

# Algorithmic Trading and Information \*

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August 18, 2009

## Abstract

We examine algorithmic trades (AT) and their role in the price discovery process in the 30 DAX stocks on the Deutsche Boerse. AT liquidity demand represents 52% of volume and AT supplies liquidity on 50% of volume. AT act strategically by monitoring the market for liquidity and deviations of price from fundamental value. AT consume liquidity when it is cheap and supply liquidity when it is expensive. AT contribute more to the efficient price by placing more efficient quotes and AT demanding liquidity to move the prices towards the efficient price.

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\*We thank Bruno Biais and conference participants at the IDEI-R Conference on Investment Banking and Financial Markets for helpful comments. Hendershott gratefully acknowledges support from the Net Institute, the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, and the Lester Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation at the Haas School at UC Berkeley. Riordan gratefully acknowledges support for the Deutsche Forschungs Gemeinschaft - graduate school Information and Market Engineering at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.

# 1 Introduction

Technology has revolutionized the way financial markets function and the way financial assets are traded. Two significant interrelated technological changes are investors using computers to automate their trading processes and markets reorganizing themselves so virtually all markets are now electronic limit order books (Jain (2005)). The speed and quality of access to such markets encourages the use of algorithmic trading (AT; AT denotes algorithmic traders as well), commonly defined as the use of computer algorithms to automatically make trading decisions, submit orders, and manage those orders after submission. Because the trading process is central to efficient risk sharing and price efficiency it is important to understand how AT is used and its role in the price formation process. We examine these issues for DAX stocks (the 30 largest market capitalization stocks) traded on the Deutsche Boerse (DB) with data identifying whether or not each trade's buyer and seller generated their order with an algorithm. Directly identifying AT is not possible in most markets, so relatively little is known.<sup>1</sup>

Liquidity demanders use algorithms to try to identify when a security's price deviates from the efficient price by quickly processing information contained in order flow and price movements in that security and other securities across markets. Liquidity suppliers must follow a similar strategy to avoid being picked off. Institutional investors also utilize AT to trade large quantities gradually over time, thereby minimizing market impact and implementation costs.

Most markets offer volume discounts to attract high-frequency traders. The development costs of AT typically lead to it being adopted first by high-volume users who automatically qualify for the quantity discounts. The German competition authority did not allow for generic volume discounts, rather requires that such discounts have a cost sensitive component. The DB successfully asserted that algorithm generated trading is lower cost and highly sensitive to fee reductions and therefore, could receive quantity discounts. In December of 2007, the DB introduced its fee rebate program for automated traders. The DB provided data on AT orders in the DAX stocks for the first three weeks of January 2008.

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<sup>1</sup>Biais and Weill (2008) theoretically examine the relation between AT, market monitoring, and liquidity dynamics. Chaboud et al. (2009) study AT in the foreign exchange market. Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008) use a proxy for AT to examine AT's effect on liquidity in the equity market.

AT initiate 52% of trading volume via marketable orders. AT initiate smaller trades with AT initiating 68% of volume for trades of less than 500 shares and 23% of volume for trades of greater than 10,000 shares. AT initiate trades quickly when spreads are small and cluster their trades together. AT are more sensitive to human trading activity than humans are to AT trading activity. These are all consistent with AT closely monitoring the market for trading opportunities. If an algorithmic trader is constantly monitoring the market, the trader can break up their order into small pieces to disguise their intentions and quickly react to changes in market conditions. AT could also be trying to exploit small deviations of price from fundamentals.

Moving beyond unconditional measures of AT activity we estimate probit models of AT using market condition variables incorporating the state of the limit order book and past volatility and trading volume. We find that AT are more likely to initiate trades when liquidity is high in terms of narrow bid-ask spreads and higher depth. AT liquidity demanding trades are not related to volatility in the prior 15 minutes, but AT initiated trading is negatively related to volume in the prior 15 minutes.

Just as algorithms are used to monitor liquidity in the market, algorithms may also be used to identify and capitalize on short-run price predictability. We use a standard vector auto-regression framework (Hasbrouck (1991a) and Hasbrouck (1991b)) to examine the return-order flow dynamics for both AT and human trades. AT liquidity demanding trades play a more significant role in discovering the efficient price than human trades. AT initiated trades have a more than 20% larger permanent price impact than human trades. In terms of the total contribution to price discovery—decomposing the variance of the efficient price into its trade-correlated and non trade-correlated components—AT liquidity demanding trades help impound 40% more information than human trades. The larger percentage difference between AT and humans for the variance decomposition as compared to the impulse response functions implies that the innovations in AT order flow are greater than the innovations in human order flow. This is consistent with AT being able to better disguise their trading intentions.

We also examine when AT supply liquidity via non-marketable orders. The nature of our data makes it possible to build an AT-only limit order book, but makes it difficult to perfectly identify

when AT supply liquidity in transactions (see Section 3 for details). Therefore, we focus our analysis on quoted prices associated with AT and humans. While AT supply liquidity for exactly 50% of trading volume, AT are at the best price (inside quote) more often than humans. This AT-human difference is more pronounced when liquidity is lower, demonstrating that AT supply liquidity more when liquidity is expensive.

We also examine the role of AT quotes in the price formation process. We calculate the information shares (Hasbrouck (1995)) for AT and human quotes. AT quotes play a larger role in the price formation process than their 50% of trading volume. The information shares decompose the changes in the efficient price into components that occur first in AT quotes, human quotes, and appear contemporaneously in AT and human quotes with the corresponding breakdown being roughly 50%, 40%, and 10%, respectively. The ability of AT to update quotes quickly based on changing market conditions could allow AT to better provide liquidity during challenging market conditions.

The results on AT liquidity supply and demand suggest that AT monitor liquidity and information in the market. AT consume liquidity when it is cheap and supply liquidity when it is expensive, smoothing out liquidity over time. AT also contribute more to the efficient price by having more efficient quotes and AT demanding liquidity so as to move the prices towards the efficient price. Casual observers often blame the recent increase in market volatility on AT.<sup>2</sup> AT demanding liquidity during times when liquidity is low could result in AT exacerbating volatility, but we find no evidence of this. AT could also exacerbate volatility by not supplying liquidity when the liquidity dries up. However, we find the opposite.

Section 2 relates our work to existing literature. Section 3 describes the algorithmic trading on the Deutsche Boerse. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 analyzes when and how AT demands liquidity. Section 6 examines how AT demand liquidity relates to discovering the efficient price. Section 7 studies when AT supply liquidity and its relation to discovering the efficient price. Section 8 concludes.

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<sup>2</sup>For example, see “Algorithmic trades produce snowball effects on volatility,” *Financial Times*, December 5, 2008.

## 2 Related Literature

Due to the difficulty in identifying AT, most existing research directly addressing AT has used data from brokers who sell AT products to institutional clients. Engle, Russell, and Ferstenberg (2007) use execution data from Morgan Stanley algorithms to study the tradeoffs between algorithm aggressiveness and the mean and dispersion of execution cost. Domowitz and Yegerman (2005) study execution costs of ITG buy-side clients, comparing results from different algorithm providers.

Several recent studies use comprehensive data on AT. Chaboud et al. (2009) study the development of AT in the foreign exchange market on the electronic broking system (EBS) in three currency pairs euro-dollar, dollar-yen, and euro-yen. They find little relation between AT and volatility, as do we. In contrast to our results, Chaboud et al. (2009) find that non-algorithmic order flow accounts for most of the variance in FX returns. There are several possible explanations for this surprising result: (i) EBS' origins as an interdealer market where algorithms were closely monitored; (ii) humans in an interdealer market being more sophisticated than humans in equity markets; or (iii) there is relatively little private information in FX. Chaboud et al. (2009) find that AT seem to follow correlated strategies, which is consistent with our results of AT clustering together in time. Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008) use a proxy for AT, message traffic, which is the sum of order submissions, order cancelations, and trades. Unfortunately, such a proxy makes it difficult to closely examine when and how AT behave and their precise role in the price formation process. Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008) are able to use an instrumental variable to show that AT improves liquidity and makes quotes more informative. Our results on AT liquidity supply and demand being more informed are the natural mechanism by which AT would lead to more informationally efficient prices.

Any analysis of AT relates to models of liquidity supply and demand.<sup>3</sup> Liquidity supply involves posting firm commitments to trade. These standing orders provide free-trading options to other traders. Using standard option pricing techniques, Copeland and Galai (1983) value the cost of the option granted by liquidity suppliers. The arrival of public information can make existing orders stale and can move the trading option into the money. Foucault, Roëll, and Sandas (2003) study

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<sup>3</sup>Parlour and Seppi (2008) for a general survey on limit order markets.

the equilibrium level of effort that liquidity suppliers should expend in monitoring the market to avoid this risk. AT enables this kind of monitoring and adjustment of limit orders in response to public information,<sup>4</sup> but AT can also be used by liquidity demanders to pick off liquidity suppliers who are not fast enough in adjusting their limit orders with public information. The monitoring of the state of liquidity in the market and taking it when cheap and making it when expensive is consistent with AT playing an important role in the make/take liquidity cycle modeled by Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2008).

Algorithms are also used by traders who are trying to passively accumulate or liquidate a large position. Bertsimas and Lo (1998) find that the optimal dynamic execution strategies for such traders involves optimally braking orders into pieces so as to minimize cost.<sup>5</sup> While such execution strategies pre-dated wide-spread adoption of AT (cf. Keim and Madhavan (1995)), brokers now automate the process with AT products.

For each component of the larger transaction, a trader (or algorithm) must choose the type and aggressiveness of the order. Cohen et al. (1981) and Harris (1998) focus on the simplest static choice: market order versus limit order. If a trader chooses a non-marketable limit order, the aggressiveness of the order is determined by its limit price (Griffiths et al. (2000) and Ranaldo (2004)). Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (2002) find that execution times are very sensitive to the choice of limit price. If limit orders do not execute, traders can cancel them and resubmit them with more aggressive prices. A short time between submission and cancelation suggests the presence of AT, and in fact Hasbrouck and Saar (2008) find that a large number of limit orders are canceled within two seconds on the INET trading platform (which is now Nasdaq's trading mechanism).

### 3 Deutsche Boerse's Automated Trading Program

The Deutsche Boerse's order-driven electronic limit order book system is called Xetra (see Hau (2001) for details).<sup>6</sup> Orders are matched using price-time-display priority. Quantities available at

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<sup>4</sup>Rosu (2006) implicitly incorporates AT by assuming limit orders can be constantly adjusted.

<sup>5</sup>Almgren and Chriss (2000) extend this by considering the risk that arises from breaking up orders and slowly executing them.

<sup>6</sup>Iceberg orders are allowed as on the Paris Bourse (cf. Venkataraman (2001)).

the 10 best bid and ask prices as well as numbers of participants at each level are disseminated continuously. See the Appendix for further details on Xetra.

During our sample period Xetra had a 97% market share of German equities trading. With such a dominant position the competition authorities (Bundeskartellamt) required approval of all fee changes prior to implementation. Fee changes must meet the following criteria: (i) all participants are treated equally; (ii) changes must have a cost-related justification; and (iii) fee changes are transparent and accessible to all participants. Criterion (i) and (iii) ensure a level playing field for all members and is comparable to regulation in the rest of Europe and North America. The second criteria is the most important for this paper. AT are viewed as satisfying the cost justification for the change, so DB could offer lower trading fees for AT.

In December of 2007 the DB introduced its Automated Trading Program (ATP) to increase the volume of automated trading on Xetra. To qualify for the ATP an electronic system must determine the price, quantity, and submission time for orders. In addition, the Deutsche Boerse ATP agreement requires that: (i) the electronic system must generate buy and sell orders independently using a specific program and data; (ii) the generated orders must be channeled directly into the Xetra system; and (iii) the exchange fees or the fees charged by the ATP member to its clients must be directly considered by the electronic system when determining the order parameters.

Before being admitted to the ATP, participants must submit an high-level overview of the electronic trading strategies they plan to employ. The level of disclosure required here is intended to be low enough to not require ATP participants to reveal important details of their trading strategies. Following admission to the ATP, the orders generated by each participant are audited monthly for plausibility. If the order patterns generated do not match those suggested by the strategy plan submitted by a participant or are considered likely to have been generated manually, the participant will be terminated from the ATP and may also be suspended from trading on Xetra. Conversations with the DB revealed that a small portion of AT orders may not be included in the data set. The suspicion on the part of the DB is due to the uncommonly high number of orders (message traffic) to executions of certain participants which is typical of AT. However, these participants make up less than 1% of trades in total and are, therefore, unlikely to affect our results.

The ATP agreement and the auditing process ensure that most, if not all, of the orders submitted by an ATP participant are electronically generated and that most, if not all, electronically generated orders are included in our data.

The DB only charges fees for executed trades and not for submitted orders. The rebate for ATP participants can be significant. The rebates are designed to increase with the total trade volume per month. Rebates are up to a maximum of 60% for euro monthly volume above 30 billion. The first Euro volume rebate level begins at a 250 million Euro volume and is 7.5%. Table 1 provides an overview of the rebate per volume level.

[Insert Table 1 Here]

For an ATP participant with 1.9 billion euros in eligible volume, the percentage rebate would be (volumes are in millions of euros):

$$(250 * 0\% + 250 * 7.5\% + 500 * 15.0\% + 900 * 22.5\%)/1,900 = 15.6\% \quad (1)$$

In the example above, an ATP participant would receive a rebate of 15.6%. This translates into roughly 14,000 euros in trading cost savings on 91,200 in total, and an additional 5,323 euros savings on 61,500 in total in clearing and settlement costs. This rebate (14,000 + 5,323) translates into a 0.1 basis point saving on the 1.9 billion in turnover. For high-frequency trading firms, whose turnover is much higher than the amount of capital invested, the savings are significant.

The fee rebate for ATP participants is the sole difference in how orders are treated. AT orders are displayed equivalently in the publicly disseminated Xetra limit order book. The Xetra matching engine does not distinguish between AT and human orders. Therefore, there are no drawbacks for an AT firm to become an ATP participant. Thus, we expect all AT to take advantage of the lower fees by becoming ATP participants. From this point on we equate ATP participants with algorithmic traders and use AT for both. We will refer to non-ATP trades and orders as human or human-generated.



## 4 Data and Descriptive Statistics

The DB provided data contain all AT orders submitted in DAX stocks, the leading German stock market index composed of the 30 largest and most liquid stocks, between January 1st and January 18th, 2008, a total of 13 trading days. This is combined with Reuters DataScope Tick History data provided by SIRCA. The SIRCA data contains two separate databases, one for transactions and another for order book updates. Firms' market capitalization on December 31, 2007 is gathered from the Deutsche Boerse website and cross-checked against data posted directly on each company's website.

Table 2 describes the 30 stocks in the DAX index. Market capitalization is as of December 31st, 2007, in billions of Euros. The smallest firm (TUI AG) is large at 4.81 billion Euros but is more than 20 times smaller than the largest stock in the sample, Siemens AG. The standard deviation of daily returns is calculated for each stock during the sample period. All other variables are calculated daily during the sample period for each stock (30 stocks for 13 trading days for a total of 390 observations). Means and standard deviations along with the minimum and maximum values are reported across the 390 stock-day observations.

[Insert Table 2 Here]

DAX stocks are quite liquid. The average trading volume is 250 million euros per day with 5,344 trades per day on average. The number of trades per day implies that our data set contains roughly 2 million transactions ( $5,344 \times 390$ ). Quoted half-spreads are calculated when trades occur. The average quoted half-spread of 2.98 basis points is comparable to large and liquid stocks in other markets. The effective spread is the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price and the mid quote price (the average of the bid and ask quotes). Average effective spreads are only slightly larger than quoted spreads, evidence that market participant seldom submit marketable orders for depth at greater than the best bid or ask.

We measure depth in two ways. The first is the standard measure of the depth at the inside quote: the average depth in euros at the best bid price and the best ask price. As with spreads,

depth is measured at the time of transactions. More depth allows traders to execute larger trades without impacting the price, which corresponds to higher liquidity. However, if the width of the spread varies over time, then comparisons of depth at the inside do not clearly correspond to levels of liquidity, e.g., 50,000 euros at an inside spread of 10 basis points need not represent more liquidity than 5,000 euros at an inside spread of 5 basis points if in the latter case there is sufficient additional depth between 5 and 10 basis points. To account for time variation in the spread we calculate a second depth measure using the limit order book. For each stock we aggregate the depth at bid and ask prices that have a distance of less than three times that stock’s average quoted half-spread from the midquote at the time of transaction. We refer to this measure of depth that does not depend on the spread at the time of the transaction as *depth3*. A similar measure is used in Foucault and Menkveld (2008) to capture depth away from the best prices.

## 5 AT Liquidity Demand

To measure AT liquidity demand we create an AT trade-initiation variable *AT* and human trade-initiation variable *Hum*. The *AT* variable takes the value 1 when a trade is initiated by an AT, and is 0 otherwise. The *Hum* variable takes the value 1 when a trade is initiated by a human and 0 otherwise. Panel A of Table 3 reports the fraction of euro trading volume for AT trades by trade size and overall.<sup>7</sup> Overall AT initiates 52% of euro volume and more than 60% of all trades. AT initiation declines as trade size increases. *AT* is greater than 68% and 57% in the two smallest trade-size categories (0-499 shares and 500-999 shares) and decreases to 23% in the largest trade-size category (10,000+ shares). AT’s decline with trade size is consistent with AT being used to breakup large orders into smaller trades as suggested by Bertsimas and Lo (1998).

[Insert Table 3 Here]

To better understand the nature of AT and human liquidity demand we perform a series of analyses similar to those found in Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995). We report the results of two

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<sup>7</sup>For simplicity and comparability we use the U.S. SEC Rule 605 trade-size categories based on the number of shares traded.

separate and related analyses in Table 4. The first column of Panel A of Table 4, labeled unconditional, provides what fraction of trades sequences, i.e., AT followed by AT, AT followed by human, etc., we expect if AT and human trades are randomly ordered. The other columns in Panel A are essentially a contingency table documenting the probability of observing a trade of a specific type after observing a previous trade with a given type. All rows sum up to 100% and can be interpreted as probability vectors.

[Insert Table 4 Here]

The first column and row of Panel A in Table 4 shows that if AT and human trades were randomly ordered 37.03% of the transactions would be AT followed by AT while in the data this occurs 40.73% of the time. The result show that AT trades are more likely to follow AT trades than we would expect unconditionally and that AT trades are more likely to be repeated on the same side of the market. The same is true for human trades. This suggests that human and AT liquidity demanding trading strategies differ.

Panel B extends the analysis of AT and humans trade sequence to include trade-size categories. As in Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) we highlight in bold the three largest values in a column. The results are similar to the diagonal results reported in Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) and predicted theoretically in Parlour (1998). The diagonal finding implies that trades of the same type—AT or human trades in the same trade-size category—follow other similar trades. This leads to a diagonal effect where the highest probabilities lie on the diagonal. The largest probability by far is for small AT trades: the  $AT_{t-1}^1 AT_t^1$  probability of 48.70% is much higher than the unconditional probability of 31.62%. This suggests that: (i) AT repeatedly use small trades to hide their information; (ii) AT limit their transitory price impact; or (iii) that different AT are following related strategies. Panel B also shows that AT seem to be sensitive to human order flow but humans are relatively insensitive to AT order flow.

Table 4 provides evidence on the clustering of AT trades in trade sequences, but is not informative on how closely together in time those trades cluster. Table 5 reports the average time between trades dependent on past trades and spreads. As in Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995)

spreads are calculated for each stock and categories, e.g., large spread, are determined relative to averages/percentiles for that stock. For example, large spread represents trades in a stock that occur when spreads are in their widest quartile for that stock.

[Insert Table 5 Here]

The most interesting results in Table 5 are in Panel C. When spreads narrow the time until the next AT trade shrinks significantly from 9.03 seconds for large spread to 4.67 seconds for small spreads. While humans also respond more quickly to smaller spreads, the difference between large spread (11.43 seconds) and small spreads (9.09 seconds) is 2.34 seconds for humans versus 4.36 seconds for AT. The difference-in-difference of 2.02 seconds between AT large-spread minus AT small-spread and human large-spread minus human small-spread is statistically significant. This is further evidence that AT actively monitor the market for liquidity.

Thus far we have studied AT and human sensitivity to past trades and spreads. Next we inspect AT and human trading taking into account contemporaneous and lagged liquidity measures. Following Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick (2003) we use the liquidity variables summarized in Table 2 and past return volatility and trading volume. Lagged volatility is the absolute value of the stock return over the 15 minutes prior to the transaction. Lagged volume is the euro trading volume in the 15 minutes prior to the transaction.

Table 6 reports coefficients estimates from probit regressions for AT initiated trades along with their corresponding linear probability slopes and chi-square statistics. To control for stock effects and time of day effects, we include, but do not report, firm dummy variables (30) and time of day dummy variables (17 for each half-hour period). The only significant time of day effects are that AT becomes less likely at the end of the trading day, primarily in the last half hour of continuous trading. All 2,085,233 observations (each trade in our data set) are used. A chi-square statistic of more than 3.84 represents statistical significant at the 5% level.

[Insert Table 6 Here]

The probit results generally show that *AT* is more likely to trade when spreads are narrow and when trading volume over the prior 15 minutes is low. As in Panel A of Table 3 larger trades are less likely to be initiated by *AT*. Volatility over the prior 15 minutes is unrelated to *AT*. Once market conditions are controlled for, depth at the inside (*depth*) is unrelated to *AT*. Depth measured independently of the inside spread (*depth3*) is positively related to *AT*. The positive relation between *AT* initiation and liquidity and the zero relation between *AT* initiation and lagged volatility provide no evidence to support the hypothesis that *AT* exacerbates volatility.

As with the spread results in the time until the next transaction analysis in Table 5, the *depth* and spread results establish that *AT* are more likely to initiate trades when liquidity is high. *AT* closely monitoring the book could bring about this result for two reasons. First *AT* could time their liquidity demand for times when liquidity is cheap, as in the Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2008) make/take liquidity cycle. When liquidity is expensive algorithms simply wait to trade when more liquidity is available. A variant on this is that when liquidity is expensive *AT* attempt to capture rather than pay the spread by switching from demanding liquidity to supplying liquidity, which we explore in Section 7.

The results suggest that *AT* monitor the market for liquidity and consume liquidity when it is cheap. This suggests that *AT* helps smooth out liquidity over time. When humans are more willing to supply liquidity *AT* increase their liquidity demand. This together with *AT* having no relationship to past volatility suggests that *AT* are more likely to dampen volatility than increase volatility.

## 6 *AT* Liquidity Demand and Price Discovery

Having established that *AT* liquidity demand relates to liquidity dynamics we next examine the dynamics between *AT* and returns. Just as *AT* monitors the market for variation in liquidity, *AT* may be able to process and act on information before humans can. We examine this by estimating the information content of *AT* and human trades using Hasbrouck (1991a) and Hasbrouck (1991b) vector-autoregressions.

## 6.1 Information Content of AT - Impulse Response Function Results

To measure the information content of AT and human trades we first calculate the permanent price impact of AT and human trades. Several papers have addressed related questions in multi-market settings, e.g., for example, Huang (2002) and Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick (2003) for quoting and trading on electronic communications networks and Nasdaq. In settings with multiple markets, variation in time stamps across markets make it difficult to ensure the proper ordering of trades across different markets. In addition if time stamps are only reported in seconds, trades and quote changes may occur contemporaneously. Our data avoid these potential issues because trading is all within the DB Xetra system and time stamps are reported to the millisecond. Therefore, we estimate the model on a trade-by-trade basis using 10 lags for AT and human trades. We estimate the model for each stock for each day. We then conduct statistical inference using the 30 stocks \* 13 days = 390 observations.

As in Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick (2003) we estimate three equations, a midpoint quote return equation, an AT equation, and a human trade equation. We use  $t$ , an event that is a trade or quote change as our time scale and define  $q^{at}$  as the signed (+1 for a buy, -1 for a sell) AT trades and  $q^{human}$  as the signed human trades. We define  $r_t$  as the quote midpoint to quote midpoint return between trades or quote changes. The VAR using 10 lags is as follows:

$$r_t = \sum_{i=1}^{10} \alpha_i r_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{10} \beta_i q_{t-i}^{at} + \sum_{i=0}^{10} \gamma_i q_{t-i}^{human} + \epsilon_{1,t}, \quad (2)$$

$$q_t^{at} = \sum_{i=1}^{10} \delta_i r_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{10} \rho_i q_{t-i}^{at} + \sum_{i=1}^{10} \zeta_i q_{t-i}^{human} + \epsilon_{2,t}, \quad (3)$$

$$q_t^{human} = \sum_{i=1}^{10} \pi_i r_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{10} \nu_i q_{t-i}^{at} + \sum_{i=1}^{10} \psi_i q_{t-i}^{human} + \epsilon_{3,t}, \quad (4)$$

Each day the trading process restarts and all lagged values are set to zero. By estimating a transaction by transaction VAR we ensure that there is no correlation between  $q_t^{at}$  and  $q_t^{human}$ . After estimating the VAR model, we follow Hasbrouck (1991a) and Hasbrouck (1991b) and invert

the VAR to get the vector moving average (VMA) model:

$$\begin{pmatrix} r_t \\ q_t^{at} \\ q_t^{human} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a(L) & b(L) & c(L) \\ d(L) & e(L) & f(L) \\ g(L) & h(L) & i(L) \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \epsilon_{1,t} \\ \epsilon_{2,t} \\ \epsilon_{3,t} \end{pmatrix},$$

where  $a(L) - i(L)$  are lagged polynomial operators. Following Hasbrouck (1991a), the impulse response function for AT is  $\sum_{t=0}^{10} b(L)$  and can be interpreted as the private information content of an innovation in AT. Similarly, the impulse response function for humans is  $\sum_{t=0}^{10} c(L)$ . The impulse response functions provide an estimate of the permanent price impact of a trade innovation (the unexpected portion of a trade).

Table 7 reports the results of the impulse response function for 10 events into the future. We also estimate the VAR out to 100 events and find no qualitatively different results. Table 7 reports impulse response functions for each of the 30 stocks and the average impulse response function across all 30 stocks. For each stock we estimate the statistical significance of the difference of the impulse response function for AT and for human trading for the 13 trading days using Newey-West standard errors. AT has a greater permanent price impact for 28 of the 30 stocks and for 23 of those the AT-human difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. The average permanent price impact for AT is 0.53 basis points versus 0.44 basis points for human trades. We estimate the statistical significance of this 0.09 overall difference between AT and human trades by double clustering standard errors on stock and trading day (Thompson (2006) and Petersen (2009)). In summary, an innovation in AT trading leads to a more than 20% greater permanent price change than an innovation in human trading.

[Insert Table 7 Here]

Figure 1 graphs the overall average (across stock days) of the cumulative impulse response function of a positive (buy order) one standard deviation shock to AT and human order flow from the immediate response to 10 events in the future. The initial impact of an AT trade innovation is

greater than for humans and the impact of AT versus humans trades increases over the subsequent 10 events. We also see that the impulse response functions are becoming flat by the tenth event. Figure 1 shows that the price response to AT order flow is immediately greater than the response to human order flow.

[Insert Figure 1 Here]

The 95% confidence intervals in Figure 1 show that the larger immediate impact of AT is statistically significant. Following Chaboud et al. (2009) to analyze whether the immediate reaction to AT is due to overreaction we report the difference between the long-run (LR; 10 event forecast horizon) and short-run (SR; immediate) impulse response functions in Table 8. As in Table 7 we report estimates for AT, humans, and the AT-human difference for each stock and overall. The lagged adjustment (LR-SR) is smaller than the immediate response to trading for both AT and human trades. The LR-SR impulse response is greater for AT than humans in 24 stocks. 17 of the AT estimates are statistically significantly greater than humans and in no stock is there statistically significant evidence that human trading has a larger impulse response function than AT.

[Insert Table 8 Here]

The impulse response results provide evidence that individual innovations in AT have more private information than human trades. This difference is persistent and increases beyond the immediate impact of the trade. If AT contributed to transitory volatility the long-run impulse response function should be lower than the short-run impulse response function. Our evidence is more consistent with AT playing an important role in the efficient price formation process.

## **6.2 Aggregate Amount of Information in AT - Variance Decomposition**

The impulse response functions reported above provide evidence that innovations in AT have a significant impact on prices, but do not characterize how important the role of AT and human trading are in the overall price formation process. To do this we follow Hasbrouck (1991b) to decompose



the variance of the efficient price into the portion of total price discovery that is correlated with AT and human trades. Doing this first requires decomposing the midpoint return  $r_t$  into its random walk component  $m_t$  and stationary component  $s_t$ :

$$r_t = m_t + s_t \quad (5)$$

We refer to  $m_t$  as the efficient price where  $m_t = m_{t-1} + w_t$  and  $Ew_t = 0$ ;  $s_t$  is the transitory component. Using the previous VMA notation and defining  $\sigma_{\epsilon_1}^2 = E\epsilon_{1,t}^2$ ,  $\sigma_{\epsilon_2}^2 = E\epsilon_{2,t}^2$ , and  $\sigma_{\epsilon_3}^2 = E\epsilon_{3,t}^2$ , we decompose the variance of the efficient price into trade-correlated and trade-uncorrelated changes:

$$\sigma_w^2 = \left( \sum_{i=0}^{10} a_i \right)^2 \sigma_{\epsilon_1}^2 + \left( \sum_{i=0}^{10} b_i \right)^2 \sigma_{\epsilon_2}^2 + \left( \sum_{i=0}^{10} c_i \right)^2 \sigma_{\epsilon_3}^2 \quad (6)$$

The second and third terms represent the proportion of the efficient price variance attributable to AT and humans respectively. The first term is the public information (non-trade correlated) portion of price discovery.<sup>8</sup>

Table 9 reports the variance decompositions results. As in the previous analyses, we report the average by stock and overall. In 27 of the 30 stocks AT has a greater contribution to price discovery and in 21 of those stocks the AT-human difference is statistically significant. In no stock is the human contribution to price discovery statistically significantly greater than that of AT. On average AT contributes 39% more to price discovery than do humans. The larger percentage difference between AT and humans for the variance decomposition as compared to the impulse response functions implies that the innovations in AT order flow are greater than the innovations in human order flow. This is consistent with AT being able to disguise their trading intentions.

[Insert Table 9 Here]

We also calculate, but do not report for brevity, the short-run (immediate) variance decompo-

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<sup>8</sup>Because each trade is initiated either by AT or by humans the correlation in the trade equation residuals,  $\epsilon_{2,t}$  and  $\epsilon_{3,t}$ , is zero. Because the contemporaneous trade variables are included in the return equation the correlation of the residuals from the trade equations are uncorrelated with the residuals from the return equation. Therefore, we do not include the residual covariance terms in the variance decomposition.

sition for AT and human trades. The results for the short-run variance decomposition are similar to the results for the short-run impulse response functions in the previous section. Roughly half of the variance explained by AT and human trades is reflected immediately.

## 7 AT Liquidity Supply and Price Discovery

Similar to the previous sections' analysis of AT demanding liquidity and the role they plays in the price discovery process, we would like to analyze how AT supply liquidity. By comparing the volume of executed non-marketable AT orders with the total trading volume we can show that AT supply liquidity on 50% of trading volume. Unfortunately, while our data from DB contains all transactions where AT liquidity supply, we are only able to unambiguously identify 90% of these in the public transaction record.<sup>9</sup> This is due to the frequency of trading, the time stamps from the different data sources are not perfectly synchronized, and because knowing the size of a non-marketable AT order does not uniquely identify the size of the total transaction. For example, if a non-marketable AT order of 100 shares is executed the total trade size could be anything above 100 shares. Therefore, there are often several possible trades that occur at time stamps within plausible differences between the public transaction record and our AT transaction record.<sup>10</sup> This limits the types of analysis we can perform.

While we are unable to exactly match AT liquidity supplying trades with trades in the SIRCA public order book, we are able to build an AT order book and match this with the public order book. To understand how AT supply liquidity we build two order books (see the Appendix for further details). We build one AT order book that contains the best prices and sizes of AT orders and compare this order book with the SIRCA full order book. The depth in the full SICRA order book that is not found in the AT order book is the human order book. We then keep the best/inside bid and ask quotes for the AT and humans. If there is any doubt, each step in the matching procedure

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<sup>9</sup>Analysis on the transactions that we can unambiguously identify as AT liquidity supplying supports the main findings in this section that AT supply liquidity when it is expensive and AT are less likely to trade against private information.

<sup>10</sup>Multiple feasible matches for AT transactions also occur for liquidity demanding trades. However, when AT initiates a trade size is uniquely identified, this only occurs on 0.1% of the AT liquidity demanding trades as opposed to 10% of the AT liquidity supplying trades.

assumes humans quote updates occur before AT quote updates.

We first examine whether or not AT are more likely to supply liquidity at the best quotes. This provides initial evidence on whether or not AT are competitive in quoting the best prices for marketable orders to trade with. Table 10 examines the amount of time AT and humans are at the inside bid and ask. This combines the times when AT and humans are alone at the inside and when they are both at the inside together. A positive number indicates that an AT is at the best alone for longer than humans and the reverse is true if the value is negative.

[Insert Table 10 Here]

Table 10 shows that AT are at the inside more often in 24 of the 30 DAX stocks with the difference being statistically significant in 21 of the stocks. On average for each stock-day AT are at the inside almost 1 hour more per day than humans and the difference is statistically significant. Table 10 also examines whether or not AT are more likely to be present at the inside when spreads are wide or narrow. As in Table 5 for each stock we identify times when spreads are wider and narrower than average for that stock. We then calculate the amount of time, during the high- and low-spread times, AT and humans are on the inside. Table 10 shows that AT are at the inside more often during both high- and low-spread periods, but the AT-human difference is significantly higher during the high-spread periods. This shows that AT are more likely to provide liquidity when it is expensive. This is consistent with AT attempting to capture liquidity supply profits in the Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2008) make/take liquidity cycle.

For AT to be on the inside more often yet only provide liquidity for for 50% of volume, AT orders must be smaller or times when humans are alone at the inside are more likely to have transactions. One natural explanation for trades occurring more often when humans are alone at the inside quote is that the human quotes are stale and are adversely picked off. Examining how much the AT and human quotes contribute to the price discover process will show if when AT and human quotes are different the AT quotes better reflect the efficient price. If AT quotes contribute more to the price discovery process then when human quotes differ from AT quotes the human quotes appear inaccurate/stale.

## 7.1 Hasbrouck Information Shares

To examine AT and human quotes in the price discovery process we use the Information Shares (IS) approach pioneered by Hasbrouck (1995). Typically this approach is used to determine which of several markets contributes more to price discovery. This approach has been used in the literature to compare spot and derivatives markets (e.g., Tse (1999) and Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002)) and multiple stocks market (Hasbrouck (1995), Huang (2002), Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick (2003), and others). Because the information share has been widely used we briefly describe it. The econometric approach assumes that AT and human quotes form a common efficient price process. The information share attributable to AT and human quotes is the relative contribution of the innovations of each to the innovation in the common efficient price. The general convention is to equate the proportional information share to price discovery.

Because AT and human quotes are for the same stock arbitrage requires that the two price series be co-integrated. We calculate the AT midpoint as  $MP_t^{AT} = (BestBid_t^{AT} + BestAsk_t^{AT})/2$  and the midpoint for humans is calculated in the same manner. The midpoints are assumed covariance stationary. The information share of a participant is measured as that participants contribution to the total variance of the common (random-walk) component. To formalize, denote a price vector  $p_t$  that represents the prevailing mid-quote for AT as  $p_t^{AT} = m_t + \epsilon_t^{AT}$  and humans as  $p_t^{Hum} = m_t + \epsilon_t^{Hum}$ .  $m_t$ , the common efficient price, is assumed to follow a random walk:

$$m_t = m_{t-1} + u_t, \tag{7}$$

where  $E(u_t) = 0$ ,  $E(u^2_t) = \sigma_u^2$ , and  $E(u_t u_s) = 0$  for  $t \neq s$ . The price vector can be represented using a VMA model:

$$\Delta p_t = \epsilon_t + \psi_1 \epsilon_{t-1} + \psi_2 \epsilon_{t-2} \dots, \tag{8}$$

Where  $\epsilon$  is a 2 X 1 vector of innovations with a zero mean and a variance matrix of  $\Omega$ ;  $\epsilon_t = [\epsilon_t^{AT}, \epsilon_t^{Hum}]$  where  $\epsilon_t^{AT}$  reflects the innovations (information) attributable to AT and  $\epsilon_t^{Hum}$  to hu-

mans. The variance of the random walk component is then:

$$\sigma_u^2 = \Psi\Omega\Psi' \tag{9}$$

where  $\Omega = Var(\epsilon_t)$  and  $\Psi$  is a polynomial in the lag operator. Writing out the above equation yields:

$$\sigma_u^2 = [\Psi^{AT}, \Psi^{Hum}] \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{at}^2 & \sigma_{at,hum} \\ \sigma_{at,hum} & \sigma_{hum}^2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \Psi^{AT} \\ \Psi^{Hum} \end{bmatrix}.$$

If the covariance matrix is diagonal the random-walk variance attributable to AT and humans can be perfectly identified. If our record of the public limit order book was updated every time an order arrived, there should be no contemporaneous correlation between AT and human quote changes. However, it appears that at times the public order book dissemination contains multiple updates. Therefore, the off-diagonal terms are not zero so we follow Hasbrouck (1995) to construct upper and lower bounds for the information shares of AT and human quotes. The upper bound for AT corresponds to the assumption that all of the contemporaneous correlation between AT and human quote changes is attributable to AT; whereas the lower bound for AT assumes the contemporaneous correlation between AT and human quote changes is attributable to humans.

Table 11 present the information share estimates using AT and human midpoint prices at 250 millisecond intervals. As with the impulse response and variance decompositions for AT liquidity demand we calculate the information shares each day. We then conduct statistical significance based on the 13 days for each stock. For the overall estimates we pool the 390 stock day information share estimates and calculate standard errors controlling for correlation within each stock's estimate and controlling for correlation across stocks on the same day. It is worth recalling that our construction of the AT and human quotes ensured that whenever there was uncertainty as to whether or not an AT quote change preceded or followed a close by human quote change we assume the human quote change occurred first. Therefore, the lower bound for the AT information share is truly a lower bound, but the upper bound for AT information share is a lower bound for the true upper bound.

[Insert Table 11 Here]

Panel A reports the upper bound estimate for AT information shares and the lower bound for human information shares. Panel B reverses the ordering to provide the lower bound estimate for AT information shares and the upper bound for human information shares. The results in Panel A of Table 11 show that in 18 of 30 stocks AT have statistically significantly higher information shares. For the entire panel AT have an information share 21% higher with a t-statistic of 9.61. In no stocks do humans have statistically significantly higher information shares than AT. We use the same statistical framework as in the previous sections. In Panel B we see that the lower bound for AT information shares is statistically significantly higher than the upper bound for humans in 11 stocks while the upper bound for humans is statistically significantly higher than the lower bound for AT in 8 stocks. Overall, the lower bound on AT information shares is greater than the upper bound for human, but the difference is not statistically significant.

Comparing the upper and lower bounds on AT and human information shares in Panels A and B of Table 11 shows that 51% of price discovery comes from AT quotes, 39% of price discovery comes from human quotes, and 10% occurs contemporaneously in AT and human quotes. Given that we have ordered the quote changes to favor humans role in price discovery, we find evidence to support AT playing a larger role in price discovery, but no evidence to suggest that humans play a larger role.

## 8 Conclusion

We study algorithmic trading and its role in the price formation process. We find that AT consume liquidity when it is cheap and provide liquidity when it is expensive. AT contributes more to the discovery of the efficient price than human trading. These results demonstrate that AT closely monitor the market in terms of liquidity and information and react quickly to changes in market conditions. Contrary to conventional wisdom we find no evidence of AT behavior that would contribute to volatility beyond making prices more efficient.

Our results have important implications for academics, regulators, and market operators. Theoretical models of limit order books should allow for a significant fraction of traders who closely

monitor the market. These traders could prevent prices from deviating significantly from fundamentals and prevent spreads from widening beyond a certain point; both of these features would reduce the dimensionality of the state space (cf. Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2008)). The ATP approved by the German competition authority appears to have led to behavior that should improve both price efficiency and market liquidity in DAX stocks.

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## A Appendix - Xetra and AT Matching Details

The Xetra trading system is the electronic trading system operated by the Deutsche Boerse and handles more than 98% of German equities trading by euro volume in DAX stocks (2007 Deutsche Boerse Factbook). The DB is a publicly traded company that also operates the Eurex derivatives trading platform and the Clearstream European clearing and settlement system. DB admits participants that want to trade on Xetra based on regulations set and monitored by German and European financial regulators. After being admitted participants can only connect electronically to Xetra, floor trading is operated separately with no interaction between the two trading segments.

Xetra is implemented as an electronic limit order book with trading split into phases as follows:

- Opening call auction with a random ending that opens trading at 9:00
- A continuous trading period
- A two-minute intra-day call auction at 1:00 with a random ending
- A second continuous trading period
- A closing call auction beginning at 5:30 with a random ending after 5:35

We focus our analysis on trade occurring during the two continuous trading periods. Liquidity in DAX stocks is provided by public limit orders displayed in the order book of each stock. Orders execute automatically when an incoming market, or marketable limit order crosses with an outstanding limit order. Order execution preference is determined using price-time priorities. Three types of orders are permitted, limit, market and iceberg orders. Iceberg orders are orders that display only a portion of the total size of an order. Iceberg orders sacrifice time priority on the non-displayed portion. Pre-trade transparency includes the 10 best bids and ask prices and quantities but not the ID of the submitting participant (as on the Paris Bourse (Venkataraman (2001))). Trade price and size are disseminated immediately to all participants. The tick size for most stocks is 1 euro cent with the exception of two stocks that trade in tenths of a cent.<sup>11</sup>

### A.1 Trade Matching

For trades we match two separate types of data. AT trades are matched with trades in the SIRCA public data record. We also match the best (highest bid and lowest ask) AT orders with the SIRCA public order book. Using the AT order data we identify AT liquidity demanding trades in the public data. We match these AT trades to the SICRA data using the following criteria:

- Symbol
- Price
- Size
- Trade Direction
- Time stamp (milliseconds)

Matches between the data sources identify liquidity demanding trades (AT). Liquidity demanding trades match exactly with trade size and price in the public data. We identify the trade initiator

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<sup>11</sup>Both stocks, Deutsche Telekom AG and Infineon AG have trade prices below 15 euros. Our sample period overlaps a Deutsche Boerse tick-size test that was subsequently extended to other stocks

in the SIRCA public data using the Lee and Ready trade direction algorithm Lee and Ready (1991) with the Bessembinder (2003) modifications to determine the trade direction in the public data and use the modification and execution time stamp in the AT data.

Adjustments are made for an additional lag in the time stamp between the AT and SIRCA data sets. The publicly available data is time-stamped to the millisecond but, due to transmission and additional system processing, it lags the system order data. We allow for a time window of up to 250 ms in the public data when looking for a match of the remaining criteria. The below table A-1 summarizes the lags needed to match trades by type.

Table A-1: **Trade Matching by Type and Lag.** This table reports distributions of lags between the time stamps in the Deutsche Boerse System Order data and SIRCA public data used for matching.

Lag (MS)	AT	% of Total
000-050	324600	25.62%
051-100	390456	30.82%
101-150	270765	21.37%
151-200	130655	10.31%
201-250	76999	6.08%
251-300	58765	4.64%
301-500	14561	1.15%
Total	1266801	100.00%

## A.2 Quote Matching

We also match the quotes from non-marketable orders submitted by algorithms and humans. To do so we create two order books. For the AT we re-create an AT order book based on the system order data. To create a human order book we take the SIRCA publicly disseminated order book and 'subtract' the AT order book. The SIRCA order book is disseminated with a lag, in this case, of not more than 250 ms. The 250 ms maximum lag was discovered by manual inspection of a large number of AT orders and SIRCA order books, especially around periods of high activity. After the AT order book is created we match the best AT price and quantity with the next order book update after the 250 ms lag. If there were no updates within 500 ms, we take the last update before 250 ms. If we find a match and the AT price is 'better' than the posted price we delete the AT record. This phenomena is likely related to fleeting orders described in Hasbrouck and Saar (2008). If an AT submits an order that only lives for a small of number of MS and is therefore fleeting, we will be unlikely to find it in the SIRCA public order data. Another case is when an AT submit a non-marketable limit order which is hit by an incoming marketable limit order directly after submission but before the 250 ms mark. This only occurs when AT orders live less than 250 ms and the true lag is also less than 250 ms. If the quantity match isn't exact we adjust the AT quantity to the lowest possible AT quantity. By performing these corrections we are essentially handicapping AT and giving the benefit of the doubt to humans in general.

Table 1: **ATP-Rebate Program.** Fee rebate schedule for ATP participants by volume levels.

<b>Cumulative Monthly ATP-Volume (in Mil. Euros)</b>	<b>ATP-Rebate (per Volume level)</b>
0 < 250	0.0%
250 < 500	7.5%
500 < 1000	15.0%
1000 < 2000	22.5%
2000 < 3750	30.0%
3750 < 7500	37.5%
7500 < 15000	45.0%
15000 < 30000	52.5%
> 30000	60.0%

Table 2: **Summary Statistics.** This table presents descriptive statistics for the 30 constituents of the DAX index between January 1, 2008 and January 18, 2008. The data set combines Deutsche Boerse Automated Trading Program System Order data and SIRCA trade, quote, and order data. Market Capitalization data is gathered from the Deutsche Boerse website and cross-checked against data posted directly on the company's website and is the closing market capitalization on December 31, 2007. Other variables are averaged per stock and day (390 observations) and the mean, std. dev., maximum and minimum of these stock-day averages are reported.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Mkt. Cap. (Euro Billion)	32.85	26.03	4.81	99.45
Price (Euros)	67.85	42.28	6.45	155.15
Std. Dev of Daily Return (%)	3.12	1.40	1.47	9.29
Daily Trading Volume (Euro Million)	250	217	23	1,509
Daily Number of Trades per Day	5,344	3,003	1,292	19,252
Trade Size (Euro)	40,893	15,808	14,944	121,710
Quoted Spread (bps)	2.98	3.01	1.24	9.86
Effective Spread (bps)	3.49	3.05	1.33	10.05
Depth (Euro 10 Million)	0.0177	0.0207	0.0044	0.1522
Depth3 (Euro 10 Million)	0.1012	0.1545	0.0198	1.0689

Table 3: **AT Volume by Trade-size Category.** This table reports volume-weighted participation by AT and humans in 5 trade size categories.

Trade-size Categories	AT	HUM	All
0 - 499	68%	32%	21%
500 -999	57%	43%	43%
1,000 - 4,999	42%	58%	21%
5,000 - 9,999	30%	70%	7%
10,000 +	23%	77%	8%
All	52%	48%	100%

Table 4: **Trade Frequency Conditional on Previous Trade.** Panel A reports the conditional frequency of observing AT and human trades after observing trades of other participants. In column and row headings  $t$  indexes trades.  $AT$  represents AT trades and  $Hum$  represents human trades. Panel B provides conditional probabilities based on the previous trade's size and participant with the three highest values per column highlighted in bold.

Panel A		Uncond.		Freq.	Buy	Sell	$Buy_{t-1}$		$Sell_{t-1}$	
Ordering							$Sell_t$	$Buy_t$		
$AT_{t-1}AT_t$	37.03%	40.73%	13.73%	10.96%	7.84%	8.20%				
$AT_{t-1}HUM_t$	23.82%	20.12%	5.53%	5.05%	5.44%	4.11%				
$HUM_{t-1}AT_t$	23.82%	20.12%	6.45%	5.64%	3.89%	4.15%				
$HUM_{t-1}HUM_t$	15.33%	19.02%	5.48%	5.35%	3.75%	4.45%				
	100.00%	31.18%	27.00%	20.91%						

Panel B		$AT_t^5$	$AT_t^4$	$AT_t^3$	$AT_t^2$	$AT_t^1$	$Hum_t^5$	$Hum_t^4$	$Hum_t^3$	$Hum_t^2$	$Hum_t^1$
$AT_{t-1}^5$	<b>8.38%</b>	<b>9.46%</b>	<b>18.13%</b>	16.78%	7.81%	<b>8.16%</b>	<b>6.03%</b>	6.74%	7.96%	10.54%	
$AT_{t-1}^4$	<b>3.82%</b>	<b>7.87%</b>	<b>15.97%</b>	23.33%	11.71%	<b>4.51%</b>	4.61%	7.36%	9.90%	10.94%	
$AT_{t-1}^3$	1.35%	2.73%	12.00%	<b>28.95%</b>	20.69%	2.22%	2.70%	6.23%	11.11%	12.03%	
$AT_{t-1}^2$	0.22%	0.70%	4.69%	<b>27.10%</b>	<b>33.88%</b>	0.60%	1.12%	4.07%	11.89%	15.72%	
$AT_{t-1}^1$	0.05%	0.18%	1.75%	16.67%	<b>48.70%</b>	0.17%	0.45%	2.19%	9.89%	19.94%	
$Hum_{t-1}^5$	<b>5.46%</b>	<b>6.51%</b>	<b>13.72%</b>	17.50%	8.30%	<b>10.26%</b>	<b>7.15%</b>	<b>8.66%</b>	10.35%	12.09%	
$Hum_{t-1}^4$	1.80%	3.36%	10.40%	22.56%	14.42%	4.24%	<b>6.40%</b>	<b>9.77%</b>	13.46%	13.58%	
$Hum_{t-1}^3$	0.56%	1.39%	6.78%	<b>23.53%</b>	21.17%	1.70%	2.75%	<b>10.16%</b>	<b>16.36%</b>	<b>15.60%</b>	
$Hum_{t-1}^2$	0.20%	0.54%	3.43%	19.21%	28.37%	0.69%	1.31%	4.95%	<b>19.83%</b>	<b>21.47%</b>	
$Hum_{t-1}^1$	0.15%	0.34%	2.20%	14.98%	<b>33.10%</b>	0.56%	0.88%	3.36%	<b>13.92%</b>	<b>30.50%</b>	
Uncond.	0.39%	0.73%	3.39%	17.10%	31.62%	1.03%	1.03%	3.88%	15.08%	26.18%	

Table 5: **Average Time Between Trades.** Panel A reports the average amount of time between two trades, two AT trades, and two human trades. Panel B provides the average amount of time between for different trade orderings and trade-size categories (0-499, 500-999, and greater than 1,000 shares). Panel C reports the average time between trades conditional on the spread at the time of the previous trade. The Small - Large row reports the difference in waiting time between trades following a small spread and trades following a large spread. The AT - Hum column reports the difference in time between trades for AT and human trades. The Diff Small - Large row represents the Small Spread minus Large Spread for each column. T-statistics account for both time-series and cross-sectional correlation. Spread categories are calculated using the time-series spread quartiles for each stock.

Panel A		All Trades	ATAT	HumHum		
Unconditional		5.49	6.78	9.27		
Panel B		Trade Ordering				
Trade Size/Ordering	Trade $\rightarrow$ AT	AT $\rightarrow$ Trade	Trade $\rightarrow$ HUM	Hum $\rightarrow$ Trade		
All Trades	4.86	5.48	6.49	5.52		
Large Trades	5.11	4.85	6.83	4.46		
Medium Trades	5.04	5.17	6.34	4.89		
Small Trades	4.73	5.72	6.49	6.19		
Panel C		Unconditional	AT	Hum	AT - Hum	t-stat
Conditional on Spread						
Large Spread	6.89	9.03	11.43	-2.40	-15.46	
Large medium spread	6.33	8.29	11.31	-3.01	-22.81	
Small medium spread	5.05	6.72	9.96	-3.24	-35.57	
Small spread	3.72	4.67	9.09	-4.42	-39.59	
Diff Small - Large	-3.17	-4.36	-2.34	-2.02	-77.97	
t-stat		-38.73	-15.53			



Table 6: **AT Probit Regression.** The dependent variable is equal to one if the trade is initiated by an AT and zero otherwise. Trade size is the euro volume of a trade divided by 100,000. Depth is the depth at the best bid + the depth at the best ask. Depth3 is the depth at three times the average quoted spread on the bid side + depth at three times the average spread on the ask side. The units for both depth measures are 10 million euros. Lagged volatility is the absolute value of the stock return over the 15-minutes prior to the trade. Lagged volume is the sum of the volume over the 15-minutes prior to the trade. Firm fixed effects and time of day dummies for each half-hour of the trading day are not reported.

Variable	Model A	Model A1
Quoted Spread	-0.016	-0.016
– Probability Slope	-0.006	-0.006
– Chi-square	5324	5420
Trade Size	-0.20	-0.20
– Probability Slope	-0.08	-0.08
– Chi-square	19645	19275
Depth	-	-0.04
– Probability Slope	-	-0.01
– Chi-square	-	1.14
Depth3	0.10	-
– Probability Slope	0.04	-
– Chi-square	69	-
Lagged Volatility	-0.648	0.161
– Probability Slope	-0.250	0.062
– Chi-square	0.07	0.00
Lagged Volume	-0.040	-0.030
– Probability Slope	-0.016	-0.012
– Chi-square	30.18	17.03
Observations	2,085,233	2,085,233

Table 7: **AT and Human Long-Run Impulse Response Functions.** This table reports the average long-run (10 events in the future) impulse response function for AT, human trades, and the AT-Human difference. T-statistics for the AT-Human difference for individual securities account for time-series correlation and for the overall average account for both time-series and cross-sectional correlation.

Stock	AT	Human	AT-Human	t-stat
ADS	0.46	0.46	-0.01	-0.28
ALV	0.23	0.15	0.07	5.28
BAS	0.25	0.16	0.09	9.65
BAY	0.47	0.35	0.12	12.30
BMW	0.49	0.45	0.04	1.39
CBK	0.75	0.59	0.16	3.30
CON	0.51	0.39	0.12	5.16
DAI	0.36	0.28	0.09	4.33
DB1	0.46	0.39	0.07	6.62
DBK	0.30	0.25	0.05	2.12
DPB	0.52	0.40	0.12	3.90
DPW	0.57	0.56	0.01	0.22
DTE	0.96	0.82	0.14	1.57
EON	0.26	0.18	0.08	5.44
FME	0.52	0.45	0.08	1.51
HNK	0.61	0.49	0.12	2.08
HRX	0.76	0.74	0.02	0.33
IFX	1.42	1.25	0.17	1.18
LHA	0.84	0.68	0.16	2.99
LIN	0.33	0.36	-0.03	-1.59
MAN	0.49	0.36	0.12	3.50
MEO	0.55	0.39	0.16	3.99
MRC	0.54	0.43	0.11	3.40
MUV	0.29	0.20	0.10	3.58
RWE	0.35	0.23	0.12	3.65
SAP	0.43	0.31	0.11	2.92
SIE	0.25	0.20	0.06	2.43
TKA	0.58	0.40	0.18	5.88
TUI	1.17	0.90	0.26	4.63
VOW	0.31	0.22	0.09	8.99
Overall	0.53	0.44	0.09	8.71

Table 8: **Long Run - Short Run Impulse Response.** This table reports the long-run impulse response (10 events in the future) minus the short-run impulse response (immediate) for AT, human trades, and the AT-Human difference. T-statistics for the AT-Human difference for individual securities account for time-series correlation and for the overall average account for both time-series and cross-sectional correlation.

Stock	AT	Human	AT-Human	t-stat
ADS	0.20	0.22	-0.02	-0.59
ALV	0.09	0.06	0.03	2.25
BAS	0.13	0.07	0.05	8.22
BAY	0.22	0.16	0.06	4.57
BMW	0.23	0.24	-0.01	-0.95
CBK	0.26	0.21	0.04	0.71
CON	0.27	0.21	0.06	5.25
DAI	0.14	0.09	0.04	2.52
DB1	0.21	0.18	0.03	4.38
DBK	0.13	0.11	0.02	0.98
DPB	0.24	0.16	0.08	4.25
DPW	0.16	0.21	-0.05	-1.51
DTE	0.00	0.10	-0.10	-1.26
EON	0.13	0.08	0.04	3.66
FME	0.21	0.17	0.04	0.94
HNK	0.24	0.19	0.05	1.08
HRX	0.31	0.36	-0.05	-1.17
IFX	0.01	0.15	-0.14	-1.16
LHA	0.27	0.22	0.05	0.85
LIN	0.17	0.20	-0.03	-1.39
MAN	0.25	0.20	0.05	1.96
MEO	0.26	0.19	0.07	2.83
MRC	0.28	0.23	0.05	2.33
MUV	0.13	0.09	0.04	2.23
RWE	0.17	0.11	0.06	2.59
SAP	0.13	0.07	0.06	3.75
SIE	0.12	0.10	0.03	1.38
TKA	0.23	0.16	0.07	3.56
TUI	0.41	0.39	0.02	0.98
VOW	0.15	0.10	0.05	5.00
Overall	0.19	0.17	0.02	2.76

Table 9: **AT-Human Variance Decomposition.** This table reports the percentage of the variance of the efficient price correlated with AT and human trades. The remainder is in the Return column and is unrelated to trading. AT-Human is the average difference in efficient price variance explained by AT and humans. T-statistics for the AT-Human difference for individual securities account for time-series correlation and for the overall average account for both time-series and cross-sectional correlation.

Stock	AT	Human	Return	AT-Human	t-stat
ADS	4.01%	4.50%	91.49%	-0.49%	-1.3
ALV	3.81%	2.01%	94.18%	1.80%	4.85
BAS	4.18%	1.81%	94.01%	2.37%	9.66
BAY	6.08%	3.69%	90.23%	2.39%	8.98
BMW	4.05%	3.95%	92.01%	0.10%	0.20
CBK	6.24%	4.06%	89.70%	2.18%	2.83
CON	5.23%	3.32%	91.45%	1.92%	4.88
DAI	4.23%	2.76%	93.01%	1.47%	3.15
DB1	6.05%	4.83%	89.12%	1.21%	4.45
DBK	4.29%	3.25%	92.46%	1.04%	1.93
DPB	4.10%	2.68%	93.23%	1.42%	2.56
DPW	4.54%	4.64%	90.82%	-0.0%	-0.15
DTE	12.71%	10.15%	77.13%	2.56%	1.03
EON	4.73%	2.51%	92.77%	2.22%	4.98
FME	5.06%	3.83%	91.11%	1.22%	1.35
HNK <sub>p</sub>	5.60%	4.70%	89.70%	0.90%	1.09
HRX	5.77%	5.42%	88.81%	0.35%	0.4
IFX	5.73%	5.67%	88.61%	0.06%	0.04
LHA	6.42%	4.52%	89.06%	1.90%	2.76
LIN	3.21%	4.01%	92.78%	-0.80%	-2.42
MAN	4.90%	3.01%	92.09%	1.89%	2.70
MEO	5.88%	3.31%	90.81%	2.57%	3.17
MRC	5.63%	4.11%	90.25%	1.52%	2.38
MUV	5.49%	2.89%	91.62%	2.59%	3.85
RWE	5.15%	2.56%	92.29%	2.59%	3.17
SAP	4.69%	2.76%	92.55%	1.94%	2.46
SIE	3.88%	2.76%	93.36%	1.13%	1.88
TKA	6.07%	3.28%	90.65%	2.79%	4.52
TUI	7.12%	4.93%	87.95%	2.19%	3.67
VOW	5.94%	3.24%	90.83%	2.70%	5.68
Overall	5.36%	3.84%	90.80%	1.52 %	8.01

Table 10: **AT and Human Time at Best Quotes.** This table reports the number of seconds AT are at the best bid and ask quotes minus the number of seconds human traders are at the best quotes. The remainder of time both AT and humans are both at the best quotes. The first column reports the AT - Human difference in time at best quotes. The subsequent columns report the AT-Human difference for time when stocks' spreads are below their per stock time-series average (Low Spread), when spreads are above their per stock time-series average (High Spread), and the AT-Human difference-in-difference for the low-spread and high-spread times (Low-Spread column minus High-Spread column). T-statistics for individual securities account for time-series correlation and for the overall average account for both time-series and cross-sectional correlation.

Stock	AT - Human	t-stat	Low Spread AT - Human	High Spreads AT - Human	Low-spread minus High-spread	t-stat
ADS	4235	3.91	1454	2780	-1326	-2.35
ALV	-3000	-2.94	-2368	-632	-1735	-2.67
BAS	1011	1.41	-492	1503	-1995	-6.07
BAY	3136	6.44	718	2418	-1700	-10.58
BMW	6321	4.31	2612	3708	-1095	-1.83
CBK	4706	2.95	2996	1709	1287	2.1
CON	1249	0.96	-739	1988	-2727	-8.01
DAI	-3893	-2.27	-3508	-385	-3122	-14.16
DB1	2739	4.94	132	2607	-2475	-2.88
DBK	-3395	-8.58	-3254	-141	-3112	-8.51
DPB	7115	7.83	2187	4927	-2740	-6
DPW	4555	4.76	2789	1765	1024	2.83
DTE	-2461	-3.56	-2087	-374	-1713	-3.9
EON	1479	2.29	-301	1780	-2081	-5.59
FME	11850	11.64	5361	6489	-1128	-0.75
HNK	7494	10.04	4054	3439	615	0.58
HRX	1028	0.54	-722	1751	-2474	-5.04
IFX	-201	-0.22	-287	85	-372	-0.95
LHA	4056	2.45	3215	840	2375	1.9
LIN	7219	12.42	2727	4492	-1764	-4.03
MAN	4712	9.18	1297	3415	-2117	-6.42
MEO	6843	3.93	3258	3585	-326	-0.53
MRC	9155	9.8	3348	5806	-2457	-5.3
MUV	6959	8.94	2492	4466	-1974	-2.58
RWE	3551	6.13	874	2676	-1802	-2.69
SAP	3715	6.1	656	3059	-2402	-6.78
SIE	-1911	-2.48	-2612	701	-3313	-11.73
TKA	4238	14.51	883	3354	-2470	-6.35
TUI	5885	5.26	4082	1802	2279	3.16
VOW	2415	2.27	-42	2458	-2500	-3.12
Overall	3360	7.00	958	2403	-1445	-7.21

Table 11: **AT and Human Information Shares:** This table reports Hasbrouck information shares for AT and human quotes. Panel A reports maximal AT contribution and minimal human contribution. Panel B reports minimal AT contribution and maximal human contribution. T-statistics for the AT-Human difference for individual securities account for time-series correlation and for the overall average account for both time-series and cross-sectional correlation.

Panel A				
Stock	AT First	Hum Second	Diff	t-stat
ADS	0.58	0.42	0.16	3.53
ALV	0.56	0.44	0.12	2.9
BAS	0.53	0.47	0.07	1.55
BAY	0.71	0.29	0.41	22.64
BMW	0.65	0.35	0.31	2.74
CBK	0.58	0.42	0.17	1.46
CON	0.51	0.49	0.02	0.21
DAI	0.51	0.49	0.02	0.35
DB1	0.54	0.46	0.08	0.92
DBK	0.55	0.45	0.09	1.54
DPB	0.56	0.44	0.13	1.25
DPW	0.66	0.34	0.32	4.54
DTE	0.72	0.28	0.44	13.92
EON	0.53	0.47	0.07	1.25
FME	0.63	0.37	0.26	5.9
HNK	0.72	0.28	0.44	7.94
HRX	0.48	0.52	-0.04	-0.25
IFX	0.75	0.25	0.50	29.57
LHA	0.72	0.28	0.43	7.61
LIN	0.54	0.46	0.08	0.6
MAN	0.57	0.43	0.13	4.1
MEO	0.69	0.31	0.38	5.89
MRC	0.58	0.42	0.16	1.48
MUV	0.67	0.33	0.35	11.96
RWE	0.65	0.35	0.29	8.56
SAP	0.67	0.33	0.35	5.53
SIE	0.48	0.52	-0.04	-0.75
TKA	0.61	0.39	0.22	2.49
TUI	0.70	0.30	0.40	5.97
VOW	0.55	0.45	0.09	2.07
Overall	0.61	0.39	0.21	9.61

Table 11 cont.  
Panel B

Stock	AT Second	Hum First	Diff	t-stat
ADS	0.48	0.52	-0.03	-0.67
ALV	0.44	0.56	-0.12	-2.43
BAS	0.43	0.57	-0.13	-3.53
BAY	0.62	0.38	0.23	8.84
BMW	0.57	0.43	0.14	1.04
CBK	0.50	0.50	0.01	0.05
CON	0.43	0.57	-0.15	-1.75
DAI	0.41	0.59	-0.19	-2.36
DB1	0.42	0.58	-0.16	-2.44
DBK	0.42	0.58	-0.17	-3.35
DPB	0.46	0.54	-0.08	-0.79
DPW	0.58	0.42	0.17	2.17
DTE	0.54	0.46	0.08	1.15
EON	0.43	0.57	-0.13	-2.82
FME	0.58	0.42	0.16	3.5
HNK	0.65	0.35	0.31	5.36
HRX	0.41	0.59	-0.18	-1.28
IFX	0.64	0.36	0.27	5.51
LHA	0.65	0.35	0.29	4.73
LIN	0.45	0.55	-0.11	-0.85
MAN	0.47	0.53	-0.05	-1.37
MEO	0.60	0.40	0.19	3.78
MRC	0.50	0.50	-0.01	-0.07
MUV	0.58	0.42	0.15	4.47
RWE	0.55	0.45	0.09	2.89
SAP	0.62	0.38	0.24	3.61
SIE	0.41	0.59	-0.18	-3.14
TKA	0.56	0.44	0.11	1.3
TUI	0.61	0.39	0.21	2.86
VOW	0.44	0.56	-0.12	-2.25
Overall	0.51	0.49	0.03	1.22




Figure 1: Cumulative Impulse Response Functions for AT and Human Initiated Trades