


---

# Value Enhancement and the Expected Value of Control: Back to Basics

# Price Enhancement versus Value Enhancement




# The Paths to Value Creation

---

- Using the DCF framework, there are four basic ways in which the value of a firm can be enhanced:
  - The cash flows from existing assets to the firm can be increased, by either
    - increasing after-tax earnings from assets in place or
    - reducing reinvestment needs (net capital expenditures or working capital)
  - The expected growth rate in these cash flows can be increased by either
    - Increasing the rate of reinvestment in the firm
    - Improving the return on capital on those reinvestments
  - The length of the high growth period can be extended to allow for more years of high growth.
  - The cost of capital can be reduced by
    - Reducing the operating risk in investments/assets
    - Changing the financial mix
    - Changing the financing composition


# Value Creation 1: Increase Cash Flows from Assets in Place

---



## Value Creation 2: Increase Expected Growth

---




*Price Leader versus Volume Leader Strategies*

*Return on Capital = Operating Margin \* Capital Turnover Ratio*


# Value Creating Growth... Evaluating the Alternatives..

## Modes of organic growth vary in value creation intensity— consumer goods industry




### III. Building Competitive Advantages: Increase length of the growth period

---



## Value Creation 4: Reduce Cost of Capital

---



# SAP: Status Quo

Avg Reinvestment rate = 36.94%

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t) : 1414  
 - Nt CpX 831  
 - Chg WC - 19  
 = FCFF 602  
 Reinvestment Rate = 812/1414 = 57.42%

Reinvestment Rate 57.42%

**Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)**  
 $.5742 * .1993 = .1144$   
**11.44%**

Return on Capital 19.93%

Stable Growth  
 $g = 3.41%$ ; Beta = 1.00;  
 Debt Ratio = 20%  
 Cost of capital = 6.62%  
 ROC = 6.62%; Tax rate = 35%  
 Reinvestment Rate = 51.54%

Terminal Value<sub>10</sub> =  $1717 / (.0662 - .0341) = 53546$

First 5 years

Growth decreases gradually to 3.41%

Op. Assets 31,615  
 + Cash: 3,018  
 - Debt 558  
 - Pension Lian 305  
 - Minor. Int. 55  
 = Equity 34,656  
 - Options 180  
 Value/Share 106.12

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Term Yr
EBIT	2,483	2,767	3,083	3,436	3,829	4,206	4,552	4,854	5,097	5,271	5451
EBIT(1-t)	1,576	1,756	1,957	2,181	2,430	2,669	2,889	3,080	3,235	3,345	3543
- Reinvestm	905	1,008	1,124	1,252	1,395	1,501	1,591	1,660	1,705	1,724	1826
= FCFF	671	748	833	929	1,035	1,168	1,298	1,420	1,530	1,621	1717

Cost of Capital (WACC) =  $8.77\% (0.986) + 2.39\% (0.014) = 8.68\%$

Debt ratio increases to 20%  
 Beta decreases to 1.00

On May 5, 2005, SAP was trading at 122 Euros/share

**Cost of Equity 8.77%**

**Cost of Debt**  
 $(3.41\% + .35\%)(1 - .3654) = 2.39\%$

**Weights**  
 E = 98.6% D = 1.4%

**Riskfree Rate:**  
 Euro riskfree rate = 3.41%

+

**Beta**  
 1.26

x

**Risk Premium**  
 4.25%

Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 1.25

Mature risk premium 4%

Country Equity Prem 0.25%

## SAP : Optimal Capital Structure

---

Debt Ratio	Beta	Cost of Equity	Bond Rating	Interest rate on debt	Tax Rate	Cost of Debt (after-tax)	WACC	Firm Value (G)
0%	1.25	8.72%	AAA	3.76%	36.54%	2.39%	8.72%	\$39,088
10%	1.34	9.09%	AAA	3.76%	36.54%	2.39%	8.42%	\$41,480
20%	1.45	9.56%	A	4.26%	36.54%	2.70%	8.19%	\$43,567
30%	1.59	10.16%	A-	4.41%	36.54%	2.80%	7.95%	\$45,900
40%	1.78	10.96%	CCC	11.41%	36.54%	7.24%	9.47%	\$34,043
50%	2.22	12.85%	C	15.41%	22.08%	12.01%	12.43%	\$22,444
60%	2.78	15.21%	C	15.41%	18.40%	12.58%	13.63%	\$19,650
70%	3.70	19.15%	C	15.41%	15.77%	12.98%	14.83%	\$17,444
80%	5.55	27.01%	C	15.41%	13.80%	13.28%	16.03%	\$15,658
90%	11.11	50.62%	C	15.41%	12.26%	13.52%	17.23%	\$14,181

# SAP: Restructured

Avg Reinvestment rate = 36.94%

Reinvest more in emerging markets

Return on Capital 19.93%

## Current Cashflow to Firm

EBIT(1-t) : 1414  
 - Nt CpX 831  
 - Chg WC - 19  
 = FCFF 602  
 Reinvestment Rate = 812/1414 = 57.42%

Reinvestment Rate 70%

Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)  
 $.70 * .1993 = .1144$   
**13.99%**

Stable Growth  
 $g = 3.41%$ ; Beta = 1.00;  
 Debt Ratio = 30%  
 Cost of capital = 6.27%  
 ROC = 6.27%; Tax rate = 35%  
 Reinvestment Rate = 54.38%

First 5 years

Growth decreases gradually to 3.41%

Terminal Value<sub>10</sub> = 1898 / (.0627 - .0341) = 66367

Op. Assets 38045  
 + Cash: 3,018  
 - Debt 558  
 - Pension Lian 305  
 - Minor. Int. 55  
 = Equity 40157  
 - Options 180  
 Value/Share 126.51

Year	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Term Yr
EBIT	2,543	2,898	3,304	3,766	4,293	4,802	5,271	5,673	5,987	6,191
EBIT(1-t)	1,614	1,839	2,097	2,390	2,724	3,047	3,345	3,600	3,799	3,929
- Reinvest	1,130	1,288	1,468	1,673	1,907	2,011	2,074	2,089	2,052	1,965
= FCFF	484	552	629	717	817	1,036	1,271	1,512	1,747	1,963

Term Yr  
 6402  
 4161  
 2263  
 1898

Cost of Capital (WACC) = 10.57% (0.70) + 2.80% (0.30) = 8.24%


Cost of Equity 10.57%

Cost of Debt  
 $(3.41% + 1.00%)(1 - .3654)$   
 = 2.80%

Weights  
 E = 70% D = 30%

On May 5, 2005, SAP was trading at 122 Euros/share

Use more debt financing.



# Blockbuster: Status Quo

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t) : 163  
 - Nt CpX 39  
 - Chg WC 4  
 = FCFF 120  
 Reinvestment Rate = 43/163  
 =26.46%

Reinvestment Rate  
26.46%

**Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)**  
 $.2645 * .0406 = .0107$   
**1.07%**

Return on Capital  
4.06%

Stable Growth  
 $g = 3\%$ ; Beta = 1.00;  
 Cost of capital = 6.76%  
 ROC = 6.76%; Tax rate = 35%  
 Reinvestment Rate = 44.37%

Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> =  $104 / (.0676 - .03) = 2714$

Op. Assets 2,472  
 + Cash: 330  
 - Debt 1847  
 = Equity 955  
 - Options 0  
 Value/Share \$ 5.13

	1	2	3	4	5
EBIT (1-t)	\$165	\$167	\$169	\$173	\$178
- Reinvestment	\$44	\$44	\$51	\$64	\$79
FCFF	\$121	\$123	\$118	\$109	\$99


Term Yr  
 184  
 82  
 102

Discount at Cost of Capital (WACC) = 8.50% (.486) + 3.97% (0.514) = 6.17%

**Cost of Equity**  
8.50%

**Cost of Debt**  
 $(4.10\% + 2\%) (1 - .35)$   
 = 3.97%

**Weights**  
 E = 48.6% D = 51.4%



# Blockbuster: Restructured

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t) : 249  
 - Nt CpX 39  
 - Chg WC 4  
 = FCFF 206  
 Reinvestment Rate =  $43/249 = 17.32\%$

Reinvestment Rate  
17.32%

**Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)**  
 $.1732 * .0620 = .0107$   
**1.07%**

Return on Capital  
6.20%

Stable Growth  
 $g = 3\%$ ; Beta = 1.00;  
 Cost of capital = 6.76%  
 ROC = 6.76%; Tax rate = 35%  
 Reinvestment Rate = 44.37%

Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> =  $156 / (.0676 - .03) = 4145$

Op. Assets 3,840  
 + Cash: 330  
 - Debt 1847  
 = Equity 2323  
 - Options 0  
 Value/Share \$ 12.47


	1	2	3	4	5	Term Yr
EBIT (1-t)	\$252	\$255	\$258	\$264	\$272	280
- Reinvestment	\$44	\$44	\$59	\$89	\$121	124
FCFF	\$208	\$211	\$200	\$176	\$151	156

Discount at Cost of Capital (WACC) =  $8.50\% (.486) + 3.97\% (0.514) = 6.17\%$

**Cost of Equity**  
8.50%


**Cost of Debt**  
 $(4.10\% + 2\%)(1 - .35) = 3.97\%$

**Weights**  
 E = 48.6% D = 51.4%



# The Expected Value of Control

---



# The Probability of Changing Control – Factors to consider

---

## ■ Institutional Factors

- Capital restrictions: In markets where it is difficult to raise funding for hostile acquisitions, management change will be less likely.
- State Restrictions: Some markets restrict hostile acquisitions for parochial, political, social (loss of jobs) and economic reasons (prevent monopolies).
- Inertia and Conflicts of Interest: Institutions may tilt to incumbents.
- Presence of activist investors, who are willing to challenge incumbents..

## ■ Firm-specific factors

- Anti-takeover amendments: They more difficult for a hostile acquirer to acquire the company or dissident stockholders to change management.
- Voting Rights: Shares with disproportionate voting rights held by insiders.
- Corporate Holding Structures: Cross holdings and Pyramid structures allow insiders with small holdings to control large numbers of firms.
- Large Stockholders as managers: A large stockholder (usually the founder) is also the incumbent manager of the firm.

## Why the probability of management changing shifts over time....

---

- Corporate governance rules can change over time, as new laws are passed. If the change gives stockholders more power, the likelihood of management changing will increase.
- Activist investing ebbs and flows with market movements (activist investors are more visible in down markets) and often in response to scandals.
- Events such as hostile acquisitions can make investors reassess the likelihood of change by reminding them of the power that they do possess.

## Estimating the Probability of Change

---

- You can estimate the probability of management changes by using historical data (on companies where change has occurred) and statistical techniques such as probits or logits.
- Empirically, the following seem to be related to the probability of management change:
  - Stock price and earnings performance, with forced turnover more likely in firms that have performed poorly relative to their peer group and to expectations.
  - Structure of the board, with forced CEO changes more likely to occur when the board is small, is composed of outsiders and when the CEO is not also the chairman of the board of directors.
  - Ownership structure; forced CEO changes are more common in companies with high institutional and low insider holdings. They also seem to occur more frequently in firms that are more dependent upon equity markets for new capital.
  - Industry structure, with CEOs more likely to be replaced in competitive industries.

## Manifestations of the Value of Control

---

- Hostile acquisitions: In hostile acquisitions which are motivated by control, the control premium should reflect the change in value that will come from changing management.
- Valuing publicly traded firms: The market price for every publicly traded firm should incorporate an expected value of control, as a function of the value of control and the probability of control changing.  
$$\text{Market value} = \text{Status quo value} + (\text{Optimal value} - \text{Status quo value}) * \text{Probability of management changing}$$
- Voting and non-voting shares: The premium (if any) that you would pay for a voting share should increase with the expected value of control.
- Minority Discounts in private companies: The minority discount (attached to buying less than a controlling stake) in a private business should be increase with the expected value of control.

# 1. Hostile Acquisition: Example

---

- In a hostile acquisition, you can ensure management change after you take over the firm. Consequently, you would be willing to pay up to the optimal value.
- As an example, Blockbuster was trading at \$9.50 per share in July 2005. The optimal value per share that we estimated as \$ 12.47 per share. Assuming that this is a reasonable estimate, you would be willing to pay up to \$2.97 as a premium in acquiring the shares.
- Issues to ponder:
  - Would you automatically pay \$2.97 as a premium per share? Why or why not?
  - What would your premium per share be if change will take three years to implement?

## 2. Market prices of Publicly Traded Companies: An example

---

- The market price per share at the time of the valuation (May 2005) was roughly \$9.50.

Expected value per share = Status Quo Value + Probability of control changing \* (Optimal Value – Status Quo Value)

$$\$ 9.50 = \$ 5.13 + \text{Probability of control changing } (\$12.47 - \$5.13)$$

- The market is attaching a probability of 59.5% that management policies can be changed. This was after Icahn's successful challenge of management. Prior to his arriving, the market price per share was \$8.20, yielding a probability of only 41.8% of management changing.

	Value of Equity	Value per share
Status Quo	\$ 955 million	\$ 5.13 per share
Optimally managed	\$2,323 million	\$12.47 per share

## Value of stock in a publicly traded firm

---

- When a firm is badly managed, the market still assesses the probability that it will be run better in the future and attaches a value of control to the stock price today:

$$\text{Value per share} = \frac{\text{Status Quo Value} + \text{Probability of control change (Optimal - Status Quo Value)}}{\text{Number of shares outstanding}}$$

- With voting shares and non-voting shares, a disproportionate share of the value of control will go to the voting shares. In the extreme scenario where non-voting shares are completely unprotected:

$$\text{Value per non - voting share} = \frac{\text{Status Quo Value}}{\# \text{ Voting Shares} + \# \text{ Non - voting shares}}$$

$$\text{Value per voting share} = \text{Value of non - voting share} + \frac{\text{Probability of control change (Optimal - Status Quo Value)}}{\# \text{ Voting Shares}}$$

### 3. Voting and Non-voting Shares: An Example

---

- To value voting and non-voting shares, we will consider Embraer, the Brazilian aerospace company. As is typical of most Brazilian companies, the company has common (voting) shares and preferred (non-voting shares).
  - Status Quo Value = 12.5 billion \$R for the equity;
  - Optimal Value = 14.7 billion \$R, assuming that the firm would be more aggressive both in its use of debt and in its reinvestment policy.
- There are 242.5 million voting shares and 476.7 non-voting shares in the company and the probability of management change is relatively low. Assuming a probability of 20% that management will change, we estimated the value per non-voting and voting share:
  - Value per non-voting share = Status Quo Value/ (# voting shares + # non-voting shares) =  $12,500 / (242.5 + 476.7) = 17.38$  \$R/ share
  - Value per voting share = Status Quo value/sh + Probability of management change \* (Optimal value – Status Quo Value) =  $17.38 + 0.2 * (14,700 - 12,500) / 242.5 = 19.19$  \$R/share
- With our assumptions, the voting shares should trade at a premium of 10.4% over the non-voting shares.

## 4. Minority Discount: An example

---

- Assume that you are valuing Kristin Kandy, a privately owned candy business for sale in a private transaction. You have estimated a value of \$ 1.6 million for the equity in this firm, assuming that the existing management of the firm continues into the future and a value of \$ 2 million for the equity with new and more creative management in place.
  - Value of 51% of the firm = 51% of optimal value =  $0.51 * \$ 2 \text{ million} = \$1.02 \text{ million}$
  - Value of 49% of the firm = 49% of status quo value =  $0.49 * \$1.6 \text{ million} = \$784,000$
- Note that a 2% difference in ownership translates into a large difference in value because one stake ensures control and the other does not.

## To conclude...

---

- The value of control in a firm should lie in being able to run that firm differently and better. Consequently, the value of control should be greater in poorly performing firms, where the primary reason for the poor performance is the management.
- The market value of every firm reflects the expected value of control, which is the product of the probability of management changing and the effect on value of that change. This has far ranging implications. In acquisitions, the premiums paid should reflect how much the price already reflects the expected value of control; in a market that already reflects a high value for expected control, the premiums should be smaller.
- With companies with voting and non-voting shares, the premium on voting shares should reflect the expected value of control. If the probability of control changing is small and/or the value of changing management is small (because the company is well run), the expected value of control should be small and so should the voting stock premium.
- In private company valuation, the discount applied to minority blocks should be a reflection of the value of control.

## Alternative Approaches to Value Enhancement

---

- *Maximize a variable that is correlated with the value of the firm. There are several choices for such a variable. It could be*
  - an accounting variable, such as **earnings or return on investment**
  - a marketing variable, such as **market share**
  - a cash flow variable, such as cash flow return on investment (CFROI)
  - a risk-adjusted cash flow variable, such as Economic Value Added (EVA)
- **The advantages of using these variables are that they**
  - Are often simpler and easier to use than DCF value.
- **The disadvantage is that the**
  - Simplicity comes at a cost; these variables are not perfectly correlated with DCF value.

## Economic Value Added (EVA) and CFROI

---

- The Economic Value Added (EVA) is a measure of surplus value created on an investment.
  - Define the return on capital (ROC) to be the “true” cash flow return on capital earned on an investment.
  - Define the cost of capital as the weighted average of the costs of the different financing instruments used to finance the investment.

$$\text{EVA} = (\text{Return on Capital} - \text{Cost of Capital}) (\text{Capital Invested in Project})$$

- The CFROI is a measure of the cash flow return made on capital
$$\text{CFROI} = (\text{Adjusted EBIT} (1-t) + \text{Depreciation \& Other Non-cash Charges}) / \text{Capital Invested}$$

## The bottom line...

---

- The value of a firm is not going to change just because you use a different metric for value. All approaches that are discounted cash flow approaches should yield the same value for a business, if they make consistent assumptions.
- If there are differences in value from using different approaches, they must be attributable to differences in assumptions, either explicit or implicit, behind the valuation.

## A Simple Illustration

---

- Assume that you have a firm with a book value value of capital of \$ 100 million, on which it expects to generate a return on capital of 15% in perpetuity with a cost of capital of 10%.
- This firm is expected to make additional investments of \$ 10 million at the beginning of each year for the next 5 years. These investments are also expected to generate 15% as return on capital in perpetuity, with a cost of capital of 10%.
- After year 5, assume that
  - The earnings will grow 5% a year in perpetuity.
  - The firm will keep reinvesting back into the business but the return on capital on these new investments will be equal to the cost of capital (10%).

## Firm Value using EVA Approach

---

Capital Invested in Assets in Place	= \$ 100
EVA from Assets in Place = $(.15 - .10)(100)/.10$	= \$ 50
+ PV of EVA from New Investments in Year 1 = $[(.15 - .10)(10)/.10]$	= \$ 5
+ PV of EVA from New Investments in Year 2 = $[(.15 - .10)(10)/.10]/1.1$	= \$ 4.55
+ PV of EVA from New Investments in Year 3 = $[(.15 - .10)(10)/.10]/1.1^2$	= \$ 4.13
+ PV of EVA from New Investments in Year 4 = $[(.15 - .10)(10)/.10]/1.1^3$	= \$ 3.76
+ PV of EVA from New Investments in Year 5 = $[(.15 - .10)(10)/.10]/1.1^4$	= \$ 3.42
<b>Value of Firm</b>	<b>= \$ 170.85</b>

## Firm Value using DCF Valuation: Estimating FCFF

	<i>Base Year</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>Term. Year</i>
EBIT (1-t) : Assets in Place	\$ 15.00	\$ 15.00	\$ 15.00	\$ 15.00	\$ 15.00	\$ 15.00	
EBIT(1-t) :Investments- Yr 1		\$ 1.50	\$ 1.50	\$ 1.50	\$ 1.50	\$ 1.50	
EBIT(1-t) :Investments- Yr 2			\$ 1.50	\$ 1.50	\$ 1.50	\$ 1.50	
EBIT(1-t): Investments -Yr 3				\$ 1.50	\$ 1.50	\$ 1.50	
EBIT(1-t): Investments -Yr 4					\$ 1.50	\$ 1.50	
EBIT(1-t): Investments- Yr 5						\$ 1.50	
Total EBIT(1-t)		\$ 16.50	\$ 18.00	\$ 19.50	\$ 21.00	\$ 22.50	\$ 23.63
- Net Capital Expenditures	\$10.00	\$ 10.00	\$ 10.00	\$ 10.00	\$ 10.00	\$ 11.25	\$ 11.81
FCFF		\$ 6.50	\$ 8.00	\$ 9.50	\$ 11.00	\$ 11.25	\$ 11.81

After year 5, the reinvestment rate is 50% =  $g/ROC$

## Firm Value: Present Value of FCFF

---

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5	Term Year
FCFF		\$ 6.50	\$ 8.00	\$ 9.50	\$ 11.00	\$ 11.25	\$ 11.81
PV of FCFF	(\$10)	\$ 5.91	\$ 6.61	\$ 7.14	\$ 7.51	\$ 6.99	
Terminal Value						\$ 236.25	
PV of Terminal Value						\$ 146.69	
Value of Firm	\$170.85						

# Implications

---

- Growth, by itself, does not create value. It is growth, with investment in excess return projects, that creates value.
  - The growth of 5% a year after year 5 creates no additional value.
- The “market value added” (MVA), which is defined to be the excess of market value over capital invested is a function of the excess value created.
  - In the example above, the market value of \$ 170.85 million exceeds the book value of \$ 100 million, because the return on capital is 5% higher than the cost of capital.

## Year-by-year EVA Changes

---

- Firms are often evaluated based upon year-to-year changes in EVA rather than the present value of EVA over time.
- The advantage of this comparison is that it is simple and does not require the making of forecasts about future earnings potential.
- Another advantage is that it can be broken down by any unit - person, division etc., as long as one is willing to assign capital and allocate earnings across these same units.
- While it is simpler than DCF valuation, using year-by-year EVA changes comes at a cost. In particular, it is entirely possible that a firm which focuses on increasing EVA on a year-to-year basis may end up being less valuable.

## Gaming the system: Delivering high current EVA while destroying value...

---


- The Growth trade off game: Managers may give up valuable growth opportunities in the future to deliver higher EVA in the current year.
- The Risk game: Managers may be able to deliver a higher dollar EVA but in riskier businesses. The value of the business is the present value of EVA over time and the risk effect may dominate the increased EVA.
- The capital invested game: The key to delivering positive EVA is to make investments that do not show up as part of capital invested. That way, your operating income will increase while capital invested will decrease.

## Delivering a high EVA may not translate into higher stock prices...


---

- The relationship between EVA and Market Value Changes is more complicated than the one between EVA and Firm Value.
- The market value of a firm reflects not only the Expected EVA of Assets in Place but also the Expected EVA from Future Projects
- To the extent that the actual economic value added is smaller than the expected EVA the market value can decrease even though the EVA is higher.

# High EVA companies do not earn excess returns



# Increases in EVA do not create excess returns



## Implications of Findings

---

- This does not imply that increasing EVA is bad from a corporate finance standpoint. In fact, given a choice between delivering a “below-expectation” EVA and no EVA at all, the firm should deliver the “below-expectation” EVA.
- It does suggest that the correlation between increasing year-to-year EVA and market value will be weaker for firms with high anticipated growth (and excess returns) than for firms with low or no anticipated growth.
- It does suggest also that “investment strategies” based upon EVA have to be carefully constructed, especially for firms where there is an expectation built into prices of “high” surplus returns.

## When focusing on year-to-year EVA changes has least side effects

---

1. Most or all of the assets of the firm are already in place; i.e, very little or none of the value of the firm is expected to come from future growth.
  - [This minimizes the risk that increases in current EVA come at the expense of future EVA]
2. The leverage is stable and the cost of capital cannot be altered easily by the investment decisions made by the firm.
  - [This minimizes the risk that the higher EVA is accompanied by an increase in the cost of capital]
3. The firm is in a sector where investors anticipate little or not surplus returns; i.e., firms in this sector are expected to earn their cost of capital.
  - [This minimizes the risk that the increase in EVA is less than what the market expected it to be, leading to a drop in the market price.]

## When focusing on year-to-year EVA changes can be dangerous

---

1. High growth firms, where the bulk of the value can be attributed to future growth.
2. Firms where neither the leverage nor the risk profile of the firm is stable, and can be changed by actions taken by the firm.
3. Firms where the current market value has imputed in it expectations of significant surplus value or excess return projects in the future.

Note that all of these problems can be avoided if we restate the objective as maximizing the present value of EVA over time. If we do so, however, some of the perceived advantages of EVA - its simplicity and observability - disappear.

## The Bottom line...

---

- Value creation is hard work. There are no short cuts.
- Investment banks/Consultants/Experts who claim to have short cuts and metrics that allow for easy value creation are holding back on hard truths.
- Value creation does not happen in finance departments of businesses. Every employee has a role to play.