A final thought: Side Costs and Benefits

- Most projects considered by any business create side costs and benefits for that business.
 - The side costs include the costs created by the use of resources that the business already owns (opportunity costs) and lost revenues for other projects that the firm may have.
 - The benefits that may not be captured in the traditional capital budgeting analysis include project synergies (where cash flow benefits may accrue to other projects) and options embedded in projects (including the options to delay, expand or abandon a project).
- The returns on a project should incorporate these costs and benefits.

First Principles



Aswath Damodaran

CAPITAL STRUCTURE: THE CHOICES AND THE TRADE OFF

"Neither a borrower nor a lender be" Someone who obviously hated this part of corporate finance

First Principles



Assessing the existing financing choices: Disney, Vale, Tata Motors & Baidu

	Disney	Vale	Tata Motors	Baidu		
BV of Interest bearing Debt	\$14,288	\$48,469	535,914₹	¥17,844		
MV of Interest bearing Debt	\$13,028	\$41,143	477,268₹	¥15,403		
Lease Debt	\$2,933	\$1,248	0.00₹	¥3,051		
	Type of D	Debt				
Bank Debt	7.93%	59.97%	62.26%	100.00%		
Bonds/Notes	92.07%	40.03%	37.74%	0.00%		
	Debt Matu	ırity				
<1 year	13.04%	6.08%	0.78%	1.98%		
1-5 years	48.93%	23.12%	30.24%	68.62%		
5-10 years	20.31%	29.44%	57.90%	29.41%		
10-20 years	4.49%	3.00%	10.18%	0.00%		
> 20 years	13.24%	38.37%	0.90%	0.00%		
	Currency for debt					
Debt in domestic currency	94.51%	34.52%	70.56%	17.90%		
Debt in foreign currency	5.49%	65.48%	29.44%	82.10%		
Fixed versus Floating rate debt						
Fixed rate debt	94.33%	100.00%	100.00%	94.63%		
Floating rate debt	5.67%	0.00%	0.00%	5.37%		

Debt: Summarizing the trade off

Advantages of Debt	Disadvantages of debt
1. Tax Benefit : Interest expenses on debt are tax deductible	1. Expected Bankruptcy Cost : The expected cost of going
but cash flows to equity are generally not.	bankrupt is a product of the probability of going bankrupt and
Implication: The higher the marginal tax rate, the greater the	the cost of going bankrupt. The latter includes both direct and
benefits of debt.	indirect costs. The probability of going bankrupt will be
	higher in businesses with more volatile earnings and the cost
	of bankruptcy will also vary across businesses.
	Implication:
	1. Firms with more stable earnings should borrow more, for any
	given level of earnings.
	2. Firms with lower bankruptcy costs should borrow more, for
	any given level of earnings.
2. Added Discipline: Borrowing money may force managers	2. Agency Costs : Actions that benefit equity investors may
to think about the consequences of the investment decisions a	hurt lenders. The greater the potential for this conflict of
little more carefully and reduce bad investments.	interest, the greater the cost borne by the borrower (as higher
Implication: As the separation between managers and	interest rates or more covenants).
stockholders increases, the benefits to using debt will go up.	Implication: Firms where lenders can monitor/ control how
	their money is being used should be able to borrow more than
	firms where this is difficult to do.
	3. Loss of flexibility : Using up available debt capacity today
	will mean that you cannot draw on it in the future. This loss of
	flexibility can be disastrous if funds are needed and access to
	capital is shut off.
	Implication:
	1. Firms that can forecast future funding needs better
	should be able to borrow more.
	2. Firms with better access to capital markets should be
	more willing to borrow more today.

The Trade off for Disney, Vale, Tata

Motors and Baidu

Debt ti
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Debt trade off	Discussion of relative benefits/costs				
Tax benefits	Marginal tax rates of 40% in US (Disney & Bookscape), 32.5% in India (Tata				
	Motors), 25% in China (Baidu) and 34% in Brazil (Vale), but there is an offsetting				
	tax benefit for equity in Brazil (interest on equity capital is deductible).				
Added	The benefits should be highest at Disney, where there is a clear separation of				
Discipline	ownership and management and smaller at the remaining firms.				
Expected	Volatility in earnings: Higher at Baidu (young firm in technology), Tata Motors				
Bankruptcy	(cyclicality) and Vale (commodity prices) and lower at Disney (diversified across				
Costs	entertainment companies).				
	Indirect bankruptcy costs likely to be highest at Tata Motors, since it's products				
	(automobiles) have long lives and require service and lower at Disney and Baidu.				
Agency Costs	Highest at Baidu, largely because it's assets are intangible and it sells services and				
	lowest at Vale (where investments are in mines, highly visible and easily				
	monitored) and Tata Motors (tangible assets, family group backing). At Disney,				
	the agency costs will vary across its business, higher in the movie and				
	broadcasting businesses and lower at theme parks.				
Flexibility	Baidu will value flexibility more than the other firms, because technology is a				
needs	shifting and unpredictable business, where future investment needs are difficult to				
	forecast. The flexibility needs should be lower at Disney and Tata Motors, since				
	they are mature companies with well-established investment needs. At Vale, the				
	need for investment funds may vary with commodity prices, since the firm grows				
	by acquiring both reserves and smaller companies. At Bookscape, the difficulty of				
	accessing external capital will make flexibility more necessary.				

Section Test: Would you expect your firm to gain or lose from using debt?

- Consider, for your firm,
 - The potential tax benefits of borrowing
 - The benefits of using debt as a disciplinary mechanism
 - The potential for expected bankruptcy costs
 - The potential for agency costs
 - The need for financial flexibility
- Would you expect your firm to have a high debt ratio or a low debt ratio?
- Does the firm's current debt ratio meet your expectations?

A Hypothetical Scenario

Assume that you live in a world where

- (a) There are no taxes
- (b) Managers have stockholder interests at heart and do what's best for stockholders.
- (c) No firm ever goes bankrupt
- (d) Equity investors are honest with lenders; there is no subterfuge or attempt to find loopholes in loan agreements.
- (e) Firms know their future financing needs with certainty

	Benefits of debt	Costs of debt	
	Tax benefits	Expected Bankruptcy Cost	
	Added Discipline	Agency Costs	
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The Miller-Modigliani Theorem

- In an environment, where there are no taxes, default risk or agency costs, capital structure is irrelevant.
- In this world,
 - Leverage is irrelevant. A firm's value will be determined by its project cash flows.
 - The cost of capital of the firm will not change with leverage. As a firm increases its leverage, the cost of equity will increase just enough to offset any gains to the leverage

Pathways to the Optimal

- The Cost of Capital Approach: The optimal debt ratio is the one that minimizes the cost of capital for a firm.
- The Sector Approach: The optimal debt ratio is the one that brings the firm closes to its peer group in terms of financing mix.

I. The Cost of Capital Approach

- Value of a Firm = Present Value of Cash Flows to the Firm, discounted back at the cost of capital.
- If the cash flows to the firm are held constant, and the cost of capital is minimized, the value of the firm will be maximized.

Applying Cost of Capital Approach: The Textbook Example

D/(D+E)	Cost of Equity	After-tax Cost of Debt	Cost of Capital	Firm Value
0	10.50%	4.80%	10.50%	\$2,747
10%	11.00%	5.10%	10.41%	\$2,780
20%	11.60%	5.40%	10.36%	\$2,799
30%	12.30%	5.52%	10.27%	\$2,835
40%	13.10%	5.70%	10.14%	\$2,885
50%	14.50%	6.10%	10.30%	\$2,822
60%	15.00%	7.20%	10.32%	\$2,814
70%	16.10%	8.10%	10.50%	\$2,747
80%	17.20%	9.00%	10.64%	\$2,696
90%	18.40%	10.20%	11.02%	\$2,569
100%	19.70%	11.40%	11.40%	\$2,452

Expected Cash flow to firm next year

200(1.03)

(Cost of capital - g)

(Cost of capital - g)

The U-shaped Cost of Capital Graph...



Current Cost of Capital: Disney

The beta for Disney's stock in November 2013 was 1.0013. The T. bond rate at that time was 2.75%. Using an estimated equity risk premium of 5.76%, we estimated the cost of equity for Disney to be 8.52%:

Cost of Equity = 2.75% + 1.0013(5.76%) = 8.52%

Disney's bond rating in May 2009 was A, and based on this rating, the estimated pretax cost of debt for Disney is 3.75%. Using a marginal tax rate of 36.1, the after-tax cost of debt for Disney is 2.40%.

After-Tax Cost of Debt = 3.75% (1 - 0.361) = 2.40%

The cost of capital was calculated using these costs and the weights based on market values of equity (121,878) and debt (15.961):
121.878

Cost of capital = $8.52\% \frac{121,878}{(15,961+121,878)} + 2.40\% \frac{15,961}{(15,961+121,878)} = 7.81\%$

Mechanics of Cost of Capital Estimation

- 1. Estimate the Cost of Equity at different levels of debt:
 - Equity will become riskier -> Beta will increase -> Cost of Equity will increase.
 - Estimation will use levered beta calculation
- 2. Estimate the Cost of Debt at different levels of debt:
 - Default risk will go up and bond ratings will go down as debt goes up -> Cost of Debt will increase.
 - To estimating bond ratings, we will use the interest coverage ratio (EBIT/Interest expense)
- 3. Estimate the Cost of Capital at different levels of debt
- 4. Calculate the effect on Firm Value and Stock Price.

I. Cost of Equity

Debt to Capital Ratio	D/E Ratio	Levered Beta	Cost of Equity
0%	0.00%	0.9239	8.07%
10%	11.11%	0.9895	8.45%
20%	25.00%	1.0715	8.92%
30%	42.86%	1.1770	9.53%
40%	66.67%	1.3175	10.34%
50%	100.00%	1.5143	11.48%
60%	150.00%	1.8095	13.18%
70%	233.33%	2.3016	16.01%
80%	400.00%	3.2856	21.68%
90%	900.00%	6.2376	38.69%

Levered Beta = 0.9239 (1 + (1- .361) (D/E)) Cost of equity = 2.75% + Levered beta * 5.76%

II. Bond Ratings, Cost of Debt and Debt

Ratios

			Interest		Pre-tax		After-tax
Debt		Interest	Coverage		cost of		cost of
Ratio	\$ Debt	Expense	Ratio	Bond Rating	debt	Tax rate	debt
0%	\$0	\$0	∞	Aaa/AAA	3.15%	36.10%	2.01%
10%	\$13,784	\$434	23.10	Aaa/AAA	3.15%	36.10%	2.01%
20%	\$27,568	\$868	11.55	Aaa/AAA	3.15%	36.10%	2.01%
30%	\$41,352	\$1,427	7.03	Aa2/AA	3.45%	36.10%	2.20%
40%	\$55,136	\$2,068	4.85	A2/A	3.75%	36.10%	2.40%
50%	\$68,919	\$6,892	1.46	B3/B-	10.00%	36.10%	6.39%
60%	\$82,703	\$9,511	1.05	Caa/CCC	11.50%	36.10%	7.35%
70%	\$96,487	\$11,096	0.90	Caa/CCC	11.50%	32.64%	7.75%
80%	\$110,271	\$13,508	0.74	Ca2/CC	12.25%	26.81%	8.97%
90%	\$124,055	\$16,437	0.61	C2/C	13.25%	22.03%	10.33%

Disney's cost of capital schedule...

				Cost of Debt (after-	
	Debt Ratio	Beta	Cost of Equity	tax)	WACC
	0%	0.9239	8.07%	2.01%	8.07%
	10%	0.9895	8.45%	2.01%	7.81%
	20%	1.0715	8.92%	2.01%	7.54%
	30%	1.1770	9.53%	2.20%	7.33%
	40%	1.3175	10.34%	2.40%	7.16%
_	50%	1.5143	11.48%	6.39%	8.93%
	60%	1.8095	13.18%	7.35%	9.68%
_	70%	2.3762	16.44%	7.75%	10.35%
	80%	3.6289	23.66%	8.97%	11.90%
	90%	7.4074	45.43%	10.33%	13.84%