Assessing my 2000 forecasts, in 2014


	Revenues	S	Operating	g Inco	ome	Operating Margin				
Year	My forecast (2000)	Actual	My forecast (2000)		Actual	My forecast (2000)	Actual			
2000	\$2,793	\$2,762	-\$ 373	-\$	664.00	-13.35%	-24.04%			
2001	\$5,585	\$3,122	-\$ 94	-\$	231.00	-1.68%	-7.40%			
2002	\$9,774	\$3,932	\$ 407	\$	106.00	4.16%	2.70%			
2003	\$14,661	\$5,264	\$ 1,038	\$	271.00	7.08%	5.15%			
2004	\$19,059	\$6,921	\$ 1,628	\$	440.00	8.54%	6.36%			
2005	\$23,862	\$8,490	\$ 2,212	\$	432.00	9.27%	5.09%			
2006	\$28,729	\$10,711	\$ 2,768	\$	389.00	9.63%	3.63%			
2007	\$33,211	\$14,835	\$ 3,261	\$	655.00	9.82%	4.42%			
2008	\$36,798	\$19,166	\$ 3,646	\$	842.00	9.91%	4.39%			
2009	\$39,006	\$24,509	\$ 3,883	\$	1,129.00	9.95%	4.61%			
2010	\$41,346	\$34,204	\$ 4,135	\$	1,406.00	10.00%	4.11%			
2011	\$43,827	\$48,077	\$ 4,383	\$	862.00	10.00%	1.79%			
2012	\$46,457	\$61,093	\$ 4,646	\$	676.00	10.00%	1.11%			
2013	\$49,244	\$74,452	\$ 4,925	\$	745.00	10.00%	1.00%			
2014 (LTM)	\$51,460	\$85,247	\$ 5,146.35	\$	97.00	10.00%	0.11%			

Amazon

The Greatest (and most Feared) Disruptive Platform in History

Amazon will complete its metaphorsis from being a retail company to one that can take its competitive advantages - access to capital & willingness to lose money for long periods, while disrupting and changing the status quo - to any business that it targets, giving it the potential for high revenue growth on top of already-large revenues. It will be able to use the pricing power it accumulates in each business it is in, to increase profit margins, partly through economies of scale and partly through higher prices. Its low debt ratio and divergent business mix give it a low cost of capital.

					The	Assun	nptions							
	Base year Years 1-5			Ye	ars 6-10				After year 10	Link to story				
Revenues (a)	\$:	208,125	15.00%	→	3.00%				3.00%	Expanding into new businessses				
			_	\rightarrow						Economies of scale and pricing power				
Operating margin (b)	7	.71%	7.71%	1	2.50%				12.50%	increase margins				
Tax rate	20.20% 20.20%		→ 2	4.00%				24.00%	Converging on a global tax rate of 25%					
										Big payoffs from investing in technology				
Reinvestment (c)			Sales to capital ratio	5.95			RIR =		30.00%	and content				
Return on capital	15	5.24%	Marginal ROIC =	89.16	%				10.00%	The last man standing				
Cost of capital (d)			7.97%	\rightarrow	7.50%				7.50%	Low debt & diverse business mix				
					The	Cash	Flows							
	Revei	nues	Operating Margin	EBIT		EBIT	(1-t)	Rei	nvestment	FCFF				
1	\$ 2	239,344	8.67%	\$	20,753	\$	16,560	\$	5,249	\$ 11,3				
2	\$ 2	275,245	9.63%	\$	26,501	\$	21,147	\$	6,037	\$ 15,1				
3	\$ 3	316,532	10.59%	\$	33,506		26,736			\$ 19,7				
4	\$ 3	364,012	11.54%	\$	42,017	\$	33,527	\$		\$ 25,5				
5	\$ 4	418,614	12.50%	\$		\$	41,754	_	9,181	\$ 32,5				
6	\$ 4	471,359	12.50%	\$	58,920	\$	46,568	\$	8,869	\$ 37,6				
7	\$!	519,438	12.50%	\$		\$	50,825	\$	8,084	\$ 42,7				
8	_	559,954	12.50%	\$		\$	54,258	_	-,	\$ 47,4				
9	_	590,191	12.50%	\$		\$	56,628	_	-,	\$ 51,5				
10	\$ (607,897	12.50%	\$	75,987	\$	57,750	_	2,977	\$ 54,7				
Terminal year	\$ (626,134	12.50%	\$	78,267	\$	59,483	\$	17,845	\$ 41,6				
						he Va	lue							
Terminal value				\$	925,287									
PV(Terminal value)				\$	435,438									
PV (CF over next 10 year				\$	206,707									
Value of operating assets =				\$	642,144									
Adjustment for distress									Probability of failure =	0.00%				
- Debt & Mnority Inter				\$	45,435									
+ Cash & Other Non-or	peratin	ig assets		\$	27,050									
Value of equity				\$	623,759									
 Value of equity optio 	ns			\$										
Number of shares					497.00									
Value per share				\$	1,255.05	1,255.05 Stock was trading at = \$1,970.19								



II. Mature Companies in transition...

- Mature companies are generally the easiest group to value. They have long, established histories that can be mined for inputs. They have investment policies that are set and capital structures that are stable, thus making valuation more grounded in past data.
- However, this stability in the numbers can mask real problems at the company. The company may be set in a process, where it invests more or less than it should and does not have the right financing mix. In effect, the policies are consistent, stable and bad.
- If you expect these companies to change or as is more often the case to have change thrust upon them,

The perils of valuing mature companies...

Figure 7.1: Estimation Issues - Mature Companies

Lots of historical data on earnings and cashflows. Key questions remain if these numbers are volatile over time or if the existing assets are not being efficiently utilized.

Growth is usually not very high, but firms may still be generating healthy returns on investments, relative to cost of funding. Questions include how long they can generate these excess returns and with what growth rate in operations. Restructuring can change both inputs dramatically and some firms maintain high growth through acquisitions.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

> How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

Equity claims can vary in voting rights and dividends.

Operating risk should be stable, but the firm can change its financial leverage This can affect both the cost of equtiy and capital.

Maintaining excess returns or high growth for any length of time is difficult to do for a mature firm.

When will the firm

become a mature

fiirm, and what are

the potential

roadblocks?

What is the value of equity in the firm?

Hormel Foods: The Value of Control Changing

Hormel Foods sells packaged meat and other food products and has been in existence as a publicly traded company for almost 80 years. In 2008, the firm reported after-tax operating income of \$315 million, reflecting a compounded growth of 5% over the previous 5 years.

The Status Quo

Run by existing management, with conservative reinvestment policies (reinvestment rate = 14.34% and debt ratio = 10.4%.

Anemic growth rate and short growth period, due to reinvestment policy

Low debt ratio affects cost of capital

Year	Operating income after taxes	Expected growth rate	ROC	Reinvestment Rate	Reinvestment	FCFF	Cost of capital	Present Value
Trailing 12 months	\$315							
1	\$324	2.75%	14.34%	19.14%	\$62	\$262	6.79%	\$245
2	\$333	2.75%	14.34%	19.14%	\$64	\$269	6.79%	\$236
3	\$342	2.75%	14.34%	19.14%	\$65	\$276	6.79%	\$227
Beyond	\$350	2.35%	7.23%	32.52%	\$114	\$4,840	7.23%	\$3,974
Value of operating a	ssets							\$4,682
(Add) Cash								\$155
(Subtract) Debt								\$491
(Subtract) Management Options								\$53
Value of equity in common stock								\$4,293
Value per share								\$31.91

New and better management

More aggressive reinvestment which increases the reinvestment rate (to 40%) and tlength of growth (to 5 years), and higher debt ratio (20%).

Operating Restructuring (1)

Expected growth rate = ROC * Reinvestment Rate

Expected growth rae (status quo) = 14.34% * 19.14% = 2.75%

Expected growth rate (optimal) = 14.00% * 40% = 5.60%

ROC drops, reinvestment rises and growth goes up.

Financial restructuring 🕢

Cost of capital = Cost of equity (1-Debt ratio) + Cost of debt (Debt ratio)

Status quo = 7.33% (1-.104) + 3.60% (1-.40) (.104) = 6.79%

Optimal = 7.75% (1-.20) + 3.60% (1-.40) (.20) = 6.63%

Cost of equity rises but cost of capital drops.

							•	
Year	Operating income after taxes	Expected growth rate	ROC	Reinvestment Rate	Reinvestment	FCFF	Cost of capital	Present Value
Trailing 12 months	\$315							
1	\$333	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$133	\$200	6.63%	\$187
2	\$351	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$141	\$211	6.63%	\$185
3	\$371	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$148	\$223	6.63%	\$184
4	\$392	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$260	\$235	6.63%	\$182
5	\$414	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$223	\$248	6.63%	\$180
Beyond	\$423	2.35%	6.74%	34.87%	\$148	\$6,282	6.74%	\$4,557
Value of operating a	ssets							\$5,475
(Add) Cash								\$155
(Subtract) Debt								\$491
(Subtract) Management Options								\$53
Value of equity in common stock								\$5,085
06 lue perAlswath	Damodaran							\$37.80

Lesson 1: Cost cutting and increased efficiency are easier accomplished on paper than in practice... and require commitment


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Aswath Damodaran


Lesson 2: Increasing growth is not always a value creating option.. And it may destroy value at times...

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Lesson 3: Financial leverage is a double-edged sword..

Exhibit 7.1: Optimal Financing Mix: Hormel Foods in January 2009



Aswath Damodaran

III. Dealing with decline and distress...

Historial data often reflects flat or declining revenues and falling margins. Investments often earn less than the cost of capital.

Growth can be negative, as firm sheds assets and shrinks. As less profitable assets are shed, the firm's remaining assets may improve in quality.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

Underfunded pension obligations and litigation claims can lower value of equity. Liquidation preferences can affect value of equity

What is the value of equity in the firm?

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

Depending upon the risk of the assets being divested and the use of the proceeds from the divestuture (to pay dividends or retire debt), the risk in both the firm and its equity can change.

When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

There is a real chance, especially with high financial leverage, that the firm will not make it. If it is expected to survive as a going concern, it will be as a much smaller entity.

a. Dealing with Decline

- In decline, firms often see declining revenues and lower margins, translating in negative expected growth over time.
- If these firms are run by good managers, they will not fight decline. Instead, they will adapt to it and shut down or sell investments that do not generate the cost of capital. This can translate into negative net capital expenditures (depreciation exceeds cap ex), declining working capital and an overall negative reinvestment rate. The best case scenario is that the firm can shed its bad assets, make itself a much smaller and healthier firm and then settle into long-term stable growth.
- As an investor, your worst case scenario is that these firms are run by managers in denial who continue to expand the firm by making bad investments (that generate lower returns than the cost of capital). These firms may be able to grow revenues and operating income but will destroy value along the way.

Figure 14.5: A Valuation of JC Penney

Declining business: Revenues expected to drop by 3% a year fo next 5 years

	Bo	ase year		1		2		3		4	5			6	7		8			9	10	
Revenue growth rate		·	-3.00%		-3.00%		-3.00%		-3.00%		-3.00%		-2.00%		-1.00%		0.00%		1.00%		2.00%	
Revenues		12,522	\$12,146		\$11,782		\$11,428		\$11,086		\$10,753		\$10,538		\$10,433		\$10,433		\$10,537		\$10,748	
EBIT (Operating) margin		1.32%		1.82%		2.31%		2.80%		3.29%		3.79%		4.28%		4.77%		5.26%		5.76%		25%
EBIT (Operating income)	\$	166	\$	221	\$	272	\$	320	\$	365	\$	407	\$	451	\$	498	\$	549	\$	607	\$	672
Tax rate	35.00%		35.00%		35.00%		35.00%		35.00%		35.00%		36.00%		37.00%		38.00%		39.00%		40.00%	
EBIT(1-t)	\$	108	\$	143	\$	177	\$	208	\$	237	\$	265	\$	289	\$	314	\$	341	\$	370	\$	403
- Reinvestment			\$	(188)	\$	(182)	\$	(177)	\$	(171)	\$	(166)	\$	(108)	\$	(53)	\$	-	\$	52	\$	105
FCFF			\$	331	\$	359	\$	385	\$	409	\$	431	\$	396	\$	366	\$	341	\$	318	\$	298
Cost of capital			9.00%		9.00%		9.00%		9.00%		9.00%		8.80%		8.60%		8.40%		8.20%		8.00%	
PV(FCFF)			\$	304	\$	302	\$	297	\$	290	\$	280	\$	237	\$	201	\$	173	\$	149	\$	129
Terminal value	\$	5,710																				
PV(Terminal value)	\$	2,479																				
PV (CF over next 10 years)	\$	2,362																				
Sum of PV	\$	4,841																				
Probability of failure =		20.00%		High debt load and poor earning		arnino	ıs r	out														
Proceeds if firm fails =		\$2,421	survival at risk. Based on bond rating,																			
Value of operating assets =		\$4,357	2	20% chance of failure and liquidation will																		
				bring in 50% of book value																		


Margins improve gradually to median for US retail sector (6.25%)

As stores shut down, cash released from real estate.

The cost of capital is at 9%, higher because of high cost of debt.

b. Dealing with the "downside" of Distress

- A DCF valuation values a firm as a going concern. If there is a significant likelihood of the firm failing before it reaches stable growth and if the assets will then be sold for a value less than the present value of the expected cashflows (a distress sale value), DCF valuations will overstate the value of the firm.
- □ Value of Equity= DCF value of equity (1 Probability of distress) + Distress sale value of equity (Probability of distress)
- □ There are three ways in which we can estimate the probability of distress:
 - Use the bond rating to estimate the cumulative probability of distress over 10 years
 - Estimate the probability of distress with a probit
 - Estimate the probability of distress by looking at market value of bonds..
- The distress sale value of equity is usually best estimated as a percent of book value (and this value will be lower if the economy is doing badly and there are other firms in the same business also in distress).



Adjusting the value of LVS for distress...

In February 2009, LVS was rated B+ by S&P. Historically, 28.25% of B+ rated bonds default within 10 years. LVS has a 6.375% bond, maturing in February 2015 (7 years), trading at \$529. If we discount the expected cash flows on the bond at the riskfree rate, we can back out the probability of distress from the bond price:

$$529 = \sum_{t=1}^{t=7} \frac{63.75(1 - \Pi_{\text{Distress}})^t}{(1.03)^t} + \frac{1000(1 - \Pi_{\text{Distress}})^7}{(1.03)^7}$$

- Solving for the probability of bankruptcy, we get:
 - \Box $\pi_{istress}$ = Annual probability of default = 13.54%
 - Cumulative probability of surviving 10 years = $(1 .1354)^{10} = 23.34\%$
 - □ Cumulative probability of distress over 10 years = 1 .2334 = .7666 or 76.66%
- □ If LVS is becomes distressed:
 - Expected distress sale proceeds = \$2,769 million < Face value of debt
 - Expected equity value/share = \$0.00
- \square Expected value per share = \$8.12 (1 .7666) + \$0.00 (.7666) = \$1.92

IV. Emerging Market Companies

Estimation Issues - Emerging Market Companies

Big shifts in economic environment (inflation, itnerest rates) can affect operating earnings history. Poor corporate governance and weak accounting standards can lead to lack of transparency on earnings.

Growth rates for a company will be affected heavily be growth rate and political developments in the country in which it operates.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

Cross holdings can affect value of equity

Even if the company's risk is stable, there can be significant changes in country risk over time.


What is the value of equity in the firm?

Economic crises can put many companies at risk. Government actions (nationalization) can affect long term value.

When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?


Lesson 1: Country risk has to be incorporated... but with a scalpel, not a bludgeon

- Emerging market companies are undoubtedly exposed to additional country risk because they are incorporated in countries that are more exposed to political and economic risk.
- Not all emerging market companies are equally exposed to country risk and many developed markets have emerging market risk exposure because of their operations.
- You can use either the "weighted country risk premium", with the weights reflecting the countries you get your revenues from or the lambda approach (which may incorporate more than revenues) to capture country risk exposure.




Lesson 2: Currency should not matter


- You can value any company in any currency. Thus, you can value a Brazilian company in nominal reais, US dollars or Swiss Francs.
- For your valuation to stay invariant and consistent, your cash flows and discount rates have to be in the same currency. Thus, if you are using a high inflation currency, both your growth rates and discount rates will be much higher.
- For your cash flows to be consistent, you have to use expected exchange rates that reflect purchasing power parity (the higher inflation currency has to depreciate by the inflation differential each year).




Lesson 3: The "corporate governance" drag

- Stockholders in Asian, Latin American and many European companies have little or no power over the managers of the firm. In many cases, insiders own voting shares and control the firm and the potential for conflict of interests is huge.
- This weak corporate governance is often a reason for given for using higher discount rates or discounting the estimated value for these companies.
- Would you discount the value that you estimate for an emerging market company to allow for this absence of stockholder power?
- a. Yes
- b. No.








Lesson 4: Watch out for cross holdings...

- Emerging market companies are more prone to having cross holdings that companies in developed markets. This is partially the result of history (since many of the larger public companies used to be family owned businesses until a few decades ago) and partly because those who run these companies value control (and use cross holdings to preserve this control).
- In many emerging market companies, the real process of valuation begins when you have finished your DCF valuation, since the cross holdings (which can be numerous) have to be valued, often with minimal information.

8. The Tata Group – April 2010



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