VI. Valuing Companies with “intangible” assets

If capital expenditures are miscategorized as operating expenses, it becomes very difficult to assess how much a firm is reinvesting for future growth and how well its investments are doing.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

The capital expenditures associated with acquiring intangible assets (technology, himan capital) are mis-categorized as operating expenses, leading to inccorect accounting earnings and measures of capital invested.

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

It ican be more difficult to borrow against intangible assets than it is against tangible assets. The risk in operations can change depending upon how stable the intangbiel asset is.

When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

Intangbile assets such as brand name and customer loyalty can last for very long periods or dissipate overnight.

Lesson 1: Accounting rules are cluttered with inconsistencies…

- If we start with accounting first principles, capital expenditures are expenditures designed to create benefits over many periods. They should not be used to reduce operating income in the period that they are made, but should be depreciated/amortized over their life. They should show up as assets on the balance sheet.
- Accounting is consistent in its treatment of cap ex with manufacturing firms, but is inconsistent with firms that do not fit the mold.
  - With pharmaceutical and technology firms, R&D is the ultimate cap ex but is treated as an operating expense.
  - With consulting firms and other firms dependent on human capital, recruiting and training expenses are your long term investments that are treated as operating expenses.
  - With brand name consumer product companies, a portion of the advertising expense is to build up brand name and is the real capital expenditure. It is treated as an operating expense.

Exhibit 11.1: Converting R&D expenses to R&D assets - Amgen

Step 1: Ddetermining an amortizable life for R & D expenses. 1

How long will it take, on an expected basis, for research to pay off at Amgen? Given the length of the approval process for new drugs by the Food and Drugs Administration, we will assume that this amortizable life is 10 years.

Step 2: Capitalize historical R&D exoense

Year	*R&D Expense*	*Unamortized portion* (2)		*Amortization this year* (3)
Current	3030.00	1.00	3030.00	
-1	3266.00	0.90	2939.40	$326.60
-2	3366.00	0.80	2692.80	$336.60
-3	2314.00	0.70	1619.80	$231.40
-4	2028.00	0.60	1216.80	$202.80
-5	1655.00	0.50	827.50	$165.50
-6	1117.00	0.40	446.80	$111.70
-7	864.00	0.30	259.20	$86.40
-8	845.00	0.20	169.00	$84.50
-9	823.00	0.10	82.30	$82.30
-10	663.00	0.00	0.00	$66.30
			$13283.60	$1,694.10

4

Current year's R&D expense = Cap ex = $3,030 million
R&D amortization = Depreciation = $ 1,694 million
Unamortized R&D = Capital invested (R&D) = $13,284 million

Step 3: Restate earnings, book value and return numbers

5

	Unadjusted	*Adjusted for R&D*	*Comments*
Net Income	$4,196	4,196 + 3030 – 1694 = $ 5,532	Add current year's R&D and subtract R&D amortization
Book value of equity	$17,869	17,869 + 13,284 = $ 31,153	Add unamortized R&D from prior years
Return on Equity	$\frac{4196}{17869} = 23.48\%$	$\frac{5532}{31153} = 17.75\%$	Return on equity drops when book equity is augmented by R&D, even though net income rises.
Pre-tax Operating Income	$5,594	5,594 + 3030 – 1694 = $ 6.930	Add current year's R&D and subtract R&D amortization
Book value of invested capital	$21,985	$21,985+$13,284 = $35,269	Add unamortized R&D from prior years
Pre-tax Return on Capital	$\frac{5594}{21985} = 25.44\%$	$\frac{6930}{35269} = 19.65\%$	Return on capital drops when capital is augmented by R&D, even though operating income rises.

10. Amgen: Status Quo

Cap Ex = Acc net Cap Ex(255) + Acquisitions (3975) + R&D (2216)

Current Cashflow to Firm
EBIT(1-t)= :7336(1-**.28**)= 6058
- Nt CpX= 6443
- Chg WC 37
= FCFF - 423
Reinvestment Rate = 6480/6058
=106.98%
Return on capital = 16.71%

Reinvestment Rate
60%

Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)
.60*.16=.096
9.6%

Return on Capital
16%

Stable Growth
g = 4%; Beta = 1.10;
Debt Ratio= 20%; Tax rate=35%
Cost of capital = 8.08%
ROC= 10.00%;
Reinvestment Rate=4/10=40%

Terminal Value$_{10}$= 7300/(.0808-.04) = 179,099

First 5 years

Growth decreases gradually to 4%

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
EBIT	$9,221	$10,106	$11,076	$12,140	$13,305	$14,433	$15,496	$16,463	$17,306	$17,998
EBIT (1-t)	$6,639	$7,276	$7,975	$8,741	$9,580	$10,392	$11,157	$11,853	$12,460	$12,958
- Reinvestment	$3,983	$4,366	$4,785	$5,244	$5,748	$5,820	$5,802	$5,690	$5,482	$5,183
= FCFF	$2,656	$2,911	$3,190	$3,496	$3,832	$4,573	$5,355	$6,164	$6,978	$7,775

Term Yr
18718
12167
4867
7300

Op. Assets 94214
+ Cash: 1283
- Debt 8272
=Equity 87226
-Options 479
Value/Share $ 74.33

Cost of Capital (WACC) = 11.7% (0.90) + 3.66% (0.10) = 10.90%

Debt ratio increases to 20%
Beta decreases to 1.10

On May 1,2007, Amgen was trading at $ 55/share

Cost of Equity
11.70%

Cost of Debt
(4.78%+..85%)(1-.35)
= 3.66%

Weights
E = 90% D = 10%

Riskfree Rate:
Riskfree rate = 4.78%

+

Beta
1.73

X

Risk Premium
4%

Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 1.59

D/E=11.06%

Lesson 2: And fixing those inconsistencies can alter your view of a company and affect its value

	No R&D adjustment	R&D adjustment
EBIT	$5,071	$7,336
Invested Capital	$25,277	$33,173
ROIC	14.58%	18.26%
Reinvestment Rate	115.68%	106.98%
Value of firm	$58,617	$95,497
Value of equity	$50,346	$87,226
Value/share	$42.73	$74.33

VII. Valuing cyclical and commodity companies

Company growth often comes from movements in the economic cycle, for cyclical firms, or commodity prices, for commodity companies.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

Historial revenue and earnings data are volatile, as the economic cycle and commodity prices change.

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

Primary risk is from the economy for cyclical firms and from commodity price movements for commodity companies. These risks can stay dormant for long periods of apparent prosperity.

When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

For commodity companies, the fact that there are only finite amounts of the commodity may put a limit on growth forever. For cyclical firms, there is the peril that the next recession may put an end to the firm.

Lesson 1: With "macro" companies, it is easy to get lost in "macro" assumptions…

- With cyclical and commodity companies, it is undeniable that the value you arrive at will be affected by your views on the economy or the price of the commodity.
- Consequently, you will feel the urge to take a stand on these macro variables and build them into your valuation. Doing so, though, will create valuations that are jointly impacted by your views on macro variables and your views on the company, and it is difficult to separate the two.
- The best (though not easiest) thing to do is to separate your macro views from your micro views. Use current market based numbers for your valuation, but then provide a separate assessment of what you think about those market numbers.

Lesson 2: Use probabilistic tools to assess value as a function of macro variables…

- If there is a key macro variable affecting the value of your company that you are uncertain about (and who is not), why not quantify the uncertainty in a distribution (rather than a single price) and use that distribution in your valuation.
- That is exactly what you do in a Monte Carlo simulation, where you allow one or more variables to be distributions and compute a distribution of values for the company.
- With a simulation, you get not only everything you would get in a standard valuation (an estimated value for your company) but you will get additional output (on the variation in that value and the likelihood that your firm is under or over valued)

Shell: A "Oil Price" Neutral Valuation: March 2016

Revenue calculated from prevailing oil price of $40/barrel in March 2016
Revenue = 39992.77+4039.40*$40
= $201,569

Compounded revenue growth of 3.91% a year, based on Shell's historical revenue growth rate from 2000 to 2015

	Base Year	1	2	3	4	5	Terminal Year
Revenues	$ 201,569	$ 209,450	$ 217,639	$ 226,149	$ 234,991	$ 244,180	$ 249,063
Operating Margin	3.01%	6.18%	7.76%	8.56%	8.95%	9.35%	9.35%
Operating Income	$ 6,065.00	$ 12,942.85	$ 16,899.10	$ 19,352.39	$ 21,040.39	$ 22,830.80	$ 23,287.41
Effective tax rate	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%
AT Operating Income	$ 4,245.50	$ 9,060.00	$ 11,829.37	$ 13,546.68	$ 14,728.27	$ 15,981.56	$ 16,301.19
+ Depreciation	$ 26,714.00	$ 27,759	$ 28,844	$ 29,972	$ 31,144	$ 32,361	
- Cap Ex	$ 31,854.00	$ 33,099	$ 34,394	$ 35,738	$ 37,136	$ 38,588	
- Chg in WC		$ 472.88	$ 491.37	$ 510.58	$ 530.55	$ 551.29	
FCFF		$ 3,246.14	$ 5,788.19	$ 7,269.29	$ 8,205.44	$ 9,203.68	$ 13,011.34
Terminal Value						$ 216,855.71	
Return on capital							12.37%
Cost of Capital		9.91%	9.91%	9.91%	9.91%	9.91%	8.00%
Cumulated Discount Factor		1.0991	1.2080	1.3277	1.4593	1.6039	
Present Value		$ 2,953.45	$ 4,791.47	$ 5,474.95	$ 5,622.81	$ 140,940.73	
Value of Operating Assets	$ 159,783.41						
+ Cash	$ 31,752.00						
+ Cross Holdings	$ 33,566.00						
- Debt	$ 58,379.00						
- Minority Interets	$ 1,245.00						
Value of Equity	$ 165,477.41						
Number of shares	4209.7						
Value per share	$ 39.31						

Operating margin converges on Shell's historical average margin of 9.35% from 200-2015

Return on capital reverts and stays at Shell's historic average of 12.37% from 200-2015

Added long term investments in joint ventures and subtracted out minority interest in consolidated holdings.

Shell's Revenues & Oil Prices





Revenue calculated from the oil price drawn from distribution
Revenue = 39992.77+4039.40*Oil Price/Barrel

Pre-tax Operating Income based on revenue & selected margin
Pre-tax Operating Income = Revenues * Operating Margin

Value Shell based on operating income, assuming other assumptions (tax rate, revenue growth, cost of capital

Percentiles:	Forecast values
0%	$6.55
10%	$23.90
20%	$27.73
30%	$30.89
40%	$33.88
50%	$36.99
60%	$40.28
70%	$44.22
80%	$49.24
90%	$57.49
100%	$197.11



VALUE, PRICE AND INFORMATION: CLOSING THE DEAL

Value versus Price

Are you valuing or pricing?

Tools for intrinsic analysis
- Discounted Cashflow Valuation (DCF)
- Intrinsic multiples
- Book value based approaches
- Excess Return Models

Tools for "the gap"
- Behavioral finance
- Price catalysts

Tools for pricing
- Multiples and comparables
- Charting and technical indicators
- Pseudo DCF

Value of cashflows, adjusted for time and risk

INTRINSIC VALUE

Value

THE GAP
Is there one?
Will it close?

Price

PRICE



Drivers of intrinsic value
- Cashflows from existing assets
- Growth in cash flows
- Quality of Growth

Drivers of "the gap"
- Information
- Liquidity
- Corporate governance

Drivers of price
- Market moods & momentum
- Surface stories about fundamentals

Test 1: Are you pricing or valuing?



Test 2: Are you pricing or valuing?

Rating
Buy

Europe
Switzerland

Biotechnology
Biotechnology

Company
BB BIOTECH

Reuters	Bloomberg	Exchange	Ticker
BION.S	BION SW	SWX	BION

Date
13 August 2013

[redacted]

Forecast Change

Price at 12 Aug 2013 (CHF)	124.00
Price Target (CHF)	164.50
52-week range (CHF)	128.40 - 84.90

Strong sector and stock-picking continue

Impressive performance
Over the past two years, BB Biotech shares have roughly tripled, which could tempt investors to take profits. However, this performance has been well backed by a deserved revival of the biotech industry, encouraging fundamental news, M&A, and increased money flow into health care stocks. In addition, BBB returned to index outperformance by modifying its stock-picking approach. Hence, despite excellent performance, the shares still trade at a 23% discount to the net asset value of the portfolio. Hence, the shares are an attractive value vehicle to capture growth opportunities in an attractive sector.

Biotech industry remains attractive
With the re-rating of the pharma sector, investors have also showed increased interest in biotech stocks. Established biotech stocks have delivered encouraging financial results and approvals, while there has also been substantial industry consolidation, which is not surprising in times of "cheap" money and high liquidity. BB Biotech remains an attractive vehicle to capture the future potential of the biotech sector. In addition, investors benefit from a 23% discount to NAV and attractive cash distribution policy of 5% yield p.a. Hence, we reiterate our Buy on BB Biotech shares.

BB Biotech shares remain attractive
In the first 6M of 2013, BB Biotech increased its NAV by 36%, which marks good outperformance against the Nasdaq Biotech Index (NBI)'s 27%. This is a remarkable performance after 2012, when BBB's NAV increase of 45% also

[redacted]

Key changes

Target Price	106.50 to 164.50	↑	54.5%

Source: Deutsche Bank

Price/price relative



Performance (%)	1m	3m	12m
Absolute	-1.4	5.4	37.4
SPI Swiss Performance IX	0.5	-1.4	26.4

Source: Deutsche Bank

The drivers of value

What are the **cashflows from existing assets**?
- Equity: Cashflows after debt payments
- Firm: Cashflows before debt payments

What is the **value added** by growth assets?
Equity: Growth in equity earnings/ cashflows
Firm: Growth in operating earnings/ cashflows

How **risky are the cash flows** from both existing assets and growth assets?
Equity: Risk in equity in the company
Firm: Risk in the firm's operations

When will the firm become a **mature fiirm**, and what are the potential roadblocks?

The determinants of price

Mood and Momentum
Price is determined in large part by mood and momentum, which, in turn, are driven by behavioral factors (panic, fear, greed).

Liquidity & Trading Ease
While the value of an asset may not change much from period to period, liquidity and ease of trading can, and as it does, so will the price.

The Market Price

Incremental information
Since you make money on price changes, not price levels, the focus is on incremental information (news stories, rumors, gossip) and how it measures up, relative to expectations

Group Think
To the extent that pricing is about gauging what other investors will do, the price can be determined by the "herd".

Three views of “the gap”

	View of the gap	Investment Strategies
The Efficient Marketer	The gaps between price and value, if they do occur, are random.	Index funds
The “value” extremist	You view pricers as dilettantes who will move on to fad and fad. Eventually, the price will converge on value.	Buy and hold stocks where value < price
The pricing extremist	Value is only in the heads of the “eggheads”. Even if it exists (and it is questionable), price may never converge on value.	(1) Look for mispriced securities. (2) Get ahead of shifts in demand/momentum.

The "pricers" dilemma..

- No anchor: If you do not believe in intrinsic value and make no attempt to estimate it, you have no moorings when you invest. You will therefore be pushed back and forth as the price moves from high to low. In other words, everything becomes relative and you can lose perspective.
- Reactive: Without a core measure of value, your investment strategy will often be reactive rather than proactive.
- Crowds are fickle and tough to get a read on: The key to being successful as a pricer is to be able to read the crowd mood and to detect shifts in that mood early in the process. By their nature, crowds are tough to read and almost impossible to model systematically.

The valuer's dilemma and ways of dealing with it…

- Uncertainty about the magnitude of the gap:
  - Margin of safety: Many value investors swear by the notion of the "margin of safety" as protection against risk/uncertainty.
  - Collect more information: Collecting more information about the company is viewed as one way to make your investment less risky.
  - Ask what if questions: Doing scenario analysis or what if analysis gives you a sense of whether you should invest.
  - Confront uncertainty: Face up to the uncertainty, bring it into the analysis and deal with the consequences.
- Uncertainty about gap closing: This is tougher and you can reduce your exposure to it by
  - Lengthening your time horizon
  - Providing or looking for a catalyst that will cause the gap to close.

Strategies for managing the risk in the "closing" of the gap

- The "karmic" approach: In this one, you buy (sell short) under (over) valued companies and sit back and wait for the gap to close. You are implicitly assuming that given time, the market will see the error of its ways and fix that error.
- The catalyst approach: For the gap to close, the price has to converge on value. For that convergence to occur, there usually has to be a catalyst.
  - If you are an activist investor, you may be the catalyst yourself. In fact, your act of buying the stock may be a sufficient signal for the market to reassess the price.
  - If you are not, you have to look for other catalysts. Here are some to watch for: a new CEO or management team, a "blockbuster" new product or an acquisition bid where the firm is targeted.

An example: Apple – Price versus Value (my estimates) from 2011 to 2018



Month	Price per share	Value per share	% Difference
Sep-11	$ 54.47	$ 69.30	-21.39%
Sep-12	$ 95.30	$ 91.29	4.40%
Sep-13	$ 68.11	$ 86.43	-21.20%
Sep-14	$ 100.75	$ 97.91	2.90%
Sep-15	$ 110.30	$ 130.91	-15.74%
Sep-16	$ 113.05	$ 126.47	-10.61%
Sep-17	$ 154.12	$ 158.33	-2.66%
Sep-18	$ 225.74	$ 201.50	12.03%

A closing thought…

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