Information Asymmetry, Market Participation, and Asset Prices

David Hirshleifer          Chong Huang          Siew Hong Teoh*

March 22, 2016

Preliminary Version

Abstract

We derive a separation theorem under asymmetric information in which investors hold a common risk-adjusted market portfolio regardless of their information sets, and a portfolio based upon their own private information. The separation theorem implies that investors have non-negligible holdings of assets they know little about, so non-participation remains a puzzle in a rational setting, in contrast to a leading theory contending that non-participation in asset markets derives from information costs. In contrast with that theory's prediction of a risk premium for non-participation, in our model assets risk premia satisfy the CAPM. Investors optimally hold an index fund that provides the risk-adjusted market portfolio, even if they are unaware of the funds exact composition. In contrast with a literature on information risk, there is no risk premium for information asymmetry.

*Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine. David Hirshleifer, david.h@uci.edu; Chong Huang, chong.h@uci.edu; Siew Hong Teoh, steoh@uci.edu. We thank Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Michael Sockin, Liyan Yang, and participants in the finance brownbag seminar at UC Irvine and 6th Miami Behavioral Finance Conference for very helpful comments.
1 Introduction

In his Presidential Address to the American Finance Association, Merton (1987) provided a model in which subsets of investors refrain from participating in the markets for different stocks, resulting in risk premia for stocks with more limited participation. Although nonparticipation is exogenous in the model, Merton explains this nonparticipation as being a consequence of information costs. Merton therefore offers a rational interpretation for non-participation, and explores its consequences.

This theory has been highly influential in guiding empirical work in financial economics and accounting. It has been appealed to as an explanation for major nonparticipation puzzles such as home bias (Foerster and Karolyi 1999), and for patterns of return predictability such as the effect of breadth of ownership (Kadlec and McConnell 1994, Bodnaruk and Ostberg 2009; Chen, Noronha, and Singal 2004), the effect of geographic dispersion of firm operations (García and Norli 2012), and the accrual anomaly (Lehavy and Sloan 2008).

We call the idea that an uninformed investor optimally takes a zero position when trading with informed investors the \textit{zero holdings conjecture}. The zero holdings conjecture is quite intuitive. It seems dangerous for an investor who knows nothing about Ford Motors, for example, to take a position in Ford when in doing so he must trade with other better-informed investors.

In terms of explicit information modeling, there are at least three possible justifications for the zero holdings conjecture. First, it might actually be true that in equilibrium investors optimally choose zero holdings of assets they lack information about. Second, they might optimally have very small holdings of such assets, so that when transactions costs are introduced, it becomes optimal to hold zero. Third, as suggested by Merton (1987), investors may have zero holdings of certain assets because they are unaware of such assets. This idea requires careful interpretation, as we discuss and model.

The first possible justification has been shown to be invalid. In settings with constant absolute risk aversion preferences, multiple risky assets, and costly information acquisition, investors in general hold nonzero quantities of all assets. In particular, in natural settings, in equilibrium investors specialize in acquiring information about only a subset of assets, and each investor tilts her portfolio toward the assets that she learns about\footnote{See Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014) and Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2015).}

The intuition offered for nonzero holdings of all assets is that there is a diversification benefit to holding even those assets about which the investor knows little\footnote{The traditional single-asset literature on information and securities markets (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), Kyle (1985)) suggests another reason for non-zero holdings: uninformed investors may take non-zero positions since there is a benefit to trading as a contrarian to price to absorb the trades made by noise/liquidity traders.}

As these papers show, the holdings of the informed in the assets that they know about are larger than those who are uninformed about these assets, because such assets...
are riskier to the uninformed. This does not, however, tell us whether the holdings of
the uninformed are sizable. The fact that there are benefits from diversification does
not resolve this issue, since being uninformed about an asset makes holding it espe-
cially risky. So these findings do not resolve whether the second possible justification
for the zero holding conjecture—that in a frictionless setting the equilibrium holdings
of the uninformed are small—is valid. If it is, modest market frictions might provide an
alternative rational pathway to nonparticipation and the Merton model’s asset pricing
implications.

We show that even this weakened version of the zero holdings conjecture is invalid:
lack of information is not a reason for very small holdings of an asset (let alone zero
holdings). To understand why, consider the example of Ford Motors more carefully. It
is true that it would be unwise for an uninformed investor to place a bet in Ford in the
hope of profit at the expense of better informed investors. But if the purpose is merely
portfolio rebalancing to achieve optimal risk sharing between different investors, not
speculation, then it seems reasonable that the market would accommodate substantial
trading by the uninformed at low cost. Instead, a reasonable conjecture is that, regard-
less of initial endowments and informational conditions, investors trade to move toward
holding the market portfolio.

This optimal risk-sharing reasoning derives from equilibrium considerations. The
key equilibrium insight is that unless the informed are extremely well informed, they
still face substantial risk from holding the assets they have information about. In conse-
quence, they have a strong incentive to reduce risk by holding less than the aggregate
endowment of each asset, thereby sharing risk with uninformed investors. This is not a
diversification argument; it has nothing to do with investment in other assets. So it goes
beyond the intuition, based on individual optimization, that there is a diversification
benefit to holding many assets.

We show that this risk-sharing intuition is correct, and therefore the weakened zero
holding conjecture is not. In our rational expectations setting, prices are not fully reveal-
ing: some investors have informational superiority over other investors for different se-
curities. Nevertheless, the zero holdings conjecture—even in more ‘moderate’ modified
versions—is invalid.

Instead, the broad insight of the basic model holds up that investors—informed or
otherwise—tend to trade toward the market portfolio to share risk. Specifically, as one
of four portfolio components, investors trade to hold what we call the risk-adjusted mar-
ket portfolio, defined as the endowed market (i.e., the market excluding supply shock)
reweighted to reflect the volatilities of the supply shocks, the average precision of in-
vestors’ private information, and investors’ risk aversion. The other three components
are a contrarian position taken to accommodate shifts in market price; a non-negative
position that reflects the greater safety of stocks about which they are informed; and a
speculative position taken to exploit informational superiority.

In equilibrium, the position taken by an uninformed investor has just two of these
components. First is a position in the risk-adjusted market portfolio, which is taken for
risk sharing reasons. Second, as is standard in models of information and securities markets, is a contrarian position. In addition to the two components that uninformed investors take, informed investors trade to exploit private information, and hold an additional non-negative deterministic position in assets they have information about since this knowledge makes such assets less risky.

All of this is under the assumption that investors share conventional common prior beliefs about fundamental security payoffs prior to the arrival of any private information. However, a possible justification for the zero holdings conjecture might be that this still grants the ‘uninformed’ some knowledge (or perceived knowledge) about assets for which they lack private signals, in the form of informative prior beliefs. We therefore examine a limiting case of the model in which prior beliefs are uninformative. As is standard, an uninformative or diffuse prior can be modeled as the limit of a uniform prior, where the support of the distribution expands to encompass the entire real line.

The findings for this case highlight even more clearly that the zero holdings conjecture is not a useful description of outcomes in rational models of asymmetric information. With diffuse priors, in equilibrium uninformed investors refuse to accommodate noise trades, because the perceived adverse selection associated with doing so is high. Ex ante, any realization of price is equally likely; the risky assets are perceived to be extremely volatile. So the perceived ratio of the variation in asset prices that derives from variation in assets’ expected payoffs conditional on private information signals is very large relative to the variation in asset prices that derives from supply shocks. Hence, the risk sharing benefit to trading as a contrarian to price is dominated by the expected loss to informed investors. In equilibrium uninformed investors hold the risk-adjusted market portfolio, and it is the informed investors who accommodate the shocks. This finding illustrates that even in the extreme case of very ignorant uninformed investors, the outcome is not zero holdings of stocks that they know nothing about; it is zero deviation of holdings from the weights in the risk-adjusted market portfolio.

Intuitively, it is self-confirming for uninformed investors to trade to reach the risk-adjusted market portfolio and for everyone else to foresee and accommodate such trades without price pressure or cost to the uninformed. All investors foresee trading to these positions for risk-sharing reasons; then, incrementally, the informed trade further to absorb the supply shocks (since the informed have sufficient knowledge to absorb those shocks without bearing unduly high risk).

Since the zero holdings conjecture is invalid, even as an approximation, the pricing implications drawn based upon it do not follow. In the rational expectations equilibrium, though investors have asymmetric information and have different asset holdings,

\[ \text{3An uninformed trader accommodates the trades of other investors as reflected in price movements that derive in part from supply shocks. Such shocks are optimally shared among both the informed and uninformed. In trading as contrarians, the uninformed sometimes lose money to the informed, but this is offset by the risk premium benefit of accommodating the supply shock.}\]

\[ \text{4This is somewhat analogous to models of sunshine trading, wherein risk-sharing trades that are pre-announced prior to information arrival can be made without cost since they are known to be uninformative (Admati and Pfleiderer 1991).}\]
there is full participation in all markets. So we show that a version of security market line of the CAPM holds, where the common component of all investors’ holdings, which is independent of any individual investor’s information, is the pricing portfolio.

We now turn to the third possible justification for the zero holdings conjecture, that information costs involve a cost of becoming aware of the existence of a possible investment asset. There are certainly behavioral settings in which lack of awareness can cause nonparticipation, and there is evidence that awareness matters (Guiso and Jappelli 2005).

The notion of unawareness we explore here could be viewed as rational. To illustrate, consider an example. Most U.S. investors have heard of Ford and General Motors, but there are many firms that most investors do not know by name. Furthermore, investors may know almost nothing about the characteristics of such assets (their payoff distributions), nor the exact number of such assets that are available for trading. However, most U.S. investors do know that such assets exist. For example, they have heard of the Dow Jones Industrial Average or the S&P 500 even though they could not name the constituents of these indices nor describe the characteristics of the stocks that they are unfamiliar with.

We therefore interpret ‘unawareness’ as meaning that there are assets that investors do not know about by name, that investors have no idea about the characteristics of these assets, and that investors do not know the number of such assets. However, investors do understand that such assets may exist. To capture the idea that investors know almost nothing about the assets they are unaware of, we assume that investors have diffuse priors about characteristics such as an asset’s mean payoff and volatility. We consider a setting in which investors are otherwise fully rational, and have the opportunity to invest in assets that they are unaware of in this sense via a low-cost index mutual fund or ETF.

It might be viewed as extremely risky for an investor to invest anything in an asset the investor knows nothing about in this sense. Nevertheless, we show that in equilibrium, lack of information about the identity and characteristics of assets does not justify nonparticipation. Investors voluntarily invest in all assets either directly or via a fund that invests in all stocks in an uninformed way, conditioning only on equilibrium prices.

This result follows from a new portfolio separation property. Under what we call portfolio information separation, investors first choose to hold an informationally passive portfolio, and then take an addition position to exploit their own private information; and finally invest the rest of their endowments in the riskfree asset. The position taken to exploit information depends on neither the prior nor the information extracted from...

---

5More severe unawareness than this should probably not be called ‘rational.’ Even an investor who does not know the name and characteristics of every asset should have some prior belief about the existence of such assets. If we rule out radical priors where the investor assesses a probability zero that there are stocks whose details the investor does not already know (i.e., the investor is sure that a certain stock does not exist, yet it actually does exist), then the investor should take into account the possibility of diversification benefits from holding such stocks.
The uninformed investors’ risky assets holdings consist of this informationally passive portfolio, which is just the risk-adjusted market portfolio combined with the position taken to trade as contrarians to market prices. It is therefore optimal for uninformed investors—even if they do not know the names, characteristics, and numbers of certain assets—to hold a fund that invests in the informationally passive portfolio. The uninformed therefore participate non-negligibly in all asset markets.

In summary, none of the three rational justifications for the zero holdings conjecture are valid. Since the zero holdings assumption does not hold even as an approximate description of the behavior of rational uninformed investors, the pricing implications of Merton (1987) also do not follow as an outcome in a market with rational investors—even if modest market frictions are added.

Empirically we do often observe a remarkable lack of participation in many securities and asset classes; our analysis therefore points to a cause other than rational responses to asymmetric information. One possible explanation is that there are severe market frictions, such as illiquidity derived from non-informational sources. Another is that investors are imperfectly rational, and in particular are fearful of stocks that they are less familiar with (see, e.g., models of ambiguity aversion, participation, and pricing (Dow and Werlang (1992), Uppal and Wang (2003), Epstein and Miao (2003), Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005), and Cao et al. (2011))). Alternatively, owing to narrow framing, investors may overestimate the risk of adding a security to their portfolios (Barberis, Huang, and Thaler 2006).

In explicitly modeling the role of information asymmetry in intimidating uninformed investors from trading, our purpose is to clarify the possible sources of non-participation. This is important for at least two reasons. First, a substantial empirical literature has taken evidence of nonparticipation or its consequences as confirming Merton’s information cost conjecture.

Second, the source of nonparticipation matters for the design of policy to promote investor welfare and the efficiency of security markets. If nonparticipation results from information costs, then it can be remedied simply by providing investors with more information at low cost. For example, participation would be improved by regulation requiring additional reporting of accounting information, or more frequent disclosures. If, however, nonparticipation derives from imperfect rationality, then policies would be needed that directly address the psychological constraints and biases of investors. In such settings, providing greater amounts of information to investors could overwhelm

---

6 So this component is like the position taken in a partial equilibrium model where prices are exogenously given, so that no inference is drawn from the price.

7 There are other problems with the idea that small transactions cost might justify a risk premium for nonparticipation by uninformed investors. Transactions costs imply risk premia for nonparticipation even if information is symmetric (Mayshar 1979, Hirshleifer 1988). So once we appeal to fixed transaction costs, it is not obvious why the information cost part of the story is needed.
their limited attention, so that the intervention could make nonparticipation more severe.

Another important strand of research examines the relation between information asymmetry and risk premia even when all investors participate in the capital market. In an influential paper, Easley and O’Hara (2004) argue that information asymmetry creates something called information risk, which, in equilibrium, induces a risk premium. Specifically, suppose that in some cases the preponderance of information signals in the market for an asset are received publicly, and in other cases privately. In the model of Easley and O’Hara (2004), the asset with more private information receives higher expected returns.

Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2007) extend Easley and O’Hara (2004) to a factor setting to study the relation between information asymmetry to expected returns when there are multiple assets and investor signals. They conclude that owing to diversification benefits, if private signals only pertain to idiosyncratic shocks, or are simply assets’ payoffs plus noise, then information asymmetry does not affect risk premia, whereas if private signals are informative about factors, holding constant the total amount of information received by informed investors, greater information asymmetry implies higher factor risk premia.

In setting with a single risky asset, Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2012) find that with perfect competition, the asset’s expected return is determined by the average precision of investors’ information conditional upon prices. They conclude that information asymmetry does not affect expected return.

In all these papers, informed investors observe the same information, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Easley and O’Hara (2004). In consequence, in these models any comparative statics shifts that increase information asymmetry also increases the volatility of cash flows conditional upon price, i.e., the conventional risk that uninformed investors face from investing in the relevant assets. So these models do not lend themselves to disentangling any possible effects of information asymmetry as contrasted with risk as conventionally defined in models with symmetric information. So not only does existing literature offer mixed conclusions about whether we should observe a premium for information risk, the literature does not make clear what the meaning of such a risk premium as distinct from the premia implied by a conventional risk measures. Nevertheless, several papers argue in support of the information risk construct, and there has been extensive empirical testing of the prediction that there is a premium for information risk.

To evaluate this issue, we perform a comparative statics to vary information asymmetry while holding constant both unconditional and conditional uncertainty. In this comparative statics, we increase the fractions of the informed investors who have the maximal information set (information about all assets) and the minimal information set (information about no assets) by decreasing the fraction who have intermediate amounts

---

of information (information about a subset of assets). This unambiguously increases information asymmetry. Risk premia do not change, so this is a counterexample to the general notion that an increase in information asymmetry increases risk premia.

Intuitively, the average private information precision does not change, because of the offsetting changes in the information possessed by different investors. Uninformed investors do not demand higher risk premium because the uncertainties they are facing (conditional on the equilibrium price) are same as before. So the risk premium estimated based on publicly available information is unchanged. This illustrates that information asymmetry per se does not induce risk premia; it is changes in conventional risk that count.

This comparative statics varies information asymmetry at the portfolio level, in the sense that we make investors more informed by giving them information about a greater number of assets, and make them less informed by giving them information about fewer assets. It is also interesting to examine what happens when the information asymmetry of an individual asset changes, which allows us to vary an information asymmetry proxy that has received greater attention in the empirical literature the probability of information-based trading (PIN). This measure of information asymmetry was introduced by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002).

So in our second comparative static analysis, corresponding to PIN, we define the information asymmetry proxy in any asset’s market as the measure of investors who have private information about such an asset. In varying the number of informed traders about a stock, in general we cannot avoid simultaneously varying the amount of conventional risk (conditional volatility). We therefore refer to varying the information asymmetry proxy rather than just varying information asymmetry.

We consider a shift in the composition of investors that increases the number of informed traders in one asset and decreases the mass of informed investors in another asset. We find that the risk premia are decreasing in the information asymmetry proxy. This is the opposite of the prediction of a positive risk premium for information risk.

Intuitively, when informed trading increases for a given asset, the information uninformed investors extract from equilibrium prices increases. So conditional on equilibrium prices, uninformed investors face less uncertainty about the asset with a greater fraction of informed traders, and hence demand a lower risk premium. These conclusions may help resolve some of the differing empirical conclusions from the literature on ‘information risk’ (or what we would call information asymmetry). More importantly, they clarify that the concept of a risk premium for information asymmetry—as contrasted with conventional measures of consumption risk—is not helpful.

---

9 So this effect does not derive from information asymmetry per se, it derives from the use of a proxy for information asymmetry, PIN, which does not hold constant the total amount of uncertainty faced by uninformed investors.
2 A Model with Asymmetric Information

There are two dates, date 0 and date 1. There is a continuum of investors with measure one, who are indexed by $i$ and uniformly distributed over $[0, 1]$. All investors trade at date 0 and consume at date 1. Any investor $i$ invests in a riskfree asset and $N$ risky assets. The riskfree asset pays $r$ units, and risky asset $n$ pays $F_n$ units of the single consumption good. Taking the riskfree asset to be the numeraire, let $P$ be the price vector of the risky assets and $D_i$ be the vector of shares of the risky assets held by investor $i$. Let $W_i = (w_{i1}, w_{i2}, \ldots, w_{iN})'$ be the endowed shareholdings of investor $i$, and let $W = \int_0^1 W_i di > 0$ be the aggregate endowments of shares in the capital market. So any investor $i$’s final wealth at Date 1 is

$$\Pi_i = r(W_i' - D_i')P + D_i'F,$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where $F = (F_1, F_2, \ldots, F_N)'$. The first term in (1) is the return of investor $i$’s investment in the riskfree asset, and the second term is the total return from her investments in risky assets. Each investor $i$’s expected utility of consumption at date 0 is

$$\mathbb{E}_i u(\Pi_i) = \mathbb{E}_i \left[ -\exp\left( -\frac{\Pi_i}{\rho} \right) \right].$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

The expectation operator, $\mathbb{E}_i$, is based on investor $i$’s information. The parameter $\rho$ is the common risk tolerance coefficient.

We assume $F$ is normally distributed. Let $\bar{F}$ be the mean vector of $F$, and let $V$ be the variance-covariance matrix of $F$. So $\bar{F}$ and $V$ summarize the prior information of $F$. For now, we assume that $V$ exists, and thus $\bar{F}$ is well-defined. Besides the prior information, any investor $i$’s information consists of the equilibrium price vector and the realization of a private information signal $S_i$, which is correlated with $F$. In particular, $S_i = F + \epsilon_i$, where $F$ and $\epsilon_i$ are independent; and $\epsilon_i$ and $\epsilon_j$ are also independent. Each $\epsilon_i$ is normally distributed, with mean zero and precision matrix $\Omega_i^{-1}$. As is standard, the independence of the errors implies that in the economy as a whole signal errors will average out, so that the equilibrium pricing function does not depend on the error realizations (though it does depend on their distribution).

Without loss of generality, we assume that risky assets are divided into two groups, $\Gamma_1$ and $\Gamma_2$, where $\Gamma_1 = \{1, 2, \ldots, \bar{N}\}$ and $\Gamma_2 = \{\bar{N} + 1, \bar{N} + 2, \ldots, N\}$. The purpose of having two groups of assets is to allow for diversity of information among investors who receive information about different groups. For simplicity, we assume that all asset payoffs are independent; allowing correlation of asset payoffs within each group does not change the main results; what matters is assume that the payoff of any asset $\ell$ in $\Gamma_1$ be independent of that of any asset $m$ in $\Gamma_2$. With regard to zero cross-group correlation, assets in $\Gamma_1$ could be viewed as stocks traded in the US market and assets in $\Gamma_2$ as stocks traded in a European market. Owing to the independence assumption prevents investors who have private information about one asset group from making any inferences about assets in another asset group.
We divide investors into four groups. Group $n \in \{1, 2, 12, \emptyset\}$ has $\lambda_n \in (0, 1)$ measure of investors, where $\sum_n \lambda_n = 1$. The most important assumption in this model is that investors in different groups have different private information signals. We assume Group 1 investors possess some information about assets in $\Gamma_1$, and Group 2 investors receive private signals about assets in $\Gamma_2$; Group 12 investors have private information about all assets, while Group $\emptyset$ investors have no private information about any assets. The structure of private information in this model is summarized in Table 1 below.

|         | Group 1 | Group 2 | Group 12 | Group $\emptyset$
|---------|---------|---------|----------|-------------------
| $\Omega_i^{-1}$ | $\Sigma_1^{-1}$ | $0$ | $0$ | $\Sigma_1^{-1}$ | $0$
|         | $0$ | $\Sigma_2^{-1}$ | $0$ | $\Sigma_2^{-1}$ | $0$
|         | $0$ | $0$ | $\Sigma_2^{-1}$ | $0$

Table 1: Private information

Here, $\Sigma_1^{-1}$ is an $\bar{N} \times \bar{N}$ matrix, and $\Sigma_2^{-1}$ is an $(N - \bar{N}) \times (N - \bar{N})$ matrix. $\Sigma_j^{-1}$ is the precision matrix of one investor’s private information about assets in $\Gamma_j$ if she is informed about assets in $\Gamma_j$. Since both $\Sigma_1$ and $\Sigma_2$ are covariance matrices, and all assets are independent, $\Sigma_1$ and $\Sigma_2$ are both diagonal and positive definite. Therefore, both $\Sigma_1^{-1}$ and $\Sigma_2^{-1}$ are positive definite and symmetric. For example, if the groups correspond to US versus European stock markets, Group 1 is US investors; Group 2 is European investors; Group 12 is international investors who are investing in and do private researches about stocks in these two markets; Group $\emptyset$ is investors who have private information about neither US stocks nor European stocks. We define the average precision matrix

$$
\Sigma^{-1} = \int_0^1 \Omega_i^{-1} di = \begin{bmatrix}
(\lambda_1 + \lambda_{12})\Sigma_1^{-1} & 0 \\
0 & (\lambda_2 + \lambda_{12})\Sigma_2^{-1}
\end{bmatrix}.
$$

(3)

If we randomly draw one investor from the population, the expected precision matrix of her private information is $\Sigma^{-1}$. Since all $\lambda$’s are strictly positive, $\Sigma^{-1}$ is also invertible (with the inverse matrix $\Sigma$) and symmetric. We assume that Group 1 investors and Group 12 investors have the same signal precisions about assets in $\Gamma_1$, and Group 2 investors and Group 12 investors have the same precision of signals about assets in $\Gamma_2$. This assumption is purely for simplicity and does not affect results.

Finally, we assume that there are random supplies of all assets to prevent the asset prices from perfectly revealing $F$. Denote the random supply of the risky assets by $Z$. We assume that $Z$ is independent of $F$ and of $\epsilon_i$ (for all $i \in \{0, 1\}$). We further assume that $Z$ is normally distributed with mean 0 and covariance matrix $U$. We assume independence of assets, so $U$ is diagonal and positive definite.

We are interested in a linear rational expectations equilibrium as defined in Definition 1.

**Definition 1 (Rational Expectations Equilibrium)** A pricing vector $P^*$ and a profile of all investors’ risky assets holdings $\{D_i^*\}_{i \in \{0, 1\}}$ constitute a rational expectations equilibrium, if
1. Given $P^*, D^*_i \in \arg \max \mathbb{E}_i u(\Pi_i)$ for all $i \in [0, 1]$; and

2. $P^*$ clears the market, that is,
   \[ \int_{i=0}^{1} D^*_i di = W + Z, \text{ for any realizations of } F \text{ and } Z. \] (4)

2.1 Equilibrium Characterization

As is standard in the literature of rational expectations equilibrium, we consider the linear pricing function
   \[ F = A + BP + CZ, \text{ with } C \text{ nonsingular.} \] (5)

If and only if $B$ is nonsingular, Equation (5) can be rearranged to
   \[ P = -B^{-1}A + B^{-1}F - B^{-1}CZ, \] (6)

which is the “real” pricing function. Recall that $S_i = F + \epsilon_i$, so conditional on $F$, $P$ and $S_i$ are independent. Therefore, we can make inferences one by one.

Let’s first consider investor $i$’s belief about $F$ conditional on $P$. Conditional on $P$, $F$ is normally distributed with mean $A + BP$ and precision $[CUC']^{-1}$. On the other hand, conditional on $S_i$, investor $i$’s belief about $F$ is also normally distributed, with mean $S_i$ and precision $\Omega_i^{-1}$. Therefore, investor $i$’s belief about $F$ conditional on what the investor observes, $P$ and $S_i$, is also normally distributed. The mean of the conditional distribution of $F$ is the weighted average of the expectation conditional on the price $P$, the expectation conditional on investor $i$’s private signal $S_i$, and the prior mean $\bar{F}$.

Therefore, the conditional mean of $F$ is
   \[ \left( [CUC']^{-1} + \Omega_i^{-1} + V^{-1} \right)^{-1} \left[ (CUC')^{-1} (A + BP) + \Omega_i^{-1} S_i + V^{-1} \bar{F} \right]. \] (7)

The precision of the conditional distribution of $F$ is
   \[ (CUC')^{-1} + \Omega_i^{-1} + V^{-1}. \] (8)

Here $\Omega_i^{-1}$ is the precision of investor $i$’s private signal. Since some investors are uninformed, the signal noise matrix $\Omega_i$ is only well-defined for Group 12 investors.

Then, from any investor $i$’s first order condition, investor $i$’s demand is
\[
D_i = \rho \left( [CUC']^{-1} + \Omega_i^{-1} + V^{-1} \right)
\times \left\{ \left( [CUC']^{-1} + \Omega_i^{-1} + V^{-1} \right)^{-1} \left[ (CUC')^{-1} (A + BP) + \Omega_i^{-1} S_i + V^{-1} \bar{F} \right] - rP \right\}
\]
\[
= \rho \left\{ \left( [CUC']^{-1} (A + BP) + \Omega_i^{-1} S_i + V^{-1} \bar{F} \right) - \left( [CUC']^{-1} + \Omega_i^{-1} + V^{-1} \right) rP \right\}
\]
\[
= \rho \left\{ (CUC')^{-1} (B - rI) - r\Omega_i^{-1} - rV^{-1} \right\} P
\]
\[
+ \rho \Omega_i^{-1} S_i + \rho [ (CUC')^{-1} A + V^{-1} \bar{F} ].
\] (9)
Substituting Equation (9) in to the market clearing condition (4), we can solve the pricing function, which in a rational expectations equilibrium should be same as that in Equation (6), for any realizations of \( F \) and \( Z \). Therefore, by matching all the coefficients, we can solve all coefficients and characterize the linear rational expectations equilibrium in Proposition 1 below.

**Proposition 1 (Equilibrium with Supply Shocks)** In the model with supply shocks, there exists an equilibrium with pricing function

\[
P = B^{-1} [F - A - CZ],
\]

where

\[
A = \left[ \rho^2 (\Sigma U \Sigma)^{-1} + \Sigma^{-1} \right]^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{\rho} W - V^{-1} \bar{F} \right)
\]

\[
B = rI + r \left[ \rho^2 (\Sigma U \Sigma)^{-1} + \Sigma^{-1} \right]^{-1} V^{-1}
\]

\[
C = \frac{1}{\rho} \Sigma = \frac{1}{\rho} \left[ \begin{array}{cc}
\frac{1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_{12}} \Sigma_{11} & 0 \\
0 & \frac{1}{\lambda_2 + \lambda_{12}} \Sigma_{22}
\end{array} \right].
\]

Any investor \( i \)'s risky asset holding is

\[
D_i = \left( I + \frac{1}{\rho^2} U \Sigma \right)^{-1} W + \rho \left[ I + \rho^2 (U \Sigma)^{-1} \right]^{-1} V^{-1} (\bar{F} - rP) + \rho \Omega_i^{-1} (S_i - rP)
\]

\[
= \left( I + \frac{1}{\rho^2} U \Sigma \right)^{-1} W + \rho \left[ I + \rho^2 (U \Sigma)^{-1} \right]^{-1} V^{-1} (F - rP)
\]

\[
+ \rho \Omega_i^{-1} G + \rho \Omega_i^{-1} (S_i - rP - G),
\]

where

\[
G = \left[ I - rB^{-1} \right] \bar{F} + rB^{-1} A
\]

is the ex-ante mean of \( S_i - rP \) for any \( i \).

### 3 Risky Asset Holdings and Asset Pricing Implications

#### 3.1 Full Market Participation

Proposition 1 has interesting implications for investors’ portfolio choices and asset pricing. We now analyze individual investors’ risky asset holdings.

Owing to supply shocks, asset prices are not fully revealing, so information asymmetry persists in equilibrium and different investors have different asset holdings. Even investors from the same group have different holdings, as they receive different signals.
This raises the possibility that some investors may not participate in the market for certain assets owing to a lack of private information, or may have such small holdings that perturbing the model to include modest frictions would result in nonparticipation. Alternatively, investors may refrain from holding certain assets because they may not know those assets by name or their associated characteristics. These possibilities would be consistent with the zero holdings conjecture of Merton (1987).

However, examination of individual investors’ risky asset holdings (equation (14)) provides very different conclusions. From equation (14), any individual investor’s asset holding is the sum of four components. The first term in equation (14),

$$\left( I + \frac{1}{\rho^2} UI\Sigma \right)^{-1} W,$$

is the risk-adjusted market portfolio, which is deterministic. This portfolio is highly correlated with, but differs from, the ex-ante endowed market portfolio $W$, because it is also influenced by the informativeness of the equilibrium price. Investors take the informativeness of asset prices into account when trading to share risks. When the random supply shock to an asset becomes more volatile, or on average investors’ private information of such an asset is less precise, the equilibrium price contains less precise information about this asset. This increases risk, which, other things equal, reduces investor holdings of this asset.$^{10}$

The second component of any investor’s risky asset holding, the second term in (14), is the contrarian position, which is taken in opposition to fluctuations in the market price. Since informed investors are not perfectly informed, it is very risky for them to hold the entire supply shock. Hence, for risk sharing reasons, uninformed investors trade as contrarians to price, helping to absorb these shocks. Although sometimes they lose money to investors with superior information, they are compensated by the risk premium benefit of accommodating supply shocks. Prior information is an important determinant of this second component. In particular, how contrarian they are depends on the ex-ante mean of the assets’ returns and on how risky the assets are.

The third component of any investor’s risky asset holding, the third term in (14), is what we call the knowledge safety position (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2009; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2010; Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp 2014; Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp 2015). This position, $\rho \Omega_i^{-1} G$, consists of extra holdings in the securities about which the investor has information, because possessing an information signal about an asset reduces its conditional volatility (independent of the signal realization). This portfolio component is deterministic and is the same for all investors who are in the same group.

The fourth component of an investor’s risky asset holding, the fourth term in (14), is the speculative position, which is taken to exploit superior information. This term,

$^{10}$In this respect private information can make investing safer for uninformed investors, an effect which is dissonant with the idea that the presence of informed investors makes investing riskier for the uninformed.
\( \rho \Omega^{-1}_i(S_i - rP - G) \), has mean zero, since this information could be either favorable or unfavorable. Different investors, even if they are in the same group, hold different speculative portfolios, because they receive heterogeneous private signals.

A critical feature of the first two components of investors’ risky asset holdings is that they are both independent of any investor’s private information. Any investor includes these two components as part of the investor’s asset holding, regardless of whether the investor is a member of Group 12—investors who have the most superior private information, or Group \( \varnothing \)—investors who have no private information. As a result, information asymmetry does not cause investors with informational disadvantage to have zero holdings.

**Corollary 1 (Market Participation)** *In the model with random supply shocks and heterogeneous risky assets endowments, if the ex-ante endowments of risky assets are positive, all investors include a common portfolio in their risky asset holdings, which is on average strictly positive. Therefore, even investors who are at an informational disadvantage participate in the market.*

We call the common portfolio, which is the sum of the risk-adjusted market portfolio and the contrarian trading portfolio, the *informationally passive portfolio*, because it can be formed by an investor based only on equilibrium prices without any private information. Since Group \( \varnothing \) investors do not have any private information (their \( \Omega^{-1} = 0 \)) and can get information through the equilibrium prices only, their risky asset holdings are exactly the informationally passive portfolio.

Since this portfolio includes the risk-adjusted market portfolio, which has strictly positive holdings of all assets and is a risk-modified version of the market, there is no presumption that asset holdings should be close to zero even in assets the investor has no information about, and even as an approximation. So this finding lends no support to the zero holdings conjecture even as an approximation or as something that would hold if moderate transactions costs were introduced.

Of course, in realization investors will occasionally hold low or negative holdings of assets. But this does not justify the zero holdings conjecture, which is about investors holding none of certain assets on a continuing basis (which in our static model, would mean on average) owing to lack of information.

All other investors possess some private information. The third term and the fourth term in equation (14), the knowledge safety and speculative components, sum to a portfolio \( \rho \Omega^{-1}_i(S_i - rP) \). To form such a portfolio, investor \( i \) neither extracts information from the price nor uses prior beliefs. The investor only uses private information, so we call it investor \( i \)’s *information-based portfolio*. Obviously, if the \( k \)th diagonal element of \( \Omega^{-1}_i \) is 0, the \( k \)th element of the vector \( \rho \Omega^{-1}_i(S_i - rP) \) is also 0, implying that if investor \( i \) does not have private information about asset \( k \), then \( i \) does not trade asset \( k \) beyond holding the informationally passive portfolio. This argument is summarized in Corollary 2 below.
Corollary 2 (Information-Based Trading) Investors trade assets beyond the informationally passive portfolio for further reducing risks and for speculation if and only if they have private information about those assets.

Merton (1987) assumes that if investors do not have information about some assets, they will have zero holdings of those assets, because they are afraid of losing money to investors who have superior information. However, as shown in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, the zero holdings conjecture does not hold in an explicit model of information and securities trading even as an approximation. Uninformed investors trade to share risks, even though they understand that they are at a position of information disadvantage. Informational disadvantage does deter investors from including assets in the information-based portfolio. So the effect of informational disadvantage in a set of assets is zero deviation from the informationally passive portfolio rather than zero holdings of these assets.

We next derive a new portfolio separation theorem, which will turn out to be important for understanding investors’ behavior when they are unaware of certain assets, as analyzed in Subsection 3.2.

Proposition 2 (Portfolio Information Separation Theorem) In the model where all assets’ characteristics are common knowledge, equilibrium asset portfolios have three components: an informationally passive portfolio based only upon equilibrium prices; an information-based portfolio based upon private information and equilibrium prices; and the riskfree asset.

The informationally passive portfolio is just the portfolio consisting of the risk-adjusted market portfolio and the contrarian portfolio as characterized in Proposition 1. The information-based portfolio combines the speculative portfolio and the knowledge safety portfolio as characterized in Proposition 1.

Uninformative Priors about Payoffs

The analysis above was under the assumption that investors share a common prior belief that is well-defined. An informative prior implicitly grants the investor some information about the payoffs of all assets. Hence, a possible defense for the zero holdings conjecture might be that investors participate because even the uninformed do not see themselves as completely ignorant—they possess knowledge (or at least, opinions) in the form of informative prior beliefs. This raises the question of whether the conclusion of Corollary 1 would hold with uninformative priors.

To address this issue, we next examine uninformative priors. In other words, we consider a limiting case of the model in which investors have uniform diffuse beliefs about all risky assets, i.e., \( V^{-1} = 0 \) and thus \( \bar{F} \) is not well-defined. So there is no information embedded within investors’ priors about risky assets’ returns. Because all steps to solve the model are continuous in \( V^{-1} \), Corollary 3 below shows that the zero holdings conjecture is still incorrect in this setting.
Corollary 3 (Holdings under Uniform Diffuse Prior) In the limiting case in which investors hold uniform diffuse prior beliefs, investors’ portfolios contain three components:

1. The risk-adjusted market portfolio, which is held for risk sharing;
2. The knowledge safety portfolio component; and
3. The speculative component.

The last two components place nonzero weight on an asset if and only if the investor has private information about the asset.

In contrast to the case with conventional priors, with a uniform diffuse prior belief, investors do not trade as contrarians to the market price; the second term in equation (14) vanishes. This is because the adverse selection problem is extremely severe for an uninformed investor with a diffuse prior. From equation (27), the prior variance of the equilibrium price is extremely high, because the variance of risky assets’ returns are extremely high. Consequently, given that the variance of random supply shocks is finite and well-defined, an increase in the price is inferred to be the result almost entirely of higher realized assets’ payoffs. Hence, for uninformed investors, the expected return from trading as a contrarian is zero, and taking such a position is risky. Therefore, uninformed investors do not trade as contrarians to price.

3.2 Investor Unawareness

We now analyze the third possible justification for the zero holding conjecture of Merton (1987): that investors are not even aware of certain assets by name or by their specific characteristics. For example, if an investor has never heard of FLIR Systems (an S&P 500 firm), does not know the market of its stock or its price, it seems natural for the investor not to participate in this market. A possible counterargument that we explore is that in equilibrium even investors who are ‘unaware’ in this sense may invest in an informationally passive low-cost mutual fund or ETF, in order to acquire a share of the risk even of securities they know nothing about. In this account, they are in equilibrium offered an adequate price by better-informed investors to bear this risk.

A possible objection to this argument is that in general, even if an investor understands that assets exist that are unknown to the investor, and that a fund can be operated cheaply, different investors might need different funds to implement their optimal portfolios. The portfolio constructed by the fund may not meet all investors’ needs, because investors are aware of different sets of assets and have heterogeneous information about the assets they are aware of. Moreover, without knowledge of the portfolio the fund provides, investors cannot assess the expected return and the risk of buying the fund, so holding the fund could be extremely risky. Consequently, according to this argument, investors may optimally choose not to buy the fund and thus not participate in the markets of stocks of which they are unaware. Such ‘unawareness’ may also affect
how an investor uses private information to trade the assets about which the investor does have private information.\footnote{In a standard rational expectations equilibrium, investors make use of all assets’ characteristics and prices to extract information about any particular asset’s payoff from its equilibrium price.}

Nevertheless, we can tractably analyze the effect of investors’ unawareness of a subset of assets in the sense considered here—namely, that investors lack knowledge about the specific names and characteristics of certain assets, and the number of such assets, but know about the existence of such assets.

Formally, we first assume $\lambda_{12} = 0$, so all investors are unaware of some risky assets. We also assume that investors hold diffuse prior beliefs about assets’ payoffs, so with full awareness, the common component of investors’ asset holdings is the risk-adjusted market portfolio only.

Let’s take any investor $i$ in Group 1 for an instance. Investor $i$ is aware of the set of assets $\Gamma_1$: she knows that the number of assets is $\bar{N}$, that the vector of total endowments is $W_1$, that the precision of her private information is $\Sigma^{-1}_1$, that the average precision of investors’ private information is $\lambda_1 \Sigma^{-1}_1$, and that the random supplies have the variance $U_1$. Investor $i$ in Group 1 can also observe the prices of all assets in $\Gamma_1$.

However, investor $i$ in Group 1 knows that there exists a set of assets, namely $\Gamma_2$, which she is unaware of. Investor $i$ believes that the number of assets in $\Gamma_2$ is $1, 2, 3, \ldots$ with equal probability. For each asset $j \in \Gamma_2$, investor $i$ holds uniform diffuse prior beliefs (with the support $\mathbb{R}^{++}$ for each) about its total endowment, the average precision of investors’ private information about it, and the variance of its random supply shock. Investor $i$ cannot observe asset $j$’s price either.

Investors in Group 2 are aware of assets in $\Gamma_2$ but unaware of assets in $\Gamma_1$, and investors in Group $\emptyset$ are unaware of any asset in $\Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2$, as defined similarly. We further assume that all investors are aware of the riskfree asset, and that there is a fund that invests in the risky assets. Investors know of the existence and name of the fund and are aware of its price, but are unaware of (have diffuse priors about) its return characteristics. So an investor who is unaware of some assets may potentially have very poor information about the distribution of returns on this fund.

The fund management observes the characteristics and prices of all assets and therefore is able to offer the risk-adjusted market portfolio to investors as specified in the setting with full awareness (in which asset characteristics are common knowledge). It is common knowledge that this is the portfolio offered by the fund.

We propose an equilibrium in which all investors, regardless of their information sets, buy the fund, and in which informed investors combine this with additional information-based portfolio. We now show that in this setting, investors hold all assets, either directly or via the fund.

**Proposition 3 (Participation under Unawareness)** When investors have diffuse priors about the characteristics of different subsets of assets (including the variances of random supply shocks and prices), and there is a low-cost mutual fund or ETF that provides the informationally passive
portfolio, there is an equilibrium in which asset prices and investors’ risky assets holdings are identical to those in the model with full awareness.

From the information separation theorem, the portfolios described in Proposition 3 are implementable. Specifically, if a fund company wants to provide investors with the informationally passive portfolio, it does not need to know the private information of any investor. For investors, buying the fund’s shares is the same as holding the informationally passive portfolio, the first component described by the information separation theorem. Therefore, intuitively, all investors are satisfied to buy the fund’s shares, even if they do not know how many assets there are and do not know exactly what the portfolio the fund provides. So all investors participate in the markets of all risky assets, in contrast with the unawareness interpretation of the zero holdings conjecture of Merton (1987).

In addition, investors do not even need to know the number of assets traded in the market when forming their information-based trading portfolios. Consider Group 1 investors as an example. For any given \( N \geq \bar{N} \), except the \( \bar{N} \times \bar{N} \) block \( \Sigma_1^{-1} \), all other blocks in the \( N \times N \) matrix \( \Omega_1^{-1} \) are 0. So lack of knowledge about the number \( N \) does not affect investors’ information-based trading.

Despite the potentially extremely high risk to an investor of investing in an asset the investor is unaware of, and of investing in the fund, Proposition 3 shows that investors, directly or indirectly, hold identical portfolios to what they hold in the setting with full awareness; and market prices are identical in the two settings.

To see this, conjecture a strategy profile in which all investors buy the fund, and then, if they possess private information, hold their information-based portfolio and the risk-free asset according to the information portfolio separation theorem. We further conjecture that market prices are identical to those in the setting with full awareness. To verify that this strategy profile and pricing function is an equilibrium, we analyze any investor \( i \)’s optimal portfolio choice, given that all other investors behave as described in the strategy profile.

Investors can reason based on all possible worlds they might face. Let’s again take an investor \( i \) from Group 1 as an example, and the arguments for Group 2 investors and Group \( \emptyset \) investors are similar. Investor \( i \) is aware of assets in \( \Gamma_1 \) and knows that there exists a set of assets \( \Gamma_2 \). Investor \( i \) can form a possible world by first constructing a possible set of assets \( \Gamma_2 \): the number of assets (\( \bar{N} \)), an \( \bar{N} \) dimension vector of the total endowments that is strictly positive (\( W_2 \)), the average precision of investors’ private information (\( \lambda_2 \Sigma_2^{-1} \)), and the variance matrix of random supplies (\( U_2 \)). She then completes a hypothetical world by combining the characteristics about assets in \( \Gamma_1 \) that she knows and the characteristics about assets in \( \Gamma_2 \) that she hypothesizes.

Investor \( i \) knows that in the hypothesized world, the fund provides the risk-adjusted market portfolio, and all investors buy the fund and hold their information-based portfolio and the risk-free asset according to the portfolio information separation in the quantities specified in Proposition 1. Then, aggregating all other investors’ demands, investor

17
i can derive the pricing function from the market clearing condition. Such a pricing function must be same as the equilibrium pricing function with full awareness in investor i’s hypothetical world, because the market clearing conditions are same. This implies that investor i extracts information from any realized price vector in exactly the same way that i extracts information in a setting with full awareness, and i’s optimal risky asset holding in the hypothetical world is exactly the one characterized in Equation (14). Then, the information portfolio separation theorem implies that investor i will also buy the fund.

This argument holds for any possible world. So if all other investors buy the fund and hold their information-based portfolio and the riskfree asset according to the information portfolio separation theorem, then it is optimal for any individual investor to do so. Therefore, the strategy profile we propose is an equilibrium.

3.3 CAPM Pricing with Supply Shocks

Returning to the basic setting with full awareness, with random supply shocks, asset prices in equilibrium are not perfectly revealing. Consequently, in equilibrium there are information asymmetries among investors, and therefore investors have different risky asset holdings. So our setting is very different from the CAPM setting, which assumes identical beliefs and has the implication that all investors hold the same portfolio. Since holding the market is equivalent to the CAPM pricing relation, it seems intuitive that in our setting the CAPM pricing relationship would fail. Formally, the CAPM Security Market Line relation can be represented by

$$R - r = \alpha + \beta (R_M - r),$$

(16)

where $R$ is the $n \times 1$ vector of assets’ gross rates of returns, $R_M$ is the market portfolio’s gross rate of return, and $\alpha$ is the $n \times 1$ vector of extra expected returns in deviation from the CAPM. Because of the information asymmetry and investors’ heterogeneous asset holdings in the equilibrium, it is natural to conjecture that $\alpha$ in equation (16) is not equal to zero.

Surprisingly, in the case of diffuse uniform prior beliefs, even with information asymmetry, the $\alpha$ in equation (16) is equal to zero, so that a version of CAPM pricing holds. This shows that the pricing predictions of the Merton model do not apply to a setting in which information asymmetry is explicitly modeled, which should not be surprising since there is full participation in our model.

From Corollary 3, we know that all investors in this case hold the risk-adjusted market portfolio as a common component of their holdings. Therefore, it is natural to consider the risk-adjusted market portfolio, $M$, as a candidate for CAPM pricing, defined as

$$M = \left( I + \frac{1}{p^2} U \Sigma \right)^{-1} W.$$

(17)
From equation \((27)\), the equilibrium pricing function is
\[
P = \frac{1}{r} \left[ F - A - \frac{1}{\rho} \Sigma Z \right], \tag{18}
\]
where \(A = \rho^2 (\Sigma U \Sigma)^{-1} + \Sigma^{-1} - \frac{1}{\rho} W\).

Given any realized equilibrium price \(P\), the volatility of asset payoffs derives from the random supply shock only. Let \(\text{diag}(P)\) be an \(N \times N\) diagonal matrix, whose off-diagonal elements are all zero and whose \(k\)th diagonal element is just the \(k\)th element of the vector \(P\). Generically, as no asset has a zero price, \(\text{diag}(P)\) is invertible. Then, by the definition of \(\text{diag}(P)\),
\[
\text{diag}(P)^{-1} P = 1. \tag{19}
\]
From the equilibrium pricing (equation \((18)\)), we have
\[
\text{diag}(P)^{-1} E(F) - r \mathbb{1} = \text{diag}(P)^{-1} A. \tag{20}
\]
The LHS of equation \((20)\) is just the vector of the risky assets’ equilibrium risk premia.

Given a realized equilibrium price, the risk-adjusted market portfolio \(M\) has value \(P'M\). Then the vector of the weights of risky assets in the risk-adjusted market portfolio is
\[
\omega = \frac{1}{P'M} \text{diag}(P) M.
\]
Hence, conditional on the price \(P\), the difference between the risk-adjusted market portfolio’s expected rate of return and the riskfree asset’s rate of return is
\[
E(R_M) - r = \omega' \text{diag}(P)^{-1} E(F) - r
= \frac{1}{P'M} M' \text{diag}(P) \text{diag}(P)^{-1} (A + r P) - r
= \frac{1}{P'M} M' A, \tag{21}
\]
where the expectations are all conditional on the equilibrium price.

The variance of the risk-adjusted market portfolio is
\[
\mathbb{V}(R_M) = E \left[ \left( \omega' \text{diag}(P)^{-1} C Z \right) \left( \omega' \text{diag}(P)^{-1} C Z \right)' \right] = \left( \frac{1}{P'M} \right)^2 M' C U C M, \tag{22}
\]
and the covariance between all risky assets and the risk-adjusted market portfolio is
\[
\text{Cov}(R, R_M) = \frac{1}{P'M} \text{diag}(P)^{-1} C U C M. \tag{23}
\]
Let \(\alpha\) be the CAPM alpha. From equations \((20)-(23)\), and since \(M = \rho (C U C)^{-1} A\), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (No Extra Risk Premia with Supply Shocks) In the model with random supply shocks and a uniform diffuse prior belief, assets do not have extra risk premia beyond those predicted by the CAPM where the relevant market portfolio for pricing is the risk-adjusted market portfolio. So even with information asymmetry, in equilibrium, the $\alpha$ with respect to the risk-adjusted market portfolio is zero.

This result may seem surprising, since investors have heterogeneous asset holdings, and since the portfolios held by informed investors are not mean-variance efficient with respect to the public information set. Nevertheless, $\alpha = 0$ independent of the information asymmetry. In equilibrium, there are no extra risk premia incremental to those predicted by the CAPM using the risk-adjusted market.

Saying that the CAPM pricing relation holds is equivalent to asserting that the risk-adjusted market portfolio is mean-variance efficient conditional on the assets’ prices only. This efficiency can be seen from Group $\emptyset$ investors’ utility maximization problem. Group $\emptyset$ investors balance the expected returns and the risks of their holdings, and their information consists of the equilibrium price only. In equilibrium, Group $\emptyset$ investors all hold the risk-adjusted market portfolio, implying that the risk-adjusted market portfolio is mean-variance efficient conditional on the equilibrium price only.

Privately informed investors also hold the risk-adjusted market portfolio as a component of their portfolios; this is the piece that does not depend upon their private signals (except to the extent that their signals are incorporated into the publicly observable market price). In addition they have other asset holdings taking advantage of the greater safety of assets they have more information about, and for speculative reasons based upon their private information. The risk-adjusted market portfolio is not mean-variance efficient with respect to their private information sets, but it is efficient with respect to the information set that contains only publicly available information.

Proposition 4 contrasts with the pricing implications of Merton (1987). In Merton (1987), owing to information costs, investors are assumed not to trade assets they don’t have private information; then, since some investors do not trade some assets, these assets may have extra risk premia incremental to those predicted by the CAPM. In our model, in equilibrium, there are still information asymmetries among investors, and thus they have different information-based trades. However, all investors hold the risk-adjusted market portfolio for risk sharing purposes, which is mean-variance efficient conditional on equilibrium asset prices only. Hence, assets do not have extra risk premia beyond those predicted by the CAPM.

Our focus on uniform diffuse priors provides a very simple and clear contrast in implications between the Merton model pricing implications and a setting that explicitly models information asymmetry and minimizes the knowledge of the uninformed. This provides an especially clearcut counterexample to the idea that there is a risk-premium for information costs, because even investors who are maximally informationally handicapped (by their uninformative priors) still hold the risk-adjusted market portfolio, and there is no extra risk premium associated with information costs. More generally, with proper priors as well, the CAPM security market line still holds with respect to the infor-
mationally passive portfolio instead of the risk-adjusted market portfolio. The intuition is exactly same as in the case with uniform diffuse priors. Since Group  investors, whose information set consists solely of equilibrium prices, hold the informationally passive portfolio, the informationally passive portfolio is mean-variance efficient conditional on the assets’ prices only.

A possible objection to this argument starts with the fact that Merton’s model does not have a distinction between the risk-adjusted market portfolio and the market portfolio inclusive of supply shocks. In our setting the CAPM does not hold with respect to this inclusive market portfolio. So the deviations from the CAPM in the Merton model might more broadly be interpreted as deviations from CAPM pricing using this inclusive market portfolio.

However, this does not justify the implication that there is a risk premium for information costs and resulting nonparticipation (as in the Merton model). This implication fails for the simple reason that there is full participation. The main insight here is robust with respect to the definition of market portfolio: rational uninformed investors fully participate in the stock market, so there is no risk premium for information-asymmetry-driven nonparticipation.

The online appendix of Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) provides a similar model setup and shows that a different version of the CAPM holds. The result they derive uses as the market portfolio for CAPM pricing the ex-post total supply of the risky assets, the sum of the endowed risky assets and the random supply of risky assets ($W + Z$ in our model). Hence, they derive that the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient conditional on the average investor’s information set. In our model, the informationally passive portfolio is a natural candidate for the market portfolio for CAPM pricing, because it is the common component in all investors’ risky asset holdings. And we show that the informationally passive portfolio is mean-variance efficient unconditional on any investor’s private information. Therefore, using the informationally passive portfolio for CAPM pricing, we show that the CAPM security market line relation holds unconditional on any investor’s private information. Our further contribution is to examine how models of asymmetric information bear upon the hypothesis that information asymmetry causes nonparticipation and a risk premium for nonparticipation.

### 3.4 Risk Premia and Information Asymmetry Proxies

Our finding that equilibrium prices satisfy a version of the CAPM seems to contrast with the conclusion of an influential paper by Easley and O’Hara (2004) that there is a risk premium for information asymmetry. So it is argued that different securities have different information risk, and that in equilibrium investors earn a premium for bearing information risk. This idea has been tested in an extensive empirical literature.

---

12 Blais, Bossaerts, and Spatt (2010) derive the same version of the CAPM in a dynamic model, in which the market portfolio used for CAPM pricing is also the ex-post total supply of the risk, and the security market line holds conditional on the average investor’s information set.
In the model of Easley and O’Hara (2004), there is a fixed number of signals about a given risky asset’s payoff. Investors are either informed or uninformed about the asset. The comparative statics consists of an increase in the fraction of signals that are received only by the informed. This is viewed as an increase in information asymmetry.

For example, in one market there might be 8 distinct public signals received by all, and two private signals that are both observed by every informed investor; and in another market only two public signals, and eight private signals, all of which are observed by every informed investor. With identical signal precisions and conditionally independent signals, as the publicly available information decreases, the informed investors’ information set remains constant. In contrast, the uninformed investors’ information becomes less precise owing to the reduction in public information. Uninformed investors demand higher risk premia as compensation for information risk.

However, an increase in the fraction of private signals in the model of Easley and O’Hara (2004) causes not only an increase in the information asymmetry; it also increases the volatility of the asset payoff for uninformed investors conditional upon what they observe. As is standard in models without information asymmetry, we expect greater uncertainty about payoff outcomes to be associated with greater risk premia. This insight does not require a new form of risk (information risk). This raises the question of whether there is any clearcut and distinctive sense in which information asymmetry induces rational risk premia.

To probe this issue more deeply, we perform comparative statics on the model to vary information asymmetry. We first consider a portfolio concept of a shift in information asymmetry, wherein some informed investors receive signals about a greater number of stocks, and others about a smaller number of stocks. Specifically, we consider a shift in the composition of the investors from \( \lambda = (\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_{12}, \lambda_{\emptyset}) \) to \( \lambda' = (\lambda_1 - \epsilon, \lambda_2 - \epsilon, \lambda_{12} + \epsilon, \lambda_{\emptyset} + \epsilon) \), where \( \epsilon > 0 \) is arbitrarily small. This increases the fraction of investors who have the maximal information set and the fraction who have the minimal information set, and decreases the fraction who have intermediate amounts of information. Hence, the information asymmetry in the economy unambiguously increases. It also holds constant the fraction of investors who are informed about any given security.

From equation (20), ex ante risk premia are

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \operatorname{diag}(P)^{-1} \mathbb{E}(F) - r \mathbb{1} \right] = \left[ \operatorname{diag} \left( B^{-1}(\bar{F} - A) \right) \right]^{-1} A,
\]

where \( A \) and \( B \) are defined in equation (11) and equation (12). Since \( \lambda_1 + \lambda_{12} \) and \( \lambda_2 + \lambda_{12} \) do not change when \( \lambda \) changes to \( \lambda' \), the average private information precision \( \Sigma^{-1} \) does not change. It immediately follows that risk premia do not change.

This is a counterexample to the general notion that an increase in information asymmetry increases risk premia. The key intuition is that although the ex ante information asymmetry increases, the average private information precision does not change, because of the offsetting between the investors with more information and the investors...
with less information. As a result, the precision of information that uninformed investors (Group $\emptyset$ investors) extract from equilibrium prices is the same as before. Hence, uninformed investors do not demand higher risk premia, because the uncertainties they are facing (conditional on the equilibrium price) are the same as before. This risk premium demanded by uninformed investors is the usual risk premium studied by econometricians—the premium that conditions only on publicly available information.

This comparative statics is in a sense a purer means of evaluating whether there is a premium for information asymmetry than that of Easley and O’Hara (2004), because their comparative statics varies information asymmetry and the total conventional uncertainty (fundamental volatility conditional upon price) faced by uninformed investors at the same time. Since it is well known from models with symmetric information that risk premia increase with conventional risk, this does not isolate the effect of information asymmetry. Instead, by fixing total uncertainty (both unconditionally and conditional on price), our comparative statics focuses specifically on the effect of varying information asymmetry. We therefore conclude that there is no general principle that there is a positive risk premium associated with information asymmetry per se. In brief, it is best not to think of information asymmetry as a type of risk.

**Proposition 5** *In a comparative statics in which information asymmetry is increased by increasing the sets of securities about which signals are received by the best informed investors and reducing the sets of securities about which signals are received by less well-informed investors, assets’ risk premia remain unchanged.*

In the first comparative statics, information asymmetry was defined at the portfolio level. Investor $i$ is more informed than investor $j$, if and only if the set of assets about which investor $i$ receives private signals contains the set of asset about which investor $j$ receives private signals. But for any particular asset, the measure of informed investors does not change, so the information asymmetry at the individual asset level does not change.

We next examine the effects of varying information asymmetry at the individual asset level to see whether securities with higher measured information asymmetry earn higher risk premia. The proxy for information asymmetry that we vary is much like the probability of information-based trading (PIN), developed by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), which has been applied extensively in empirical studies.\(^{13}\)

We define the information asymmetry proxy in any risky asset’s market as the measure of investors who have private information about such an asset. So the proxy for information asymmetry of assets in $\Gamma_1$ is $\lambda_1 + \lambda_{12}$, while that of assets in $\Gamma_2$ is $\lambda_2 + \lambda_{12}$. This corresponds to PIN, defined by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) as the ratio of the arrival rate for information-based orders to the arrival rate for all orders. In

\(^{13}\)PIN in our model does not, however, hold constant the uncertainty faced by uninformed investors about a security conditional on price. In that sense it is not a pure measure of information asymmetry, so we refer to it as the information asymmetry proxy.
our model, all investors—informed and uninformed—participate in all assets’ markets (Corollary 1), so the arrival rate for all orders is 1. For $\Gamma_1$ assets, the arrival rate for information-based orders is $\lambda_1 + \lambda_{12}$, since Group 1 investors and Group 12 investors possess private information about these assets. Similarly, for $\Gamma_2$ assets, the arrival rate for information-based orders is $\lambda_2 + \lambda_{12}$. Therefore, PIN of any asset in $\Gamma_1$ is $\lambda_1 + \lambda_{12}$, while PIN of any asset in $\Gamma_2$ is $\lambda_2 + \lambda_{12}$.

Suppose now that the composition of investors shifts from $\lambda$ to $\lambda' = (\lambda_1 - \epsilon, \lambda_2 + \epsilon, \lambda_{12}, \lambda_\emptyset)$. By the definition of the information asymmetry proxy, in $\Gamma_1$ assets’ markets it decreases, and in $\Gamma_2$ assets’ markets it increases.

From equation (24), we can calculate the risk premium of asset $i$ in $\Gamma_1$ as

$$W_i \left( 1 + \frac{v_i^2}{\rho^2(\lambda_1 + \lambda_{12})^2u_i^2 + (\lambda_1 + \lambda_{12})\sigma_i^2} \right) \frac{r}{\rho F_i \left( \rho^2(\lambda_1 + \lambda_{12})^2u_i^2 + (\lambda_1 + \lambda_{12})\sigma_i^2 + v_i^2 \right) + W_i}$$

where $\sigma_i^2$, $u_i^2$, and $v_i^2$ are the $i^{th}$ diagonal elements of $\Omega_{12}^{-1}$, $U^{-1}$, and $V^{-1}$, respectively.

It is then obvious that when the composition of investors shifts from $\lambda$ to $\lambda'$, the expression (25) increases, because $\lambda_1$ decreases to $\lambda_1 - \epsilon$. So the risk premium of asset $i$ in $\Gamma_1$ increases. Similarly, when the composition of investors shifts from $\lambda$ to $\lambda'$, the risk premium of asset $i$ in $\Gamma_2$ decreases. It follows that an asset’s risk premium is decreasing in its information asymmetry proxy. This is the opposite of the prediction of the model of Easley and O’Hara (2004).

**Proposition 6** In a comparative statics where the fraction of informed traders in one security increases and the fraction of informed traders in another security decreases, the risk premium of the asset with an increased number of informed traders decreases and the risk premium of the other asset increases.

It is not hard to resolve the difference in predictions. In the comparative statics of Easley and O’Hara (2004), an increase in the fraction of signals about an asset that is known only to informed investors is accompanied by greater uncertainty faced by uninformed investors about that asset based on what they observe. This is because, by assumption, when there are more private signals, there are fewer public signals.

In contrast, the key intuition in Proposition 6 is that when there are fewer informed investors about the assets in $\Gamma_1$ and more for $\Gamma_2$, the information investors extract from the equilibrium prices about assets in $\Gamma_1$ becomes less precise, and the information investors extract from the equilibrium prices about assets in $\Gamma_2$ becomes more precise. So conditional on equilibrium prices, uninformed investors face more uncertainty about assets in $\Gamma_1$ and less uncertainty about assets in $\Gamma_2$. In consequence, they demand higher risk premia of assets in $\Gamma_1$ and less risk premia of assets in $\Gamma_2$.

These results may help explain the mixed evidence in the empirical literature about whether information risk (or what we would call information asymmetry) is priced. As Proposition 5 showed, a pure variation of information asymmetry that does not shift
total risk implies no shift in risk premium. In Proposition 6, when PIN is increased in a way that decreases the volatility of the asset payoff conditional on price (by increasing the amount of information incorporated into price), the risk to the uninformed is reduced, implying lower risk premia. Finally, if PIN is increased in a way that increases the volatility of the asset payoff conditional upon price (by reducing the number of public signals, as in the model of Easley and O’Hara (2004)), the risk premium increases. We conclude that it is best not to think of asymmetric information as a kind of risk.

Some empirical tests use proxies for information risk that confound variations in information asymmetry with variations in total amount of \textit{ex ante} uncertainty (not conditioning upon price). This is an additional source of possible ambiguity in what outcome we would expect to observe. For example, several empirical papers use as proxies for information uncertainty (lack of) analyst following, total or residual volatility, or measures of (low) quality of a firm’s financial reporting and disclosure environment. It is indeed plausible that each of these proxies is correlated across firms with information asymmetry. However, it is equally plausible that each of these is correlated with total ex ante uncertainty about the firm’s future cash flows. Securities with high uncertainty will tend to have high factor loadings and/or idiosyncratic risk. So from the viewpoint of traditional asset pricing theory, higher risk premia would be expected for such securities even if there were no information asymmetry in any asset market.

4 Extensions

4.1 Heterogeneous Risk Tolerances

In the model described in Section 2, investors share a same risk aversion coefficient $\rho$. However, when their risk tolerances differ, the zero holdings hypothesis may hold, especially when investors are unaware of other investors’ risk tolerances. Therefore, in this section, we explore whether heterogeneous risk tolerances, together with the three justifications of the zero holding hypothesis discussed above in this paper, can justify the zero holding hypothesis and its asset pricing implications.

We extend the model in Section 2 by assuming that any investor $i$ ($i \in [0,1]$) has the risk aversion coefficient $\rho_i$. Here, $\rho_i$ is a continuous function of $i$. Let

$$\bar{\rho} = \int_0^1 \rho_i di \text{ and } \Sigma^{-1} = \int_0^1 \rho_i \Omega^{-1} i di.$$

Here, $\rho$ is the average risk tolerance, and $\Sigma^{-1}$ is the average precision of investors’ private information that is weighted by their risk tolerances.

We again consider the linear pricing function as in Equation (5),

$$F = A + BP + CZ, \quad \text{with } C \text{ nonsingular.}$$

Therefore, conditional on the price, assets’ payoffs have the conditional distribution is

$$F|P \sim \mathcal{N}(A + BP, CUC')\ .$$
Any investor $i$ gleans such information from the price. She will also use the prior belief and her private information (if any) to derive her posterior belief about the assets’ payoffs. Therefore, as in Equation (9), any investor $i$’s demand is

$$D_i = \rho_i \left[ (CUC')^{-1}(B - rI) - r\Omega_i^{-1} - rV^{-1} \right] P + \rho_i \Omega_i^{-1} S_i + \rho_i [(CUC')^{-1}A + V^{-1} F].$$ (26)

Then, by integrating all investors’ demands and equalizing the aggregate demand and the total supply (the aggregate endowments and the random supply shocks), we can derive Proposition 7 below, which is essentially same as Proposition 1.

**Proposition 7 (Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Risk Tolerances)** In the model with supply shocks and heterogeneous risk tolerances, there exists an equilibrium with pricing function

$$P = B^{-1} [F - A - CZ],$$ (27)

where

$$A = [\bar{\rho}(\Sigma U \Sigma)^{-1} + \Sigma^{-1}]^{-1} \left(W - \bar{\rho} V^{-1} F\right),$$ (28)

$$B = rI + r[\bar{\rho}(\Sigma U \Sigma)^{-1} + \Sigma^{-1}]^{-1} \bar{\rho} V^{-1},$$ (29)

$$C = \Sigma. $$ (30)

Any investor $i$’s risky asset holding is

$$D_i = \rho_i \left( \bar{\rho} + U \Sigma \right)^{-1} W + \rho_i \left[ I - \bar{\rho} \left( \bar{\rho} + U \Sigma \right) \right] V^{-1} (F - rP) + \rho_i \Omega_i^{-1} (S_i - rP).$$ (31)

Proposition 7 especially investor $i$’s equilibrium demand function Equation (31) implies that when investors have heterogeneous risk tolerances, the zero holding hypothesis and its asset pricing implications are still not valid.

First of all, a separation theorem holds. In the first step, any investor $i$ can hold the position as the first two terms in Equation (31) directly, or she can buy $\rho_i$ shares of an index fund that provides the “informationally passive market portfolio” $( \bar{\rho} + U \Sigma )^{-1} W + [I - \bar{\rho} ( \bar{\rho} + U \Sigma )] V^{-1} (F - rP)$. Second, investor $i$ use her own private information to form the information-based trading portfolio $\rho_i \Omega_i^{-1} (S_i - rP)$. Finally, investor $i$ invests the rest of her endowments in the risk-free asset.

Then because the informationally passive market portfolio is on average positive, investors are holding strictly positive positions of all risky assets. What’s more, if investors hold improper diffuse prior belief, the informationally passive market portfolio shrinks to the risk-adjusted market portfolio, which is deterministic and strictly positive. Consequently, though there are information asymmetry in the equilibrium, all investors, including those without any private information, will participate the markets of all assets. In addition, mild transaction costs will not prevent investors from participating.
If investors are unaware of different subsets of assets, as well as other investors’ risk tolerances, the separation theorem also implies that there is an equilibrium, in which all investors will buy the informationally passive market portfolio provided by an index fund that knows all traded assets (and the average risk tolerance and the weighted average precision of investors’ private information). Therefore, heterogeneous risk tolerances and unawareness cannot justify the zero holdings hypothesis.

Finally, if we use the portfolio

\[ \tilde{\rho} \left[ (\tilde{\rho} + U \Sigma)^{-1} W + \left[ I - \tilde{\rho} (\tilde{\rho} + U \Sigma) \right] V^{-1} (F - rP) \right] \] (32)

for pricing, all assets have no extra risk premia beyond those predicted by the CAPM. This is intuitive. Because \( \rho_i \) is continuous in \( i \), there must be some uninformed investor \( j \)'s risk tolerance is \( \rho_j = \tilde{\rho} \). Then, the portfolio in (32) is just investor \( j \)'s equilibrium demand. Therefore, such a portfolio must be mean-variance efficient.

5 Concluding Remarks

A leading theory of capital market trading and pricing contends that investors refrain from participating in the market for stocks for which it is too costly to acquire information, resulting in a risk premium for stocks in which participation is low. We show that in rational settings with asymmetric information, the zero holdings conjecture is invalid, even in weakened or approximate form.

In natural rational settings with asymmetric information, investors take nonzero positions in all assets (e.g., Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009)), the intuition offered being that there is a diversification benefit to holding many assets. However, since assets that an investor knows little about are especially risky to such an investor, it is less clear whether the positions held by the uninformed are small. If so, the zero holdings conjecture might hold as an approximation, and modest transactions costs might resurrect the zero holdings conjecture and its pricing implications.

We find that in equilibrium, for risk-sharing reasons, investors trade toward the market portfolio, with some adjustment to this position to accommodate noise trades or the information trades of other investors. The portfolio prediction of the zero holdings conjecture fails even as an approximation. In consequence, the asset pricing implications also fail. In particular, the idea that there is a risk premium in compensation for the non-participation of uninformed investors is invalid, even as an approximation. It follows that there is no risk premium for the fact that some investors choose not to incur costs of acquiring information about a security.

A different possible approach to justifying the zero holdings conjecture would be that investors are literally unaware of certain securities. Although most investors have heard of Ford Motors, there are many securities that many investors have not heard of. We make more specific the idea of unawareness by assuming that investors do not know the names, payoff characteristics, and prices of various stocks, but do know that such
stocks may exist. In particular, investors have diffuse priors over the characteristics of stocks that they are unaware of. Few investors could name all the stocks in the S&P500, yet many investors are aware of the fact that the stocks composing S&P500 exist, and that they can invest in those stocks by buying an index fund. We also allow for the possibility that investors do not know how many assets they are ignorant about. When there is a mutual fund whose management is aware of all assets and which offers an informationally passive portfolio, and investors know of this fund and its price, we show that such investors will delegate their investment to the fund, even if they have diffuse priors over its characteristics. In particular, there is an equilibrium under unawareness that is essentially identical to the equilibrium under full awareness. Investors hold the same overall portfolios, in part by investing in informationally passive funds, and market prices are also identical.

To sum up, these findings suggest that nonparticipation puzzles are not resolved by costs of acquiring information. Instead, their resolution requires an appeal either to substantial market frictions (other than information costs), or to imperfect rationality of market participants. Similarly, non-informational frictions or imperfect rationality underlie any pricing implications of nonparticipation, such as those derived in the Merton (1987) model.

Understanding the source of nonparticipation is important, since a policy remedy that could effectively address information costs can be ineffective or even counterproductive in addressing investor behavioral biases. For example, a natural solution to the problem of information costs about an asset is to provide investors with more information about it.

But if nonparticipation results from psychological bias, this solution could make the problem worse. More information does not always debias decision makers, since extraneous information can be distracting or overwhelming.

For example, large amounts of information about numerous assets could make investors feel less competent to evaluate their investments. This could exacerbate ambiguity aversion, which is a plausible source of nonparticipation. Similarly, such information might push investors toward the use simple decision heuristics such as narrow framing, which is another leading possible explanation for nonparticipation. Such a policy intervention, by intensifying behavioral biases and reducing participation, can also make securities less efficient, with greater deviations of prices from the CAPM of the sort modeled by Merton (1987).

Behavioral approaches suggest that providing information per se is often not helpful. What is most likely to help is forms of presentation that make the benefits to a diversified portfolio more salient and easier to grasp. For example, a graph showing the historical mean and variance of a portfolio of well-known stocks, as compared with the mean and variance of a wider portfolio that includes many less familiar stocks, could help drive home the advantages of a portfolio that includes assets that might feel dangerous to a naive investor. Providing detailed information about many specific assets might distract from the key point, thereby weakening the message.
In this example, the calculations would be based on information that is already publicly available, so this is not a matter of providing information that is ‘news’ to investors. Rather, it is a matter of focusing investor attention on certain subsets of available information that are likely to act as cues for good decisions, and helping them to process it in a way that helps them reach better conclusions. This difference highlights the importance of understanding the actual sources of nonparticipation—non-informational market frictions or behavioral bias, rather than information costs per se—in order to determine how to address it.

Finally, our model provides insight about another important strand of research that examines the relation between information asymmetry and risk premia even when all investors participate in the capital market. In an influential paper, Easley and O’Hara (2004) provide a model in which assets with high information asymmetry earn high risk premia. It is therefore argued that there is a premium for information risk. Many empirical papers have performed tests of this hypothesis.

However, in the model of Easley and O’Hara (2004), the comparative statics shift that increases information asymmetry also increases total unconditional uncertainty about cash flows that uninformed investors face. So the apparent premium for information asymmetry could instead be a premium for bearing risk as conventionally defined in models without information asymmetry.

To evaluate this, we perform a comparative statics in our model to vary information asymmetry without varying total uncertainty. To do so, we increase the fraction of the population of informed investors who have the maximal information set (gain signals about the largest number of securities) and those with the minimal information set (gain signals about the smallest number of securities), while reducing the fraction who have intermediate amounts of information. This unambiguously increases information asymmetry, while holding constant the fraction of investors who are informed about any given security. We find that the risk premia do not change. So it is not in general the case that an increase in information asymmetry increases risk premia.

Intuitively, the average private information precision does not change, because of the offsetting changes in the information possessed by different investors. Uninformed investors do not demand higher risk premia because the uncertainties they are facing (conditional on the equilibrium price) are same as before. So the risk premium estimated based on publicly available information is unchanged. This illustrates that information asymmetry per se does not induce risk premia; what matters is conventional consumption risk.

Instead of defining information asymmetry at the portfolio level, it is also interesting to vary the information asymmetry of individual assets, and to examine the effect of varying an information asymmetry proxy that has been applied extensively in the empirical literature. So in our second comparative static analysis, we define an information asymmetry proxy in any asset’s market as the measure of investors who have private information about such an asset. This corresponds to the probability of information-based trading (PIN), the measure of information asymmetry used by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and
We consider a shift in the composition of investors that increases informed trading in one asset and decreases informed trading in the other asset. We find that an asset’s risk premium is *decreasing* in its information asymmetry proxy. This is the opposite of the prediction of a positive risk premium for information risk.

Intuitively, when informed trading increases for a given asset, the information uninformed investors extract from equilibrium prices increases. So conditional on equilibrium prices, uninformed investors face less uncertainty about the asset with a greater fraction of informed traders, and hence demand a lower risk premium. This effect derives from the use of a proxy for information asymmetry, PIN, which does not hold constant the total amount of uncertainty faced by uninformed traders. These conclusions may help resolve some of the differing empirical conclusions from the literature on information risk (or what we would call information asymmetry). More importantly, they suggest that it is best not to think of information asymmetry as a type of risk that is distinct from conventional measures of consumption risk.
Appendices

Proof of Proposition 1

Integrating across all investors’ demands gives the aggregated demand as

\[
\int_0^1 D_i di = \rho \left\{ (CUC')^{-1}(B - rI) - r \left( \int_0^1 \Omega_i^{-1} di \right) - rV^{-1} \right\} P \\
+ \rho \left( \int_0^1 \Omega_i S_i di \right) + \rho [(CUC')^{-1}A + V^{-1}F].
\]

(33)

By equation (3), we have \( \int_0^1 \Omega_i^{-1} di = \Sigma^{-1} \). Also, note that

\[
\int_0^1 \Omega_i^{-1} S_i di \\
= \int_{\text{Group 1}} \Omega_i^{-1} S_i di + \int_{\text{Group 2}} \Omega_i^{-1} S_i di + \int_{\text{Group 12}} \Omega_i^{-1} S_i di \\
= (\lambda_1 + \lambda_{12}) \Omega_1^{-1} F + (\lambda_2 + \lambda_{12}) \Omega_2^{-1} F \\
= \Sigma^{-1} F.
\]

(34)

Therefore, from the market clearing condition, we have

\[
\int_0^1 D_i di = Z + W.
\]

(35)

In an equilibrium, both equation (5) and equation (35) hold simultaneously for any realized \( F \) and \( Z \), therefore, by matching coefficients in these two equations, we have

\[
\rho \left[ (CUC')^{-1}A + V^{-1}F \right] - W = -C^{-1} A
\]

(36)

\[
\rho \left[ (CUC')^{-1}(B - rI) - r\Sigma^{-1} - rV^{-1} \right] = -C^{-1} B
\]

(37)

\[
\rho \Sigma^{-1} = C^{-1}
\]

(38)

Therefore, from equation (38), we have

\[
C = \frac{1}{\rho} \Sigma = \frac{1}{\rho} \left[ \frac{1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_{12}} \Sigma_1 \right] \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \lambda_2 + \lambda_{12} \Sigma_2 \end{bmatrix}
\]

Obviously, \( C \) is positive definite and symmetric. Then from equation (36), we have

\[
[p^2(\Sigma U \Sigma)^{-1} + \Sigma^{-1}] A = \frac{1}{p} [W - V^{-1}F].
\]

Because both \((\Sigma U \Sigma)^{-1}\) and \(\Sigma^{-1}\) are both positive definite, we have

\[
A = [p^2(\Sigma U \Sigma)^{-1} + \Sigma^{-1}]^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{p} [W - V^{-1}F] \right).
\]
From equation (37), we have
\[
\rho^2 (\Sigma U \Sigma)^{-1} + \Sigma^{-1} (B - rI) = rV^{-1}.
\]
Again, because \([\rho^2 (\Sigma U \Sigma)^{-1} + \Sigma^{-1}]\) is positive definite, we have
\[
B = rI + r[\rho^2 (\Sigma U \Sigma)^{-1} + \Sigma^{-1}]^{-1} V^{-1}.
\]
Obviously, \(B\) is invertible. By substituting \(A\), \(B\), and \(C\) into equation (6), we solve the equilibrium pricing function.

Now, let’s look at any investor \(i\)’s holding. Substituting the coefficients into investor \(i\)’s holding function (9), we have
\[
D_i = \left( I + \frac{1}{\rho^2} U \Sigma \right)^{-1} W + \rho \left[ I + \rho^2 (U \Sigma)^{-1} \right]^{-1} V^{-1} (\hat{F} - rP) + \rho \Omega_i^{-1} (S_i - rP).
\]
Take expectation about \(S_i - rP\), we have
\[
\mathbb{E}(S_i - rP) = \mathbb{E}
\begin{align*}
&\mathbb{E} \left[ S_i - rB^{-1} (F - A - CZ) \right] \\
&= \mathbb{E} \left[ \mathbb{E} \left( S_i - rB^{-1} (F - A - CZ) \mid F \right) \right] \\
&= \mathbb{E} \left[ F - rB^{-1} F + rB^{-1} A \right] \\
&= F \left[ I - rB^{-1} \right] + rB^{-1} A,
\end{align*}
\]
which is \(G\) defined in equation (15). Therefore, we have
\[
D_i = \left( I + \frac{1}{\rho^2} U \Sigma \right)^{-1} W + \rho \left[ I + \rho^2 (U \Sigma)^{-1} \right]^{-1} V^{-1} (\hat{F} - rP)
+ \rho \Omega_i^{-1} G + \rho \Omega_i^{-1} (S_i - rP - G).
\]
\[Q.E.D.\]

Proof of Proposition 4:
By equations (21), (22), and (23), we have
\[
\frac{1}{PM} \text{diag}(P)^{-1} CUCM M'A
\]
\[
\left( \frac{1}{PM} \right)^2 M'CUCM
\]
\[
\frac{1}{P'M}
\]
\[
= \frac{\text{diag}(P)^{-1} CUCM}{M'CUCM} M'A.
\]
32
This is the RHS of the Security Market Line relation. We want to show that this equals the difference between the risky assets’ rates of return and the riskfree asset’s rate of return, which is shown to be $\text{diag}(P)^{-1}A$ from equation (20).

Then, we have

$$\frac{\text{diag}(P)^{-1}CUC}{M'CUC}M'A = \text{diag}(P)^{-1}A$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \text{diag}(P)^{-1}CUCMM'A = \text{diag}(P)^{-1}AM'CUC$$

$$\Leftrightarrow CUCMM'A = AM'CUC.$$

The last equation holds because $M = \rho(CUC)^{-1}A$ and $(CUC)^{-1}$ is a symmetric matrix. 

Q.E.D.
References


