationships: A comparison between U.S. and Japanese automakers. Management Science 41 (1995), 1471-1492.
2. Brynjolfsson, Erik. Information Assets, Technology and Organization. Management Science 40 (1994), 1645-1662.
3. Bakos, J. Yannis and Brynjolfsson, Erik. Information technology, incentives, and the optimal number of suppliers. Journal of Management Information Systems 10, Iss.2 (1993), 37-53.
4. Cachon, Gérard P. and Zipkin, Paul. Competitive and Cooperative Inventory Policies in a Two Stage Supply Chain. Working Paper, Fuqua School of Business, January 1997.
5. Cash, J.I. and Konsynski, B.R. I.S. redraws competitive boundaries. Harvard Business Review, (MArch-April 1985).
6. Chase, Charles. The Changing Role of Sales Forecasting Within the Organization. Journal of Business Forecasting, Spring 1996.
7. Clark, T.H., Croson, D.C., McKenney, J.L. and Nolan, R.L. H.E. Butt Grocery Company: A Leader in ECR Implementation. Boston: Harvard Business School Case 9-195-125, 1994.
8. Clark, T.H. and McKenney, J.L. Campbell Soup Company: A Leader in Continuous Replenishment Innovations. Boston: Harvard Business School Case 9-195-124, 1994.
9. Clark, T.H. and McKenney, J.L. Procter and gamble: Improving Consumer Value through Process Design. Boston: Harvard Business School Case 9-195-126, 1995.
10. Clemons, E.K. and McFarlan, F.W. Telecom: hook up or lose out. Harvard Business Review (July-August 1986), 91-97.
11. Clemons, Eric, Reddi, Sashidar P. and Row, Michael C. The impact of information technology on the organization of economic activity: The 'move to the middle' hypothesis. Journal of Management Information Systems 10, Iss.2 (1993), 9-35.
12. Clemons, Eric, and Row, Michael C. McKesson Drug Company: A case study of Economost - a strategic information system. Journal of Management Information Systems, 5, 1 (Summer 1988), 36-50.
13. Fisher, Marshall and Cachon, Gérard P. Supply Chain Inventory Management and the Value of Shared Information. Working Paper, Fuqua School of Business, January 1997.
14. Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. Game Theory. The MIT Press, 1991.
15. Henderson,John C. Plugging into Strategic Partnerships: The Critical IS Connection. Sloan Management Review, Vol. 31, Issue 3 (1990), 7-18.
16. Lilien, G.L., Kotler, P. and Moorthy, K.S. Marketing Models. Prentice Hall Inc., 1992
17. Linwood, Johnson and Montgomery, D.C. Operations Research in Production Planning, Scheduling and Inventory Control. John Wiley and Sons, 1974.
18. MasColell, A., Whinston, M.D. and Green, J.R. Microeconomic Theory. New York. Oxford University Press, 1995.
19. Nahmias, Steven. Production and Operations Analysis, 3rd Edition. Richard D Irwin, August 1996.
20. Numetrix boosts Bass' profitability (http://www.numetrix.com/cases/bass).
21. Riggins, Frederick J. and Mukhopadhyay, Tridas. Interdependent benefits from inter-organizational systems: Opportunities for business partner reengineering. Journal of Management Information Systems 11, Iss.2 (1993), 37-57.
22. Schiano, W.T. and Clark, T.H. Hannaford Brothers: Leading the Grocery Channel Transformation. Boston: Harvard Business School Case 9-195-127, 1995.
23. Wang, Eric T.G. and Seidmann, Abraham. Electronic Data Interchange: Competitive externalizes and strategic implementation policies. Management Science 41 (1995) 401-418.
24. Porter, Michael E. and Miller, Victor E. How information gives you competitive advantage. Harvard Business Review 63, Issue 4 (1985), 149-160.