CITATION COUNT FOR HOLGER MUELLER  
(FEBRUARY 2, 2009)

Below is a list of citations of my work by published or forthcoming articles and books. The list does not include citations by unpublished papers, unless they are forthcoming.

Some of my papers have changed titles several times in the course of their lives, which makes it difficult for an outsider to replicate the citation analysis (e.g., using Google Scholar). For this reason, I provide complete and detailed references of all citations to my work. The information is primarily based on Web of Science and Google Scholar.

As of February 2, 2009, my papers have been cited 190 times by published or forthcoming articles and books, including popular textbooks such as Berk and DeMarzo’s Corporate Finance (2007, MBA), Tirole’s The Theory of Corporate Finance (2006, Ph.D.) and Bolton and Dewatripont’s Contract Theory (2005, Ph.D.). For instance, Berk and DeMarzo spend two pages (pp. 894-896) presenting the theoretical argument on how leverage affects tender offer outcomes that I developed in my QJE paper. Tirole (pp. 433-434) spends about one page on the same issue.

Citation growth rate: In August 2006, when I performed a citation analysis for my tenure review, I had 104 citations. Thus, my citation count has grown 83% over a period of roughly 2 ½ years.

Citations


Bertrand, M., 2008, CEOs, forthcoming, Annual Review of Economics (inaugural issue, 2009)


Morck, R., 2008, Comment on “Family Values or Crony Capitalism?” Capitalism and Society 3, Article No. 2


Gabaix, X., and A. Landier, 2008, Why has CEO pay increased so much? Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 49-100


Conyon, M.J., 2006, Executive compensation and incentives, Academy of Management Perspectives 20, 25-44


**Financing a Portfolio of Projects, 2007, with Felix Münnich and Roman Inderst, Review of Financial Studies (3 citations)**


**Distributional Conflict in Organizations, 2007, European Economic Review, and Influence Costs and Hierarchy, 2005, Economics of Governance, both with Roman Inderst and Karl Wärneryd. (This was initially a single paper titled “Influence Costs and Hierarchy” that was later split into two papers.) (16 citations)**


Hausken, K., 2005, Production and conflict models versus rent-seeking models, Public Choice 123, 59-93


Malloy, T., 2002, Regulating by incentives: Myths, models and micro-markets, Texas Law Review 80, 531-605

Wärneryd, K., 2001, Replicating contests, Economics Letters 71, 323-327


Biais, B., and T. Mariotti, 2005, Strategic liquidity supply and security design, Review of Economic Studies 72, 615-649
Benefits of Broad-Based Option Pay, 2004, with Roman Inderst, mimeo, NYU (8 citations)


Kalmi, P., 2006, Stock option compensation and equity values, Economics Bulletin 10, 1-8


Tender Offers and Leverage, 2004, with Fausto Panunzi, Quarterly Journal of Economics (9 citations)


DeMarzo, P., and J. Berk, 2006, Corporate Finance, Addison-Wesley-Pearson


The Effect of Capital Market Characteristics on the Value of Start-Up Firms, 2004, 
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predator prey dynamics with learning by doing, Economics of Innovation and New 
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1888-1916

Bottazzi, L., M. Da Rin, and T.F. Hellmann, 2008, Who are the active investors? Evidence 
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Renucci, A., 2008, Access to financing, rents, and organization of the firm, Journal of 
Corporate Finance 14, 337-346

Hyytinen, A., and T. Takalo, 2008, Investor protection and business creation, 
International Review of Law and Economics 28, 113-122

of the firm, Journal of Finance 63, 1169-1211

constraints on labor and capital, Review of Financial Studies 21, 543-577


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Mueller, H.M., 2003, Comment on ‘taxes and venture capital support’, European Finance Review 7, 541-545


Macher, J.T., and B.D. Richman, 2008, Transaction cost economics: An assessment of empirical research in the social sciences, Business and Politics 10, Article no. 1


Choe, C., and X. Yin, 2007, Diversification discount, information rents, and internal capital markets, forthcoming, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance


Dimitrov, V., and S. Tice, 2006, Corporate diversification and credit constraints: Real effects across the business cycle, Review of Financial Studies 19, 1465-1498


Brusco, S., and F. Panunzi, F., 2005, Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets, European Economic Review 49, 659-681


**Competitive Search Markets for Durable Goods, 2002, with Roman Inderst, Economic Theory (5 citations)**

Inderst, R., 2005, Competitive search markets with heterogeneous workers, European Economic Review 49, 1525-2542


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Hausken, K., 2005, Production and conflict models versus rent-seeking models, Public Choice 123, 59-93

Kim, J., and J.T. Mahoney, 2005, Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: An organizational economics approach to strategic management, Managerial and Decision Economics 26, 223-242


Skaperdas, S., 2003, Restraining the genuine homo economicus: Why the economy cannot be divorced from its governance, Economics and Politics 15, 135-162


**Asymptotic Efficiency in Dynamic Principal-Agent Problems, 2000, Journal of Economic Theory (8 citations)**


Cvitanić, J., X.H. Wan, and J.F. Zhang, 2008, Principal-agent problems with exit options, B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 8, Article no. 23


Cvitanić, J., X. Wan, and J. Zhang, 2006, Optimal contracts in continuous-time models, Journal of Applied Mathematics and Stochastic Analysis, Article ID 95203

Sung, J., 2005, Optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard: A continuous-time approach, Review of Financial Studies 18, 1021-1073


Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of Debt, 1999, with Roman Inderst, mimeo, University of Mannheim (3 citations)


The First-Best Sharing Rule in the Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem with Exponential Utility, 1998, Journal of Economic Theory (9 citations)


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