Doctoral Seminar: Agency and Executive Compensation  
Fall 2016  
Tuesdays 10:30 - 11:50 & 1:30 - 2:50, KMC 3-80

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This course surveys leading academic research in executive compensation and related areas of managerial incentives, such as stock ownership and the threat of dismissal. Class meetings will be held twice weekly, and the most important readings on each topic are starred (**). Evaluation will be based on a series of approximately six problem sets and referee reports due intermittently throughout the course.

1. Overview


** K. Murphy, “Executive compensation: Where we are, and how we got there,” in G. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz eds., Handbook of the Economics of Finance (Elsevier, 2013).

2. Theory


3. **Pay-Performance Sensitivity**


4. **Incentives and Leverage**


5. **Incentives from Ownership**


6. **Stock Options - Overview**


7. **Stock Options - Exercise, Cost and Valuation**


8. Stock Options - Impact on Investors


9. Stock Options - Repricing and Backdating


10. Insider Trading and Compensation


11. Perquisites


12. CEO Turnover


13. Family Firms


M. Bennedsen and L. Van der Heyden, “When MBAs meet Henokiens: What can we learn from long-lived family firms?” Unpublished manuscript (2010).


14. Compensation and M&A


** L. Biggerstaff, D. Cicero, and A. Puckett, “Suspect CEOs, unethical culture, and

17. **Disclosure and Regulation**


