On Melting Pots and Salad Bowls: A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Identity-Blind and Identity-Conscious Diversity Ideologies

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Significant debate exists regarding whether different diversity ideologies, defined as individuals’ beliefs regarding the importance of demographic differences and how to navigate them, improve intergroup relations in organizations and the broader society. We seek to advance understanding by drawing finer-grained distinctions among diversity ideology types and intergroup relations outcomes. To this end, we use random effects meta-analysis (k = 296) to investigate the effects of 3 identity-blind ideologies—colorblindness, meritocracy, and assimilation—and 1 identity-conscious ideology—multiculturalism—on 4 indicators of high quality intergroup relations—reduced prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping and increased diversity policy support. Multiculturalism is generally associated with high quality intergroup relations (prejudice: ρ = −.32; discrimination: ρ = −.22; stereotyping: ρ = −.17; policy support: ρ = .57). In contrast, the effects of identity-blind ideologies vary considerably. Different identity-blind ideologies have divergent effects on the same outcome; for example, colorblindness is negatively related (ρ = −.19), meritocracy is unrelated (ρ = .00), and assimilation is positively related (ρ = .17) to stereotyping. Likewise, the same ideology has divergent effects on different outcomes; for example, meritocracy is negatively related to discrimination (ρ = −.48), but also negatively related to policy support (ρ = −.45) and unrelated to prejudice (ρ = −.15) and stereotyping (ρ = .00). We discuss the implications of our findings for theory, practice, and future research.

Keywords: diversity ideologies, multiculturalism, colorblindness, assimilation, meritocracy

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decades and the current majority, White Americans, is projected to be a numerical minority by 2060 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). Individuals are also experiencing increased diversity at work. Although traditionally underrepresented, women now comprise half of the American workforce and hold half of managerial positions (Percheski, 2008; Welle, 2004). Diversity can enrich individuals’ experiences, foster creativity, enhance decision making, and improve group and organizational performance (e.g., Loyd, Wang, Phillips, & Lount, 2013; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Yet diversity can also breed prejudice, discrimination, and other negative interactions and thus undermine group and organizational performance (e.g., Leslie, King, Bradley, & Hebl, 2008; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007).

Given that diversity is a source of both opportunities and challenges, it is not surprising that a large body of work exists on strategies for facilitating positive, high quality interactions in diverse settings, thereby preventing the potential downsides of diversity (e.g., Joshi & Roh, 2009; Ramos, Hewstone, Barreto, & Branscombe, 2016). Within this literature, one stream of research focuses on the implications of encouraging different diversity ideologies, defined as individuals’ beliefs regarding the importance of demographic differences and how to navigate them (e.g., Thomas, Plaut, & Tran, 2014; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000).

Scholars have differentiated two broad categories of diversity ideologies: identity-blind and identity-conscious (e.g., Plaut, Thomas, Hurd, & Romano, 2018; Wolsko et al., 2000). Identity-blind ideologies emphasize that demographic differences are not important and should be minimized. These ideologies are captured by the metaphor of a melting pot, in which different ingredients blend together, and are reflected in the above quote from former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. In contrast, identity-conscious ideologies emphasize that differences are important and should be acknowledged. These ideologies are captured by the metaphor of a salad bowl, in which different ingredients remain distinct, and are reflected in the above quote from Supreme Court Justice Sonya Sotomayor.

A dominant focus of the diversity ideologies literature is assessing the impact of identity-blind and identity-conscious ideologies on the quality of intergroup relations (e.g., Plaut, 2010; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Specifically, scholars have investigated whether these ideologies reduce intergroup bias (i.e., prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping; e.g., Rosenthal & Levy, 2012; Verkuyten, 2005) and increase support for policies aimed at increasing diversity (e.g., affirmative action; Aberson, 2007; Mazzocco, Cooper, & Flint, 2012). Yet research is fragmented across disciplines (e.g., organizational, social, cultural, counseling, and developmental psychology) and findings are contradictory; studies find that both identity-blind and identity-conscious ideologies can result in either higher or lower quality intergroup relations (e.g., Plaut, 2010; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010).

Prior mixed findings may stem, at least in part, from conflation of both diversity ideology types and intergroup relations outcomes. Scholars have identified at least three distinct identity-blind ideologies; differences can be minimized by ignoring them (i.e., colorblindness), treating demographic groups equitably (i.e., meritocracy), or having nondominant groups adopt the practices of the dominant group (i.e., assimilation; e.g., O’Brien & Gilbert, 2013). Yet different identity-blind ideologies are at times treated as a single construct (e.g., Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Browne, 2000), which masks their potentially divergent effects and may partially explain inconsistent findings. Likewise, scholars have long acknowledged that intergroup bias takes different forms (i.e., prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination), which are both conceptually distinct and only moderately correlated (e.g., Fiske, 1998; Jones et al., 2017). Moreover, prior work shows the same ideology can have divergent effects across intergroup bias types (e.g., Wolsko et al., 2000). Nevertheless, scholars at times conflate intergroup bias outcomes (e.g., Adesokan, Ulrich, van Dick, & Tropp, 2011), which may also contribute to mixed results.

We seek to contribute to understanding by drawing finer-grained distinctions among diversity ideology types and intergroup relations outcomes. To this end, we investigate the consequences of three identity-blind ideologies—colorblindness, meritocracy, and assimilation—and one identity-conscious ideology—multiculturalism. Notably, like identity-blind ideologies, identity-conscious ideologies can take different forms; differences can be acknowledged by learning about them, having groups maintain their culture, or valuing differences (Plaut, 2010; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Yet these subtypes are all referred to as multiculturalism, due to the blurry conceptual distinctions among them; beliefs that emphasize learning about or maintaining differences imply they are valuable. Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that items capturing different subtypes load on the same factor (e.g., Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). We therefore focus on multiculturalism as the identity-conscious ideology of interest, and define it to include acknowledging differences by learning about, maintaining, or valuing them.

We consider the effect of each ideology on four indicators of high quality intergroup relations commonly studied in the diversity ideologies literature. Specifically, we focus on reductions in three forms of intergroup bias—prejudice (i.e., negative affect toward outgroups), discrimination (i.e., negative treatment of outgroups), and stereotyping (i.e., beliefs that groups possess different traits). We also focus on support for diversity policies, defined to include any policy aimed at increasing diversity by providing nondominant groups with additional resources and opportunities (e.g., affirmative action, permissive immigration).

Our predictions are grounded in the general proposition that the content of each diversity ideology is better aligned with some intergroup relations outcomes than with others and that ideologies have the strongest effects on outcomes that are most consistent with their content. As a result, there is variation in both the effect of different ideologies on the same outcome and the effect of the same ideology on different outcomes. To test our hypotheses, we conduct a meta-analytic review of diversity ideologies research conducted in a variety of literatures.

The present work not only provides a quantitative summary of past findings, but also builds on prior work by more clearly distinguishing among diversity ideology types and intergroup relations outcomes. We propose there is variation in the effects of not only identity-blind versus identity-conscious ideologies, but also different identity-blind ideologies. Moreover, conclusions regarding the effect of any given ideology depend on the intergroup relations outcome of interest. Deeper, more nuanced understanding of the effects of diversity ideologies has impli-
cations for facilitating high quality intergroup relations in organizations and societies.

Background

Diversity ideologies have been studied in organizational (e.g., Martin & Phillips, 2017), social (e.g., Wolsko et al., 2000), cultural (e.g., Berry, 1997), counseling (e.g., Neville et al., 2000), and developmental (e.g., Phinney, Chavira, & Williamson, 1992) psychology. Across disciplines, a variety of labels have been used for this construct, including intergroup ideologies (e.g., Vorauer & Sasaki, 2011), interethic ideologies (Wolsko et al., 2000), diversity perspectives (Ely & Thomas, 2001), diversity models (Plaut, 2010), diversity beliefs (van Knippenberg, Haslam, & Platow, 2007), and diversity climate perceptions (McKay & Avery, 2015). In spite of this variety, each label refers to the same general construct: individuals’ beliefs regarding the importance of demographic differences and how to navigate them.

The dominant theoretical perspective in the diversity ideologies literature is social categorization, which subsumes social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and categorization theories (Brewer, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Scholars have used the social categorization perspective to argue that both identity-blind ideologies (i.e., differences are not important and should be minimized) and identity-conscious ideologies (i.e., differences are important and should be acknowledged) can improve intergroup relations.

More specifically, the social categorization perspective suggests that group membership is highly salient and used to categorize the self and others. Moreover, individuals are motivated to favor the ingroup and derogate outgroups to maintain a positive sense of self (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). If categorization is a root cause of negative intergroup dynamics, minimizing the salience of group membership, for example by adopting an identity-blind ideology, should improve intergroup relations (e.g., Brewer & Miller, 1984; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989). Yet the social categorization perspective also suggests that because group membership is salient and important to the self, minimizing differences may not be possible or desirable. Acknowledging and valuing differences, for example by adopting an identity-conscious ideology, may thus be a more effective way to foster intergroup respect and improve intergroup relations (e.g., Hornsey & Hogg, 2000).

Theory suggests that both identity-blind and identity-conscious ideologies may improve intergroup relations, but evidence is contradictory, particularly for identity-blind ideologies (e.g., Plaut, 2010; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Some studies find that endorsement of an identity-blind ideology is associated with improved intergroup relations (e.g., reduced prejudice and stereotyping; Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008; Kunst, Thomsen, Sam, & Berry, 2015; Martin & Phillips, 2017), but others find the opposite (e.g., Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2008; Mazzocco et al., 2012; Neville et al., 2000). Endorsement of an identity-conscious ideology is more consistently associated with improved intergroup relations (e.g., Velasco González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008; Vorauer, Gagnon, & Sasaki, 2009), although some studies instead find the reverse (e.g., Bernard et al., 2016; Wolsko et al., 2000).

One factor that likely contributes to mixed findings is the conflation of diversity ideology types and intergroup relations outcomes. Diversity ideologies can be broadly categorized as identity-blind or identity conscious, but at least three distinct identity-blind ideologies exist and vary in how differences are minimized (e.g., O’Brien & Gilbert, 2013; Plaut, Thomas, Tran, & Bazemore, 2014; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010; Thomas, Mack, & Montaglioni, 2004). A colorblind ideology emphasizes minimizing differences by ignoring them and instead focusing on either similarities across groups or individuals’ unique traits. Alternatively, a meritocracy ideology emphasizes minimizing differences by treating demographic groups equitably and preventing discrimination. Finally, an assimilation ideology emphasizes minimizing differences by encouraging nondominant groups (e.g., ethnic/racial minorities, women) to give up their practices and adopt those of the dominant group (e.g., the ethnic/racial majority, men).

Despite the conceptual distinctions among them, colorblindness, meritocracy, and assimilation are often conflated. Theoretically, scholars at times explore the effects of several identity-blind ideologies without offering hypotheses regarding whether they have the same or different effects (e.g., Ryan, Casas, & Thompson, 2010; Vorauer et al., 2009). Empirically, measures labeled as colorblindness include items that instead assess assimilation and meritocracy. For example, the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS; Neville et al., 2000) includes items that capture colorblindness (e.g., “Talking about racial issues causes unnecessary tension”), meritocracy (e.g., “Everyone who works hard, no matter what race they are, has an equal chance to become rich”), and assimilation (e.g., “Immigrants should try to fit into the culture and values of the U.S.”), but is often used as a single index (e.g., Gushue, 2004).

Conflation of intergroup relations outcomes, and particularly different types of intergroup bias, is also a concern. Following the well-established distinctions among affect, behavior, and cognition, scholars have identified prejudice (i.e., affect toward outgroups), discrimination (i.e., behaviors toward outgroups), and stereotyping (i.e., cognitions about outgroups) as distinct types of intergroup bias (Dovidio, Brigham, Johns, & Gaertner, 1996; Fiske, 1998). Moreover, although positively related, these forms of intergroup bias are only moderately correlated (e.g., meta-analytic correlations range from .11 to .37; Jones et al., 2017; Schutz & Six, 1996; Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008), indicating substantial unshared variance. It is therefore not surprising that prior work finds the same diversity ideology can have divergent effects across intergroup bias outcomes; studies have found multiculturalism is negatively related to prejudice, but positively related to stereotyping (Wolsko et al., 2000; Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006).

Despite this prior evidence, different intergroup bias types are often conflated. Theoretically, scholars at times predict that diversity ideologies affect intergroup bias in general, without specifying whether prejudice, discrimination, or stereotyping is the outcome of interest or considering whether an ideology may have divergent effects across intergroup bias types (e.g., Badea, Er-Rafiy, Chekroun, Legal, & Gosling, 2015; Verkuyten, 2005). Empirically, measures labeled as one type of intergroup bias (e.g., prejudice) at times include items that measure a different type (e.g., discrimination; Adesokan et al., 2011; Celeste, Brown, Tip, & Matera, 2014).
We seek to advance understanding by considering the potentially divergent effects of four diversity ideologies—colorblindness, meritocracy, assimilation, and multiculturalism—on four intergroup relations outcomes—prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, and diversity policy support. Our predictions are grounded in the broad proposition that each ideology is better aligned with some outcomes than with others. Individuals tend to prefer consistency and are thus motivated to avoid conflicts among their beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (e.g., Beaman, Cole, Preston, Klintz, & Stebly, 1983; Festinger, 1957; Gawronski & Strack, 2012; Heider, 1946). We therefore expect each diversity ideology is most likely to result in higher quality intergroup relations for the outcomes that are most consistent with its content and result in lower quality intergroup relations for the outcomes that are most antithetical to its content (see Table 1).

### Colorblindness

The social categorization perspective suggests that because colorblindness emphasizes minimizing the salience of differences, specifically by ignoring them, this ideology may improve intergroup relations. Yet because demographic characteristics are highly salient ignoring them may not be realistic (e.g., Apfelbaum, Norton, & Sommers, 2012). Moreover, ignoring differences does not acknowledge or seek to redress the historical disadvantages faced by nondominant groups. Thus, individuals may endorse colorblindness as a way to perpetuate group-based inequity (Guimond, de la Sablonniere, & Nugier, 2014; Haney López, 2014; Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, & Chow, 2009; Thomas et al., 2004). These critiques suggest colorblindness may be unrelated, or even negatively related, to the quality of intergroup relations.

Empirically, the effects of colorblindness are difficult to discern; colorblindness measures often include items that reflect meritocracy or assimilation (e.g., Neville et al., 2000). Moreover, studies that operationalize colorblindness cleanly produce mixed results. Colorblindness is associated with improved intergroup relations in some studies (e.g., Kunst et al., 2015; Martin & Phillips, 2017; Wolsko et al., 2000), but unrelated (e.g., Rosenthal & Levy, 2012) or negatively related (e.g., Apfelbaum et al., 2008) to the quality of intergroup relations in others.

Mixed findings may be reconciled in part by differentiating among intergroup relations outcomes. Colorblindness emphasizes suppressing thoughts about demographic groups and is thus a cognitive strategy for minimizing differences. Given the cognitive focus of this ideology, colorblindness is particularly likely to decrease cognitive manifestations of intergroup bias, namely stereotyping. Beliefs that differences are superficial and best ignored (i.e., colorblindness) directly conflict with beliefs that group membership provides meaningful insight into individuals’ underlying traits (i.e., stereotyping). To the extent that individuals are motivated to maintain consistency among their beliefs (e.g., Gawronski & Strack, 2012), individuals who endorse colorblindness are unlikely to stereotype.

By comparison, because colorblindness is a cognitive strategy for minimizing differences, it is less inconsistent with negative affect (i.e., prejudice) and behavior (i.e., discrimination) toward outgroups. Colorblindness directly conflicts with beliefs that groups possess different traits (i.e., stereotyping), but it is comparatively easier to endorse colorblindness while holding prejudice or discriminating; colorblindness emphasizes minimizing cognitions about demographic differences more than negative affect or behavior toward outgroups. Because colorblindness is most inconsistent with stereotyping, it is likely negatively related to this form of intergroup bias, but may have weaker or more variable effects on prejudice and discrimination. We therefore offer a prediction for stereotyping only.

**Hypothesis 1a:** Colorblindness is negatively related to stereotyping.

Although likely to reduce stereotyping, we also predict that endorsement of colorblindness is negatively related to diversity policy support. Policies that increase diversity draw attention to differences and imply that they are important. Support for such policies is antithetical to beliefs that differences are best ignored (e.g., Mazzocco et al., 2012).

**Hypothesis 1b:** Colorblindness is negatively related to diversity policy support.

### Meritocracy

The social categorization perspective suggests that because meritocracy emphasizes minimizing the salience of differences, specifically by treating different groups equitably, it may improve intergroup relations. Yet meritocracy is subject to some of the same criticisms as colorblindness; it does not acknowledge or

### Table 1

**Summary of Hypotheses and Findings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Colorblindness</th>
<th>Meritocracy</th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice</td>
<td>No hypothesis</td>
<td>No hypothesis</td>
<td>H3a: Positive for dominant groups</td>
<td>H4a: Negative [supported]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[negative effect]</td>
<td>[null effect]</td>
<td>[supported]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>No hypothesis</td>
<td>H2a: Negative</td>
<td>H3b: Positive for dominant groups</td>
<td>H4b: Negative [supported]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[null effect]</td>
<td>[supported]</td>
<td>[weakly supported]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotyping</td>
<td>H1a: Negative</td>
<td>No hypothesis</td>
<td>H3c: Positive [supported]</td>
<td>H4c: Negative for negative stereotypes [supported]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[supported]</td>
<td>[null effect]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy support</td>
<td>H1b: Negative</td>
<td>H2b: Negative</td>
<td>H3d: Negative [supported]</td>
<td>H4d: Positive [supported]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[supported]</td>
<td>[supported]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* For each ideology-outcome combination, we indicate the direction of the hypothesized effect (if any). In brackets we indicate the level of support for hypotheses that were supported and the direction of the effect for nonsupported hypotheses and nonhypothesized effects.
redress historical disadvantages faced by nondominant groups. Meritocracy may thus be a strategy for perpetuating group-based inequity and associated with low quality intergroup relations (e.g., Guimond et al., 2014; Haney López, 2014).

Empirical evidence regarding the effects of meritocracy is difficult to interpret, given that meritocracy is often included as a component of colorblindness (e.g., Neville et al., 2000) and is studied under a variety of labels, such as an antiracism ideology (Vorauer et al., 2009), support for group equality (Verkuyten, 2009), and discrimination beliefs (e.g., Martins & Parsons, 2007). Nevertheless, studies that operationalize meritocracy cleanly find meritocracy has positive (e.g., Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2007), null (e.g., Vorauer et al., 2009), or negative (Verkuyten, 2009) implications for the quality of intergroup relations.

Like colorblindness, we expect the effects of meritocracy vary across outcomes, but that the effects of these two ideologies also differ. Whereas colorblindness is a cognitive strategy for minimizing differences, meritocracy is a behavioral strategy, in that it emphasizes equitable treatment of groups. As a result, meritocracy is particularly likely to reduce behavioral manifestations of intergroup bias, namely discrimination. Beliefs that emphasize equitable treatment of members of different demographic groups (i.e., meritocracy) directly conflict with negative behavior toward outgroups (i.e., discrimination). To maintain consistency among their beliefs and behaviors, individuals who endorse meritocracy are unlikely to discriminate.

By comparison, because meritocracy is a behavioral strategy for minimizing differences, it is less inconsistent with negative affect toward outgroups (i.e., prejudice) and cognitions regarding different groups’ traits (i.e., stereotyping). Endorsing a meritocracy ideology directly conflicts with negative treatment of outgroups (i.e., discrimination), but it is comparatively easier to endorse meritocracy while engaging in prejudice and stereotyping; meritocracy emphasizes minimizing differences by treating groups equitably more than reducing negative affect or changing cognitions. Because meritocracy is most inconsistent with discrimination, it is likely negatively related to this form of intergroup bias, but may have weaker or more variable effects on prejudice and stereotyping. We therefore offer a hypothesis for discrimination only.

**Hypothesis 2a:** Meritocracy is negatively related to discrimination.

Despite the expected negative effect on discrimination, we expect that endorsement of meritocracy, like colorblindness, is negatively related to diversity policy support. Diversity policies provide additional resources to nondominant groups, thereby drawing attention to differences. An ideology that emphasizes minimizing differences via equitable treatment, regardless of group membership, is antithetical to support for policies that draw attention to differences and provide additional resources to certain groups (e.g., Aberson, 2007).

**Hypothesis 2b:** Meritocracy is negatively related to diversity policy support.

**Assimilation**

Akin to colorblindness and meritocracy, assimilation emphasizes minimizing the salience of differences, specifically by having nondominant groups behave like the dominant group. The social categorization perspective therefore suggests that assimilation may lead to high quality intergroup relations. At the same time, endorsement of assimilation may be insufficient for improving intergroup relations. If nondominant group members indeed change their behavior and adopt the practices of the dominant group, differences may be minimized and intergroup relations improved. Yet mere beliefs that nondominant groups should change their practices are likely insufficient for minimizing differences, particularly if held by dominant group members.

Moreover, assimilation differs from colorblindness and meritocracy in that it places asymmetric value on different groups; by emphasizing that nondominant groups should adopt the practices of the dominant group, assimilation implies that the dominant group’s culture is preferable. Due to the implied inferiority of nondominant groups, assimilation may increase intergroup bias among dominant groups that is directed at nondominant outgroups. Alternatively, due to the implied superiority of dominant groups, assimilation is less likely to increase, and may even decrease, intergroup bias among nondominant groups that is directed at the dominant outgroup (e.g., Guimond et al., 2014; Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko et al., 2006).

Like other identity-blind ideologies, the effects of assimilation are difficult to discern. Assimilation is often treated as conceptually similar to, and thus conflated with, colorblindness (e.g., Neville et al., 2000; Pieterse, Utsey, & Miller, 2016). Studies that operationalize assimilation cleanly often find that assimilation is associated with lower quality intergroup relations among dominant group members, but unrelated to or even associated with higher quality intergroup relations among nondominant group members (Badea et al., 2015; Gieling, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2014; Verkuyten, 2005, 2011; Wolsko et al., 2006).

We similarly propose that assimilation has asymmetric effects on intergroup bias, but expect these effects apply to some intergroup relations outcomes more than others. Consistent with the above theory and evidence, endorsement of an assimilation ideology by dominant group members is likely associated with negative feelings (i.e., prejudice) and behavior (i.e., discrimination) toward nondominant outgroups; negativity toward nondominant outgroups is consistent with the inferiority of these groups implied by assimilation. Alternatively, endorsement of an assimilation ideology by nondominant group members is less likely to be associated with prejudice and discrimination toward the dominant outgroup; negativity toward the dominant outgroup is inconsistent with the implied superiority of this group.

**Hypotheses 3a–b:** Assimilation is more likely to be positively related to (a) prejudice and (b) discrimination among dominant groups than among nondominant groups.

In contrast, we expect assimilation is positively related to stereotyping, regardless of group membership. An ideology that emphasizes that nondominant groups should adopt the practices of the dominant group implies there are meaningful differences among groups. If dominant and nondominant groups possessed the same traits, characteristics, and behaviors there would be no need for assimilation. Thus, to maintain consistency in their beliefs, individuals who endorse an assimilation ideology are likely to
believe that groups differ in their underlying characteristics (i.e., stereotyping), regardless of group membership.

Hypotheses 3c: Assimilation is positively related to stereotyping.

We also expect endorsement of assimilation is negatively related to diversity policy support, regardless of group membership. Assimilation emphasizes the importance of minimizing differences by having nondominant groups adopt the practices of the dominant group, thereby implying that differences are undesirable. Assimilation is therefore antithetical to support for diversity policies that draw attention to differences; doing so directly conflicts with beliefs that differences should be minimized (e.g., Wolsko et al., 2006).

Hypothesis 3d: Assimilation is negatively related to diversity policy support.

Multiculturalism

Unlike identity-blind ideologies, multiculturalism does not involve minimizing differences. Nevertheless, the social categorization perspective suggests that because multiculturalism emphasizes acknowledging and valuing differences it may foster intergroup respect and thereby improve intergroup relations (e.g., Correll et al., 2008; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Multiculturalism is also not subject to criticisms of identity-blind ideologies; it does not involve ignoring salient differences, acknowledges and seeks to redress historical disadvantages nondominant groups face, and does not imply dominant groups are superior.

Evidence regarding the effects of multiculturalism is fragmented; multiculturalism has been studied under different labels, such as value-in-diversity beliefs (e.g., Apfelbaum, Pauker, Sommers, & Ambady, 2010), diversity climate perceptions (e.g., McKay & Avery, 2015), and integrationism (e.g., Olsen & Martins, 2012). Construct conflation is also a concern, as some multiculturalism measures include items that capture meritocracy, particularly in studies of diversity climate (cf. Dwertmann, Nishii, & van Knippenberg, 2016). Nevertheless, findings are relatively consistent. Multiculturalism is often associated with high quality intergroup relations (e.g., Berry & Kalin, 1995; Velasco González et al., 2008; Verkuyten, 2009), although some studies instead find null or opposite effects (e.g., Bernardo et al., 2016; Wolsko et al., 2000).

Nevertheless, like identity-blind ideologies, the effects of multiculturalism likely vary across outcomes. A multicultural ideology implies that differences are important and valuable, and thus reflects a positive orientation toward outgroups. A positive orientation toward outgroups directly conflict with negative affect (i.e., prejudice) and behaviors (i.e., discrimination) directed toward outgroups. To maintain consistency, individuals who endorse a multicultural ideology are unlikely to engage in prejudice and discrimination.

Hypotheses 4a–b: Multiculturalism is negatively related to (a) prejudice and (b) discrimination.

Alternatively, the effect of multiculturalism on stereotyping likely depends on the type of stereotyping: negative or neutral. Like prejudice and discrimination, which are valenced constructs that capture negative affect and behaviors toward outgroups, respectively, stereotyping is at times a valenced construct, which captures beliefs that outgroups possess negative traits (e.g., incompetence or coldness; Velasco González et al., 2008). Yet stereotyping is also at times a neutral or nonvalenced construct, which captures beliefs that groups possess different traits, but does not involve ascribing negative characteristics to outgroups. Neutral forms of stereotyping include generalized, nonspecific beliefs that group membership provides insight into individuals’ traits (e.g., “Different ethnic groups often have very different approaches to life”; Wolsko et al., 2006) and beliefs that certain groups possess traits that are not strongly valenced (e.g., family oriented or not career-oriented; Duguid & Thomas-Hunt, 2015).

Because multiculturalism places positive value on differences, it is antithetical to negative stereotyping. To maintain consistency, individuals who endorse multiculturalism are unlikely to ascribe negative traits to outgroups. Yet multiculturalism also emphasizes that demographic characteristics are meaningful and implies that group membership provides insight into individuals’ underlying traits. As a result, multiculturalism is consistent with neutral forms of stereotyping that capture beliefs that groups possess different traits without ascribing negative traits to outgroups. Thus, relative to negative stereotyping, multiculturalism is less likely to be negatively related to, and may even be positively related to, neutral stereotyping.

Hypothesis 4c: Multiculturalism is more likely to be negatively related to stereotyping than to neutral stereotyping.

Finally, we expect endorsement of multiculturalism is positively related to diversity policy support. A multicultural ideology emphasizes that differences are important and valuable. Such beliefs are consistent with support for diversity policies, which seek to increase diversity and thus also imply that diversity is a valuable asset (e.g., Wolsko et al., 2006).

Hypothesis 4d: Multiculturalism is positively related to diversity policy support.

Method

Search Procedure and Sample

We searched databases (Business Source Premier, PsycINFO, and Web of Science) using relevant terms (multicultural, color-blind, meritocracy, assimilation, justice, inclusion, exclusion, acculturation, diversity attitudes, diversity beliefs, diversity climate, diversity ideology, interethnic ideology, intergroup ideology, inequality, inequity, harassment, discrimination, incivility, and fairness). No start date was specified and we included all articles available through the end of 2017. We also reviewed the reference sections of review articles and manually searched journals that frequently publish diversity ideologies research from 1990–2017. To identify unpublished articles, we searched conference programs and posted requests for articles on listservs.1

We reviewed abstracts and eliminated articles that were clearly not relevant. We identified 824 potentially relevant

1 We manually searched Journal of Applied Psychology, Personnel Psychology, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, and Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin. The end date for our search was 2017, but the sample includes papers that were in press when identified and subsequently published in 2018.
articles, which we examined more closely. We deemed studies relevant if they (a) provided quantitative data, (b) included at least one diversity ideology and at least one outcome of interest, and (c) reported statistics necessary to calculate effect sizes. Our final sample included 114 articles, which contained 167 independent samples (i.e., some articles included multiple studies). Some studies contributed multiple effects (i.e., assessed more than one diversity ideology or outcome), resulting in 296 effect sizes. The online supplemental material includes a description of each effect size (see Appendix A in the online supplemental material).

The sample included correlational (77%) and experimental (23%) studies. Most studies were conducted in North America (63% overall; 58% United States; 5% Canada), followed by Europe (21% overall; 10% the Netherlands; all other countries <5%), Australia/New Zealand (6%), East Asia (4%), Africa (2%), and South America (1%; 2% spanned multiple countries).

Coding

We first coded diversity ideologies. All authors coded a subset of 25 articles and discrepancies were discussed. All authors then coded a second subset of 10 articles and discrepancies were again discussed. Yeonka (Sophia) Kim and Gregory R. Beaver coded each of the remaining studies independently (agreement rate: 96%). All discrepancies were resolved among the authors. We next coded the dependent and moderator variables. Yeonka (Sophia) Kim and Gregory R. Beaver coded an initial set of 20 articles and reached perfect agreement. Yeonka (Sophia) Kim and Gregory R. Beaver then each coded half of the remaining articles.

Labels used to describe ideologies and outcomes were often insufficient for our coding purposes because diversity ideology types and intergroup relations outcomes are often conflated. Thus, we coded measures and manipulations based on their content, not their labels. If a measure included items that captured multiple ideologies/outcomes, we used a “two-thirds rule.” If at least two-thirds of the items captured a single ideology/outcome, we coded the measure as reflecting that ideology/outcome. Otherwise, the study was excluded. Excluding measures that mixed ideologies or outcomes, but met the two-thirds rule, did not alter our conclusions.

Diversity ideologies. We coded diversity ideology manipulations so they captured the effect of an ideology, relative to a control condition. This coding mirrors diversity ideology measures, which capture the extent to which individuals endorse an ideology. We excluded studies that compare two ideologies, but do not include a control condition. Diversity ideology measures and manipulations had to reference demographic traits. For example, measures capturing beliefs regarding equitable treatment of ethnic groups were coded as meritocracy, but those capturing equitable treatment of individuals in general were not. At the effect size level, 88% of diversity ideologies referenced ethnicity/race, 9% referenced gender, 1% referenced age, 1% referenced demographic traits in general, and less than 1% referenced weight.

We operationalized multiculturalism as beliefs that focus on acknowledging differences by maintaining them (e.g., “Ethnic minorities should be helped to preserve their cultural heritage in the Netherlands”), learning about them (e.g., “Dutch natives should do more to learn about the customs and heritage of different cultural groups in this country”), or valuing them (e.g., “A society that has a variety of cultural groups is more able to tackle new problems as they occur”; Arends-Toth & van de Vijver, 2003). We operationalized colorblindness as beliefs that emphasize minimizing differences by ignoring them (e.g., “Black people should not consider race when buying art or selecting a book to read”), highlighting similarities (e.g., “Blacks and Whites have more commonalities than differences”), or highlighting uniqueness (e.g., “People regardless of their race have strengths and limitations”; Sellers, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, & Smith, 1997). We operationalized meritocracy as beliefs that emphasize the equitable treatment of versus discrimination against demographic groups (e.g., “Many social barriers prevent people from minority groups from getting ahead”; Foster & Tsarfati, 2005; reverse coded). We operationalized assimilation as beliefs that emphasize nondominant groups giving up their practices and adopting those of the dominant group (e.g., “I believe that the best way for members of ethnic minority groups to get along is to play down their own culture and to become part of American society”; Phinney et al., 1992).

Outcomes. We operationalized prejudice as negative affect or attitudes toward outgroups (e.g., “Indicate whether you have positive or negative feelings about the following groups”; Badea et al., 2015) and operationalized discrimination as negative behaviors or behavioral intentions toward outgroups (e.g., “If given the opportunity, how willing would you be to have a person from a racial/ethnic group other than your own as a neighbor?”; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). We operationalized stereotyping as the tendency to associate traits with certain groups and differentiated negative and neutral forms. Negative stereotyping was coded so that higher scores indicated the association of more negative and fewer positive traits with a demographic group (e.g., “violent”; Velasco González et al., 2008). Neutral stereotyping included general beliefs that groups possess different traits (e.g., “Different ethnic groups often have very different approaches to life”; Wolko et al., 2006) and associating traits that are not strongly positive or negative with a group (e.g., “family-oriented” and “not career-oriented”; Duguid & Thomas-Hunt, 2015). We operationalized diversity policy support as positive attitudes toward policies aimed at increasing diversity by granting resources to nondominant groups (e.g., “Automatic U.S. citizenship should be granted to the children of illegal immigrants”; Wolko et al., 2006).

Group membership. We coded the percent of dominant group members in each sample, which we defined in relation to the demographic characteristic referenced in each ideology. For example, percent dominant group members reflected percent ethnic majority for ethnicity-focused ideologies and reflected percent male for gender-focused ideologies. For ideologies focused on

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2 All stereotyping and discrimination measures, and the vast majority of prejudice measures (99%), were explicit. Eliminating implicit prejudice measures does not alter our conclusions. Likewise, all prejudice and stereotyping measures, and most discrimination measures, capture discrimination against outgroups directed at others (i.e., perpetrator perspective), but some discrimination measures capture discrimination against outgroups directed at the self (i.e., victim perspective). Eliminating measures of outgroup discrimination directed at the self does not alter our conclusions.
differences in general, we averaged percent ethnic majority and percent male.

Analyses

We conducted random effects meta-analyses using SAS (Arthur, Bennett, & Huffcutt, 2001; Schmidt & Hunter, 2015). We calculated effect sizes as correlations and corrected for sampling error by weighting each effect by its sample when averaging across samples. We also corrected for unreliability. If reliability was not reported for a diversity ideology (6% of effects) or outcome (29% of effects), we used the average reliability for that variable reported in other studies (range: $\alpha = .76$ to .83; see the online supplemental material, Appendix B, for all reliabilities).

All effect sizes included in a given meta-analysis are from independent samples. If a sample provided two effects (e.g., the effect of multiculturalism on two measures of prejudice), we used their average. For each meta-analysis we report the number of effects ($k$), the total number of observations ($N$), the weighted average effect ($r$), the variance of $r$, the weighted average effect corrected for unreliability ($\rho$), the variance of $\rho$, the 95% confidence interval around $\rho$ (95% CI), the 80% credibility interval (80% CrI), and a homogeneity statistic ($Q_w$).

To test the moderating effect of stereotype valence (negative vs. neutral) we calculated a separate meta-analytic estimate for each level of the moderator (i.e., subgroup analysis; Schmidt & Hunter, 2015). To test the moderating effect of group membership we regressed the study effect sizes on the percent of majority group members in each sample and weighted each effect size by its inverse sampling error variance (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Wilson, 2010). We report the number of studies ($k$) and the standardized regression coefficient ($\beta$). If the regression coefficient for percent dominant group is significant (i.e., an effect varies with the percent of dominant group members in the sample), we used subgroup analysis to determine if the effect is significant in samples of entirely dominant and entirely nondominant group members. Some studies contributed effects to multiple levels of a moderator and some moderators could not be coded in all studies. As a result, the number of effect sizes summed across all levels of a moderator is not always equal to that in the relevant main effect analysis.

We identified potential outliers by calculating the sample-adjusted meta-analytic deviancy statistic (Huffcutt & Arthur, 1995). Outliers were often explained by moderators. For example, all but one of the assimilation-prejudice effect sizes were positive (Badea et al., 2015). Participants in this study were nondominant group members and the proposed moderating effect of group membership therefore explains this outlier. No methodological anomalies were identified in studies with outliers not explained by moderators.

Results

Table 2 presents the results for the main effects and the moderating effects of stereotype valence. Table 3 reports the results for the moderating effects of group membership. We hypothesized that group membership and stereotype valence moderate some ideology-outcome combinations. We explore these two moderators for all other combinations.

Colorblindness

We predicted a negative relationship between colorblindness and stereotyping (Hypothesis 1a), but did not offer hypotheses for prejudice and discrimination. In support of Hypothesis 1a, colorblindness is negatively related to stereotyping ($p = -.19$, 95% CI $[-.29, -.10]$; Table 2). Colorblindness is also negatively related to prejudice ($p = -.07$, 95% CI $[-.15, -.03]$), but not discrimination ($p = -.08$, 95% CI $[-.24, .08]$). Given the significant, nonhypothesized effect for prejudice, we used a t test to compare this effect to the hypothesized relationship with stereotyping (Aguinis, Sturman, & Pierce, 2008). Colorblindness has a larger negative effect on stereotyping than prejudice, $t(41) = 2.69, p = .01$. We also expected a negative relationship between colorblindness and policy support (Hypothesis 1b), which is supported ($p = -.25$, 95% CI $[-.43, -.08]$). Exploratory analyses revealed that none of the effects of colorblindness depends on group membership (see Table 3) and the effect of colorblindness is significant for both negative ($p = -.20$, 95% CI $[-.31, -.10]$) and neutral ($p = -.23$, 95% CI $[-.39, -.06]$) stereotyping (see Table 2).

Overall, colorblindness has inconsistent effects. Across outcomes, it is associated with higher quality (i.e., reduced stereotyping and prejudice), associated with lower quality (i.e., decreased policy support), and unrelated to (i.e., no effect on discrimination) intergroup relations. The negative effect on prejudice was not hypothesized, but is smaller than the hypothesized effect on stereotyping and characterized by significant variability ($Q_w = 312.15, p < .01$).

Meritocracy

We predicted a negative relationship between meritocracy and discrimination (Hypothesis 2a), but did not offer hypotheses for prejudice and stereotyping. In support of Hypothesis 2a, meritocracy is negatively related to discrimination ($p = -.48$, 95% CI $[-.56, -.41]$; Table 2). Alternatively, meritocracy is unrelated to both prejudice ($p = -.15$, 95% CI $[-.37, .07]$) and stereotyping ($p = .00$, 95% CI $[-.19, .18]$). We also expected a negative association between meritocracy and policy support (Hypothesis 2b), which is supported ($p = -.45$, 95% CI $[-.60, -.31]$). None of these effects depends on group membership (see Table 3) and the effect of meritocracy is nonsignificant for both negative ($p = .01$, 95% CI $[-.21, .22]$) and neutral ($p = -.02$, 95% CI $[-.31, .27]$) stereotyping (see Table 2).

Like colorblindness, meritocracy is associated with higher quality (i.e., reduced discrimination), associated with lower quality (i.e., decreased policy support), and unrelated to (i.e., no effect on prejudice and stereotyping) intergroup relations. At the same time, colorblindness and meritocracy are associated with improvements in different outcomes (prejudice and stereotyping vs. discrimination, respectively). Their only consistent effect is a negative relationship with policy support.

Assimilation

We hypothesized that assimilation is more likely to be positively related to prejudice and discrimination among dominant than among nondominant groups (Hypotheses 3a–b). Overall, assimilation is positively related to prejudice ($p = .34$, 95% CI $[.23, .46]$)
and discrimination (\( r = .40, 95\% \text{ CI} [.23, .58]; \text{Table 2} \)). Weighted regression revealed that the magnitude of the assimilation–prejudice relationship increases with the percentage of majority group members (\( \beta = .58, p = .00; \text{Table 3} \)), which supports Hypothesis 3a. Subgroup analyses indicate that assimilation is positively related to prejudice in samples of dominant group members (\( r = .38, 95\% \text{ CI} [.28, .48], k = 16 \)), but unrelated to prejudice in samples of nondominant group members (\( r = .07, 95\% \text{ CI} [.15, .28], k = 7 \)). The moderating effect of percent dominant group is not significant at the traditional level for the assimilation–discrimination relationship (\( \beta = .65, p = .09 \)), which fails to support Hypothesis 3b. Given relatively low power to detect moderation via regression (\( k = 9 \)), we also conducted subgroup analyses. Assimilation is positively related to discrimination in samples of dominant group members (\( r = .60, 95\% \text{ CI} [.36, .84], k = 3 \)), but unrelated to discrimination in samples of nondominant group members (\( r = .06, 95\% \text{ CI} [.06, .18], k = 4 \)), which is consistent with Hypothesis 3b. Overall, Hypothesis 3b is weakly supported.

We also predicted that assimilation is positively related to stereotyping and negatively related to policy support, regardless of group membership (Hypotheses 3c–d). Both of these hypotheses are supported (stereotyping: \( r = .17, 95\% \text{ CI} [.01, .34] \) policy support: \( r = .38, 95\% \text{ CI} [.52, .25]; \text{Table 2} \)). Exploratory analyses reveal that group membership does not moderate the assimilation–stereotyping relationship (\( \beta = .62, p = .10; \text{Table 3} \)) and the effect of assimilation is positive for both negative (\( r = .44, 95\% \text{ CI} [.29, .59] \)) and neutral (\( r = .11, 95\% \text{ CI} [.11, .12] \)) stereotyping (see \text{Table 2} \)). There are insufficient studies to explore the moderating effect of group membership on the assimilation–policy support relationship (\( k = 2 \)).

Overall, unlike colorblindness and meritocracy, assimilation is consistently associated with low quality intergroup relations, in the form of increased prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping, and reduced policy support. However, the effects of assimilation on some outcomes (i.e., prejudice and discrimination) only hold among dominant group members.

### Multiculturalism

We hypothesized that multiculturalism is negatively related to prejudice and discrimination (Hypotheses 4a–b). Both hypotheses are supported (prejudice: \( r = -.32, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.37, -.27] \); discrimination: \( r = -.22, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.30, -.14] \), see \text{Table 2} \)). We also hypothesized that multiculturalism is more likely to have a negative association with negative, than with neutral, stereotyping (Hypothesis 4c). Multiculturalism is negatively related to stereotyping overall (\( r = -.17, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.29, -.05] \)). In support of Hypothesis 4c, the effect of multiculturalism is negative for negative stereotyping (\( r = -.39, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.52, -.27] \)), but not significant for neutral stereotyping (\( r = .13, 95\% \text{ CI} [.06, .32] \)).

### Table 2

**Meta-Analytic Effects of Diversity Ideologies on Intergroup Relations Outcomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>( k )</th>
<th>( N )</th>
<th>( r )</th>
<th>( Var_{r} )</th>
<th>( p )</th>
<th>( Var_{p} )</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>80% CrI</th>
<th>( Q_{w} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15,733</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>[-.15, -.00]</td>
<td>[-.28, .13]</td>
<td>312.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,658</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>[-.24, .08]</td>
<td>[-.26, .11]</td>
<td>52.74**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotyping</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>[-.29, -.10]</td>
<td>[-.28, -.10]</td>
<td>12.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>[-.31, -.10]</td>
<td>[-.26, -.14]</td>
<td>9.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>[-.39, -.06]</td>
<td>[-.35, -.10]</td>
<td>6.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy support</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10,860</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>[-.43, -.08]</td>
<td>[-.51, .00]</td>
<td>312.09**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Note: \( k \) is the number of effect sizes, \( N \) is the number of participants across studies, \( r \) is the sample weighted average effect size, \( Var_{r} \) is the variance of \( r, \) \( Var_{p} \) is the corrected average effect size, \( Var_{r} \) is the variance of \( r, \) 95% CI is the 95% confidence interval around \( r, \) 80% CrI is the 80% credibility interval, and \( Q_{w} \) is the test for homogeneity.

* \( p < .05. \ \ \text{**} \ p < .01. \)
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>k</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colorblindness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>−.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotyping</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>−.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy support</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meritocracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>−.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotyping</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>−.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy support</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.58**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotyping</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>−.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>−.35†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotyping</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>−.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy support</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>−.60*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. k is the number of effect sizes contributing to each regression; β is the standardized regression coefficient that captures the effect of the percentage of dominant group members in the sample on the magnitude of the effect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>p</th>
<th>k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; .01</td>
<td>*p &lt; .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>**p &lt; .01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In support of Hypotheses 4d, multiculturalism is positively related to policy support (p = .57, 95% CI [.41, .73]; Table 3).

Exploratory analyses reveal that group membership does not moderate the effect of multiculturalism on stereotyping (β = −.37, p = .12), but does moderate the effect of multiculturalism on prejudice (β = −.29, p = .01) and policy support (β = .60, p = .02; Table 3). The moderating effect of group membership also approaches significance for discrimination (β = −.35, p = .05).

Subgroup analyses indicate that multiculturalism is negatively related to prejudice and discrimination among both dominant (prejudice: p = −.34, 95% CI [−.41, −.27], k = 54; discrimination: p = −.34, 95% CI [−.47, −.21], k = 11) and nondominant (prejudice: p = −.17, 95% CI [−.26, −.08], k = 16; discrimination: p = −.10, 95% CI [−.19, −.004], k = 11) groups, but the effects are larger among dominant groups. The effect of multiculturalism on policy support is positive among dominant groups (p = .48, 95% CI [.40, .56], k = 5). No sample includes only nondominant group members, but the effect remains positive and significant, albeit smaller, in samples that include at least some nondominant group members (p = .31, 95% CI [.03, .59], k = 5; samples ranged from 40–77% dominant group members).

The stronger effects of multiculturalism among dominant versus nondominant groups may be explained by floor and ceiling effects. For example, nondominant groups support diversity policies more than dominant groups do (e.g., Harrison, Kravitz, Mayer, Leslie, & Lev-Arey, 2006). High baseline levels of policy support may suppress the effects of multiculturalism.

Overall, multiculturalism is more consistently associated with improved intergroup relations than any identity-blind ideology is. It is negatively associated with prejudice, discrimination, and negative stereotyping, and positively association with policy support, but unrelated to neutral stereotyping. These effects hold regardless of group membership, but are at times stronger among dominant group members.

**Ideology Comparisons by Outcome**

Multiculturalism is associated with high quality intergroup relations for most outcomes and is the only ideology positively associated with policy support, but colorblindness and meritocracy are also associated high quality intergroup relations for some outcomes. In cases where more than one ideology is associated with improvements in the same intergroup relations outcome, we used t tests to determine which ideology has the strongest effect.

Multiculturalism (p = −.32) and colorblindness (p = −.07) are both negatively related to prejudice, but the effect is stronger for multiculturalism, t(106) = 6.33, p = .00. Alternatively, multiculturalism (p = −.22) and meritocracy (p = −.48) are both negatively related to discrimination, but the effect is stronger for meritocracy, t(48) = 5.81, p = .00. Finally, multiculturalism (p = −.17) and colorblindness (p = −.19) are both negatively related to stereotyping and the two effects do not differ, t(28) = .26, p = .80. Given that the effect of multiculturalism on stereotyping depends on stereotype valence, we compared the effects of multiculturalism and colorblindness on both negative and neutral stereotyping. Multiculturalism (p = −.39) has a stronger effect on negative stereotyping than colorblindness (p = −.20) does, t(23) = 3.91, p = .00. In contrast, colorblindness is negatively associated with neutral stereotyping (p = −.23), whereas multiculturalism is unrelated to neutral stereotyping (p = .13), and the two effects differ significantly, t(6) = 4.20, p = .01. In all, multiculturalism is associated with the largest improvement in three outcomes (reduced prejudice and negative stereotyping, increased policy support). Colorblindness (reduced neutral stereotyping) and meritocracy (reduced discrimination) are each associated with the largest improvement in one outcome.

**Discussion**

The social categorization perspective suggests that both identity-blind and identity-conscious ideologies may improve intergroup relations, but findings are contradictory. Our goal was to investigate whether inconsistent findings can be reconciled, in part, by drawing finer-grained distinctions among diversity ideology types and intergroup relations outcomes. We find diversity ideologies have more complicated and nuanced effects than prior work can account for.

**Implications for Theory and Research**

Whereas prior work at times conflates identity-blind ideology types, our research underscores the importance of differentiating colorblindness, meritocracy, and assimilation. Colorblindness is negatively related, meritocracy is unrelated, and assimilation is positively related to stereotyping and prejudice. In contrast, meritocracy is negatively related, colorblindness is unrelated, and assimilation is positively related to discrimination. Moreover, some of the effects of assimilation hold among dominant, but not nondominant, groups, whereas the same is not true for colorblindness and meritocracy. Indeed, the only consistent effect is that all...
identity-blind ideologies are negatively related to diversity policy support. These findings emphasize that, rather than reflecting a single construct with homogenous consequences, colorblindness, meritocracy, and assimilation are distinct constructs with divergent effects.

Our research also highlights the importance of maintaining firm conceptual boundaries around different intergroup relations outcomes. We proposed that each diversity ideology is better aligned with some intergroup relations outcomes than others, and thus produces divergent effects. Colorblindness is associated with high quality intergroup relations (i.e., decreased stereotyping and prejudice, unrelated to intergroup relations (i.e., null association with discrimination), and associated with low quality intergroup relations (i.e., decreased policy support), and the same is true for meritocracy (i.e., decreased discrimination, unrelated to prejudice and stereotyping, decreased policy support). By comparison, assimilation is more consistently associated with low quality intergroup relations (i.e., increased prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping; decreased policy support); however, the effects of assimilation on prejudice and discrimination, but not stereotyping, depend on group membership. Finally, multiculturalism is most consistently associated with high quality intergroup relations (i.e., decreased prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping, increased policy support), although its negative association with stereotyping applies to negative, but not neutral, stereotyping. In all, our findings indicate that rather than producing consistent effects, conclusions regarding any given diversity ideology vary across intergroup relations outcomes.

In 1997 the American Psychological Association concluded that “we cannot be nor should we be color-blind” (Neville et al., 2000, p. 60). Narrative reviews also tend to conclude identity-blind ideologies lead to low quality intergroup relations (O’Brien & Gilbert, 2013; Plaut, 2010; Thomas et al., 2004). Consistent with these conclusions, all three identity-blind ideologies are negatively related to policy support and assimilation is associated with increases in all three forms of intergroup bias (i.e., prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination). Yet colorblindness and meritocracy are either negatively related or unrelated to intergroup bias. Moreover, colorblindness is the only ideology negatively related to both negative and neutral forms of stereotyping and meritocracy exhibits the strongest negative relationship with discrimination. Thus, prior conclusions that identity-blind ideologies lead to low quality intergroup relations do not apply consistently to all ideology-outcome combinations and the reverse is even true for some ideology-outcome relationships (e.g., colorblindness-stereotyping; meritocracy-discrimination).

Our theory and findings also have clear implications for diversity research. Given their varied consequences, it is critical that scholars distinguish among colorblindness, meritocracy, and assimilation, conceptually and empirically. Continued conflation of different identity-blind ideologies will add further confusion to current understanding. Likewise, given that ideologies have divergent effects across intergroup bias types, it is critical for scholars to distinguish among prejudice, discrimination, negative stereotyping, and neutral stereotyping. Finally, we included studies of diversity climate perceptions, given that this construct is often operationalized in ways that meet the definition of a diversity ideology. Yet many diversity climate studies could not be included because the measures used capture both multiculturalism and meritocracy (cf. Dwertmann et al., 2016). Given their divergent effects, it is important not to conflate multiculturalism and meritocracy in future diversity climate research.

### Implications for Practice

Our research offers practical insights for managing diversity. Given that multiculturalism is most consistently associated with improved intergroup relations the overall quality of intergroup relations is likely to be highest in settings where most individuals hold a multicultural ideology. Likewise, leaders’ efforts to foster multiculturalism are likely to further improve intergroup relations. Yet there is considerable variability in the ideologies individuals hold, both between and within societies and organizations; different individuals strongly endorse both identity-conscious and identity-blind ideologies (e.g., Nkomo & Hoobler, 2014; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007). Moreover, although individuals can be induced to adopt a certain ideology at least temporarily (e.g., Wolsko et al., 2000), ideological beliefs are often deeply held and may be resistant to lasting change (cf. Jost, 2006). In situations where changing ideologies is not feasible, our research nevertheless has implications for improving intergroup relations.

Specifically, our work suggests different types of diversity training may be needed, depending on the dominant diversity ideology in an organization. Colorblindness is negatively associated with prejudice and stereotyping, but unrelated to discrimination, which suggests discrimination may be most problematic in organizations where colorblindness prevails. In such settings, diversity training focused on behavioral strategies for preventing discrimination may be particularly important. In contrast, meritocracy is negatively related to discrimination, but not prejudice or stereotyping. Thus, in organizations where meritocracy prevails, diversity training focused on engendering positive cognitions about and feelings toward outgroups may be needed. Moreover, given that both colorblindness and meritocracy are negatively related to diversity policy support, the quality of intergroup relations in both types of organizations will likely benefit from interventions aimed at increasing policy support.

Alternatively, given that assimilation is consistently associated with low quality intergroup relations, in organizations where an assimilation ideology prevails, training aimed at decreasing prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, and increasing diversity policy support, is likely needed. Given that assimilation is associated with low quality intergroup relations among dominant groups more than nondominant groups, such training may be particularly important for dominant group members. Finally, multiculturalism is associated with high quality intergroup relations, with the exception of neutral stereotyping. Neutral stereotyping reduces identification with outgroups and increases stress during cross-cultural interactions (for a review see Hong, Chao, & No, 2009). Thus, even in organizations where multiculturalism prevails, diversity training focused on combatting neutral stereotyping may further improve intergroup relations.

### Strengths, Limitations, and Future Work

Our meta-analytic approach offers several strengths. We integrated diversity ideologies research across disciplines, using con-
sistent definitions of diversity ideology types and intergroup relations outcomes, and corrected for statistical artifacts (i.e., sampling error, unreliability). Our conclusions are also more robust than those from any single study; they are based on 296 effect sizes, drawn from 167 independent samples. Moreover, the average number of studies ($M = 19$) and individuals ($M = 9,157$) contributing to each main effect was large. Yet, in some cases, few studies were available (e.g., $k = 2$ for assimilation-policy support).

Publication bias (i.e., the possibility that larger effects are more likely to be published, and thus included in meta-analyses) is a potential concern (e.g., Kepes, Banks, McDaniel, & Whetzel, 2012). To minimize publication bias we included unpublished articles. Moreover, mixed findings in the diversity ideologies literature make publication bias less of a concern; debate regarding the effects of diversity ideologies reduces the likelihood that null findings will remain unpublished. Indeed, our dataset includes studies finding that both identity-blind and identity-conscious diversity ideologies are associated with high quality, associated with low quality, and unrelated to intergroup relations and approximately a quarter of the effect sizes in our sample (24%; $k = 70$) are small (i.e., between $-1.0$ and 1.0). To further investigate the possibility of publication bias we used the funnel plot approach (Kepes et al., 2012). Most funnel plots were symmetric (60%). For asymmetric funnel plots, we used the trim and fill approach to impute potentially missing effects (Duval & Tweedie, 2000), which did not alter our conclusions. (See the online supplemental material, Appendix C.) It is thus unlikely publication bias affected our results.

The vast majority of outcome measures in our sample are explicit and our findings may not generalize to implicit measures. For example, we found colorblindness is negatively related to explicit stereotyping, but some studies find that colorblindness is positively related to implicit stereotyping (e.g., Correll et al., 2008). Moreover, because our findings rely on explicit measures, and individuals are often motivated to avoid appearing biased against outgroups (e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), socially desirable responding may have affected our findings.

Consistent with most prior work on diversity ideologies, we focused on support for diversity policies that provide resources to nondominant groups. Yet our findings may not apply to other diversity policy types, such as those that focus on nondiscrimination or provide accountability for diversity outcomes (Leslie, 2019). Although colorblindness and meritocracy are negatively related to support for policies that provide resources to nondominant groups, they may be positively related to policies that emphasize nondiscrimination (e.g., Aberson, 2007).

We theorized and found that multiculturalism is negatively related to intergroup bias and positively related to support for diversity policies, such as affirmative action. These findings seem in some ways at odds with evidence that affirmative action policies increase intergroup bias (i.e., stereotyping and discrimination; Heilman, 1994; Leslie, Mayer, & Kravitz, 2014). Future work could explore the possibility of additional complexity in the interplay between multiculturalism and affirmative action. Multiculturalism may not only increase affirmative action support, but also prevent affirmative action policies from, in turn, increasing stereotyping and discrimination.

Meta-analysis generates broad conclusions, but our findings should be interpreted in light of prior evidence regarding when they may not hold. For example, we found colorblindness is negatively related to prejudice and unrelated to discrimination, but other studies find that colorblindness increases prejudice among high social dominance individuals (Knowles et al., 2009) and decreases recognition of discrimination (Apfelbaum et al., 2010). Likewise, we found multiculturalism is negatively related to intergroup bias, but other studies find multiculturalism increases perceived exclusion among dominant groups (Plaut, Barnett, Buffardi, & Sanchez-Burks, 2011) and intergroup bias when described concretely (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014).

Our hypotheses are grounded in the idea that individuals prefer consistency (e.g., Beaman et al., 1983; Festinger, 1957; Gawronski & Strack, 2012). Yet this tendency varies across individuals and cultures (e.g., Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010). For example, individuals from East Asian (e.g., China), as compared with Western (e.g., the United States), cultures are more comfortable with contradiction (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). The majority of studies in our sample were conducted in Western cultures (85%), where the preference for consistency is common, and few (4%) were conducted in East Asian cultures, where the preference for consistency is uncommon. As a result, our theory and findings may not generalize to Eastern cultures and other samples of individuals who do not prefer consistency.

We conceptualized diversity ideologies as antecedents to intergroup relations outcomes, which is the dominant conceptual model in this literature (e.g., Plaut, 2010; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). Moreover, although most studies in our sample are correlational, close to a quarter (23%) are experimental studies that test whether diversity ideologies have a causal effect on intergroup relations. Nevertheless, scholars have at times conceptualized intergroup bias as an antecedent to diversity ideologies (e.g., Kunst, Sadeghi, Tahir, Sam, & Thomsen, 2016). Thus, tests of whether the effect of diversity ideologies on intergroup relations or the effect of intergroup relations on diversity ideologies is stronger is an avenue for future work. Scholars could also explore the possibility of additional complexity in the causal effects of diversity ideologies. For example, some outcomes (e.g., prejudice) may mediate the effects of diversity ideologies on others (e.g., discrimination).

We focused on four common diversity ideologies, yet others exist. For example, polyculturalism emphasizes both acknowledgment and minimizing differences by highlighting connections among groups (e.g., Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). It is also possible to draw finer-grained distinctions among the four ideologies we studied. For example, colorblindness can involve ignoring differences entirely, focusing on commonalities across groups, or focusing on individuals’ unique traits. Future work could explore whether additional ideology types and subtypes also have divergent effects across intergroup relations outcomes.

Diversity ideologies have implications for outcomes other than those we studied, such as individuals’ well-being and work engagement (e.g., Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009) as well as team- and organizational-level conflict and performance (e.g.,

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3 Although our sample included a mix of correlational and experimental studies, we lacked sufficient studies to test this moderator with sufficient power for many ideology-outcome relationships.
Hentschel, Shemla, Wegge, & Kearney, 2013; McKay, Avery, & Morris, 2009). Investigating whether drawing firmer conceptual boundaries around different diversity ideology types advances understanding of their effects on a wider range of outcomes is another avenue for future research.

Conclusion

Decades of research demonstrates that beliefs regarding the importance of demographic differences and how to navigate them have implications for the quality of intergroup relations. Yet questions remain regarding whether identity-blind and identity-conscious ideologies improve intergroup relations. We advance understanding by demonstrating that different identity-blind ideologies often have divergent effects on the same intergroup relations outcome and that same diversity ideology often has divergent effects on different intergroup relations outcomes. By uncovering additional nuance in the effects of diversity ideologies our work has implications for improving intergroup relations in diverse organizations and societies.

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