

Erin E. Smith

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CITIZENSHIP	USA	
EDUCATION	New York University Stern School of Business New York, NY USA M.Phil., Finance, 2011 Ph.D., Finance, 2013 <i>Expected</i> Dartmouth College , Hanover, NH USA B.A., Economics, 2007 B.A., Engineering, 2007	
AWARDS	Academic Honors, Dartmouth College, 2007 Honors in Economics, Dartmouth College Economics Dept., 2007 Cum Laude, Dartmouth College, 2007 Doctoral Fellowship, NYU Stern School of Business, 2008-2012	
RESEARCH INTERESTS	Corporate Governance, Bankruptcy and Distress, Behavioral Finance, Entrepreneurial Finance	
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS	London Business School, Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference, 2010 NYU Stern Doctoral Seminar, 2011	
RESEARCH WORKSHOPS	NBER Entrepreneurship Research Bootcamp Kauffman Foundation, Cambridge 2010 Summer Institute in Behavioral Economics Russell Sage Foundation, Trento Italy 2010	
TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Foundations of Financial Markets Instructor, 2011 Corporate Finance Teaching Assistant for Prof. Jeffrey Wurgler, 2010, 2011 Entrepreneurial Finance Teaching Assistant for Prof. Roy Smith, 2010	

MEDIA COVERAGE Fewer Empty Seats May Mean More Runs, The Wall Street Journal 2010

PUBLISHED PAPERS **Paleocene primates from the Goler Formation of the Mojave Desert in California**, with Donald Lofgren et. al., Geology and Vertebrate Paleontology of Western and Southern North America, 2008

Do Fans Matter? The Effect of Attendance on the Outcomes of Major League Baseball Games, with Jon Groetzinger, Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports

WORK IN PROGRESS

Over-Voting

When a share is lent, the lending institution often does not match the loan to a particular underlying share. The institution will then solicit the owner of the lent share for votes on corporate proposals, despite the owners loss of voting rights. This voting, termed over-voting, introduces a pro-management bias on amendments requiring approval from a majority of shares outstanding. I develop an identification strategy to estimate this distortion and identify 44 out-comes that were potentially affected by over-votes. Over-voting appears to produce less efficient outcomes, as risk-adjusted meeting-date returns are lower for companies most susceptible to over-voting.

Moral Hazard in Mutual Funds: The Impact of Fund Manager Wealth on Fund Performance

I present a one period principal-agent model of mutual fund money management with moral hazard. I show that under reasonable assumptions and using conservative parameters, the optimal level of effort for the investor (principal) to induce from the manager (agent) is decreasing in the fund managers initial wealth. This is true even when considering the principals optimal choice of contract because the principals optimal choice of pay-performance sensitivity is decreasing in the wealth of the manager. I empirically test the theoretical predictions using a proxy for mutual fund manager wealth. I find that the managers personal is negatively related to the managers performance as measured by risk adjusted returns and fund flows. A one standard deviation increase corresponds to a one percent decrease in four-factor alpha and a ten percent decrease in fund flows. The results are statistically and economically significant and are robust to fund level and manager level fixed effects.

Debt Takeovers

OTHER EXPERIENCE

BlackRock, New York, NY USA
Analyst, Portfolio Analytics Group (client: Freddie Mac), 2007-2008

Barclays Global Investors, San Francisco, CA USA
Intern, Global Markets and Strategies Group (currency hedge fund), 2006

LANGUAGES

Python, Matlab, STATA

REFERENCES

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