


# ~~Advanced~~ Valuation

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## Some Initial Thoughts

" One hundred thousand lemmings cannot be wrong"

*Graffiti*



# Misconceptions about Valuation

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- Myth 1: A valuation is an objective search for “true” value
  - Truth 1.1: All valuations are biased. The only questions are how much and in which direction.
  - Truth 1.2: The direction and magnitude of the bias in your valuation is directly proportional to who pays you and how much you are paid.
- Myth 2.: A good valuation provides a precise estimate of value
  - Truth 2.1: There are no precise valuations
  - Truth 2.2: The payoff to valuation is greatest when valuation is least precise.
- Myth 3: . The more quantitative a model, the better the valuation
  - Truth 3.1: One’ s understanding of a valuation model is inversely proportional to the number of inputs required for the model.
  - Truth 3.2: Simpler valuation models do much better than complex ones.

## Approaches to Valuation

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- **Discounted cashflow valuation**, relates the value of an asset to the present value of expected future cashflows on that asset.
- **Relative valuation**, estimates the value of an asset by looking at the pricing of 'comparable' assets relative to a common variable like earnings, cashflows, book value or sales.
- **Contingent claim valuation**, uses option pricing models to measure the value of assets that share option characteristics.

# Discounted Cash Flow Valuation

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- **What is it:** In discounted cash flow valuation, the value of an asset is the present value of the expected cash flows on the asset.
- **Philosophical Basis:** Every asset has an intrinsic value that can be estimated, based upon its characteristics in terms of cash flows, growth and risk.
- **Information Needed:** To use discounted cash flow valuation, you need
  - to estimate the life of the asset
  - to estimate the cash flows during the life of the asset
  - to estimate the discount rate to apply to these cash flows to get present value
- **Market Inefficiency:** Markets are assumed to make mistakes in pricing assets across time, and are assumed to correct themselves over time, as new information comes out about assets.

## Risk Adjusted Value: Three Basic Propositions

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The value of an asset is the present value of the expected cash flows on that asset, over its expected life:

$$\text{Value of asset} = \frac{E(\text{CF}_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(\text{CF}_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(\text{CF}_3)}{(1+r)^3} \dots + \frac{E(\text{CF}_n)}{(1+r)^n}$$

**Proposition 1: If “it” does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), “it” cannot affect value.**

**Proposition 2: For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.**

**Proposition 3: Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.**


# DCF Choices: Equity Valuation versus Firm Valuation

**Firm Valuation:** Value the entire business


Assets		Liabilities	
Existing Investments Generate cashflows today Includes long lived (fixed) and short-lived (working capital) assets	Assets in Place	Debt	Fixed Claim on cash flows Little or No role in management <i>Fixed Maturity</i> <i>Tax Deductible</i>
Expected Value that will be created by future investments	Growth Assets	Equity	Residual Claim on cash flows Significant Role in management <i>Perpetual Lives</i>

**Equity valuation:** Value just the equity claim in the business

# The Drivers of Value...



# DISCOUNTED CASHFLOW VALUATION



# Amgen: Status Quo

Cap Ex = Acc net Cap Ex(255) + Acquisitions (3975) + R&D (2216)

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t) = :7336(1-.28) = 6058  
 - Nt CpX = 6443  
 - Chg WC 37  
 = FCFF - 423  
 Reinvestment Rate = 6480/6058 = 106.98%  
 Return on capital = 16.71%

Reinvestment Rate 60%

**Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)**  
 $.60 \times .16 = .096$   
**9.6%**

Return on Capital 16%

**Stable Growth**  
 g = 4%; Beta = 1.10;  
 Debt Ratio = 20%; Tax rate = 35%  
 Cost of capital = 8.08%  
 ROC = 10.00%;  
 Reinvestment Rate = 4/10 = 40%

Terminal Value<sub>10</sub> = 7300 / (.0808 - .04) = 179,099

First 5 years

Growth decreases gradually to 4%

Op. Assets 94214  
 + Cash: 1283  
 - Debt 8272  
 = Equity 87226  
 - Options 479  
 Value/Share \$ 74.33

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Term Yr
EBIT	\$9,221	\$10,106	\$11,076	\$12,140	\$13,305	\$14,433	\$15,496	\$16,463	\$17,306	\$17,998	18718
EBIT (1-t)	\$6,639	\$7,276	\$7,975	\$8,741	\$9,580	\$10,392	\$11,157	\$11,853	\$12,460	\$12,958	12167
- Reinvestment	\$3,983	\$4,366	\$4,785	\$5,244	\$5,748	\$5,820	\$5,802	\$5,690	\$5,482	\$5,183	4867
= FCFF	\$2,656	\$2,911	\$3,190	\$3,496	\$3,832	\$4,573	\$5,355	\$6,164	\$6,978	\$7,775	7300

Cost of Capital (WACC) = 11.7% (0.90) + 3.66% (0.10) = 10.90%


Debt ratio increases to 20%  
 Beta decreases to 1.10

On May 1, 2007, Amgen was trading at \$ 55/share

**Cost of Equity 11.70%**

**Cost of Debt**  
 $(4.78\% + .85\%)(1 - .35)$   
 = 3.66%

**Weights**  
 E = 90% D = 10%



## Valuing Dr. Reddy's Labs

Cap Ex = Acc net Cap Ex(7,290) + Net R&D (1,976)

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t)=19,332 (1-.2171) =15,805  
 - Nt CpX= — 9,266  
 - Chg WC 6,788  
 = FCFF - 248  
 Reinvestment Rate = 16,053/15,805 = 101.57%  
 Return on capital = 28.93%

Reinvestment Rate 101.57%  
 Return on Capital 28.93  
**Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)**  
 $1.0157 * 28.93 = .0586$   
**29.39%**

**Stable Growth**  
 g = 6%; Beta = 1.00;  
 Debt Ratio= 6.4%; Tax rate=34%  
 Cost of capital = 13.45%  
 ROC= 13.45%; Reinvestment Rate=6%/13.45% = 44.61%

First 5 years Growth decreases gradually to 6%  
 Terminal Value<sub>10</sub> = 57,484 / (.1345 - .06) = 771,489

Op. Assets 259,323  
 + Cash: 5,730  
 - Debt 20,216  
 =Equity 244,838  
 Value/Share Rs 1,444

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
EBIT (1-t)	20450	26460	34235	44296	57313	71475	85792	98965	109532	116104
- Reinvestment	20771	26875	34773	44992	58213	64454	67592	66695	61337	51790
FCFF	-321	-416	-538	-696	-900	7020	18201	32270	48195	64314

Term Yr  
 103,771  
 37,738  
 8,551  
 57,484  
 Tax rate increases to 35%

Cost of Capital (WACC) = 14.28% (0.936) + 4.39% (0.064) = 14.28%

Debt ratio istays unchanged  
 Beta decreases to 1.00

**Cost of Equity**  
 14.28%

**Cost of Debt**  
 (6%+0.65%)(1-.3399)  
 = 4.39%

**Weights**  
 E = 93.6% D = 6.4%

On March 14, 2012,  
 Dr. Reddy's was trading at Rs 1747

**Riskfree Rate:**  
 Riskfree rate = 3%

+ **Beta** 1.14 x **Risk Premium** 6%  
 + **Unlevered Beta for Sectors:** 1.41 x **D/E=21.35%**

Region	Revenues	% from Regid	% of typical d	Lambda	CRP
North Ameri	22.56	31.02%	75%	0.41	0.00%
Europe	15.77	21.68%	70%	0.31	0.50%
India	12.96	17.82%	80%	0.22	3.00%
Russia & East	10.86	14.93%	90%	0.17	4.00%
Others	10.58	14.55%	70%	0.21	3.00%
	72.73				2.11%

# Tata Motors: April 2010

## Current Cashflow to Firm

EBIT(1-t) : Rs 20,116  
 - Nt CpX : Rs 31,590  
 - Chg WC : Rs 2,732  
 = FCFF : - Rs 14,205  
 Reinv Rate =  $(31590+2732)/20116 = 170.61\%$ ; Tax rate = 21.00%  
 Return on capital = 17.16%

Average reinvestment rate  
 from 2005-09: 179.59%;  
 without acquisitions: 70%

Reinvestment Rate  
 70%

Expected Growth  
 from new inv.  
 $70 \cdot 17.16 = 0.1201$

Return on Capital  
 17.16%

Stable Growth  
 $g = 5\%$ ; Beta = 1.00  
 Country Premium = 3%  
 Cost of capital = 10.39%  
 Tax rate = 33.99%  
 ROC = 10.39%;  
 Reinvestment Rate =  $g/ROC = 5/10.39 = 48.11\%$

## Rs Cashflows

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
EBIT (1-t)	22533	25240	28272	31668	35472	39236	42848	46192	49150	51607
- Reinvestment	15773	17668	19790	22168	24830	25242	25138	24482	23264	21503
FCFF	6760	7572	8482	9500	10642	13994	17711	21710	25886	30104

Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> =  $23493 / (.1039 - .05) = Rs 435,686$

45278  
 21785  
 23493

Op. Assets Rs210,813  
 + Cash: 11418  
 + Other NO 140576  
 - Debt 109198  
 = Equity 253,628

Value/Share Rs 614

Discount at Cost of Capital (WACC) =  $14.00\% (.747) + 8.09\% (0.253) = 12.50\%$

Growth declines to 5%  
 and cost of capital  
 moves to stable period  
 level.

Cost of Equity  
 14.00%

Cost of Debt  
 $(5\% + 4.25\% + 3\%)(1 - .3399)$   
 = 8.09%

Weights  
 E = 74.7% D = 25.3%

On April 1, 2010  
 Tata Motors price = Rs 781

Riskfree Rate:  
 Rs Riskfree Rate = 5%

+

Beta  
 1.20

X

Mature market  
 premium  
 4.5%

+

Lambda  
 0.80

X

Country Equity Risk  
 Premium  
 4.50%


Unlevered Beta for  
 Sectors: 1.04

Firm's D/E  
 Ratio: 33%

Country Default  
 Spread  
 3%

X

Rel Equity  
 Mkt Vol  
 1.50




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# DCF Inputs

“Garbage in, garbage out”

# I. Measure earnings right..



## Operating Leases at Amgen in 2007

- Amgen has lease commitments and its cost of debt (based on it's A rating) is 5.63%.

Year	Commitment	Present Value
1	\$96.00	\$90.88
2	\$95.00	\$85.14
3	\$102.00	\$86.54
4	\$98.00	\$78.72
5	\$87.00	\$66.16
6-12	\$107.43	\$462.10 (\$752 million prorated)
Debt Value of leases =		\$869.55

- Debt outstanding at Amgen = \$7,402 + \$ 870 = \$8,272 million
- Adjusted Operating Income = Stated OI + Lease exp this year - Depreciation  
= 5,071 m + 69 m - 870/12 = \$5,068 million (12 year life for assets)
- Approximate Operating income= \$5,071 m + 870 m (.0563) = \$ 5,120 million

## Capitalizing R&D Expenses: Amgen

- R & D was assumed to have a 10-year life.

Year	R&D Expense	Unamortized portion	Amortization this year	
Current	3366.00	1.00	3366.00	
-1	2314.00	0.90	2082.60	\$231.40
-2	2028.00	0.80	1622.40	\$202.80
-3	1655.00	0.70	1158.50	\$165.50
-4	1117.00	0.60	670.20	\$111.70
-5	865.00	0.50	432.50	\$86.50
-6	845.00	0.40	338.00	\$84.50
-7	823.00	0.30	246.90	\$82.30
-8	663.00	0.20	132.60	\$66.30
-9	631.00	0.10	63.10	\$63.10
-10	558.00	0.00	0.00	\$55.80

Value of Research Asset = \$10,112.80      \$1,149.90

Adjusted Operating Income = \$5,120 + 3,366 - 1,150 = \$7,336 million

## II. Get the big picture (not the accounting one) when it comes to cap ex and working capital

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- Capital expenditures should include
  - Research and development expenses, once they have been re-categorized as capital expenses.
  - Acquisitions of other firms, whether paid for with cash or stock.
- Working capital should be defined not as the difference between current assets and current liabilities but as the difference between non-cash current assets and non-debt current liabilities.
- On both items, start with what the company did in the most recent year but do look at the company's history and at industry averages.

## Amgen's Net Capital Expenditures

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- The accounting net cap ex at Amgen is small:


Accounting Capital Expenditures =	\$1,218 million
- Accounting Depreciation =	\$ 963 million
Accounting Net Cap Ex =	\$ 255 million

- We define capital expenditures broadly to include R&D and acquisitions:


Accounting Net Cap Ex =	\$ 255 million
Net R&D Cap Ex = (3366-1150) =	\$2,216 million
Acquisitions in 2006 =	\$3,975 million
Total Net Capital Expenditures =	\$ 6,443 million

- Acquisitions have been a volatile item. Amgen was quiet on the acquisition front in 2004 and 2005 and had a significant acquisition in 2003.



### III. Betas do not come from regressions... and are noisy...




## Even against local indices...




# Look better for some companies, but looks can be deceptive...



# Determinants of Betas



# Bottom-up Betas



## Two examples...

### ■ Amgen

- The unlevered beta for pharmaceutical firms is 1.59. Using Amgen's debt to equity ratio of 11%, the bottom up beta for Amgen is
- Bottom-up Beta =  $1.59 (1 + (1 - .35)(.11)) = 1.73$

### ■ Tata Motors

- The unlevered beta for automobile firms is 0.98. Using Tata Motor's debt to equity ratio of 33.87%, the bottom up beta for Tata Motors is
- Bottom-up Beta =  $0.98 (1 + (1 - .3399)(.3387)) = 1.20$

### ■ A Question to ponder: Tata Motors recently made two big investments.

- Tata Nano: Promoted as the cheapest car in the world, Tata Motors hopes that volume (especially in Asia) will make up for tight margins.
- Jaguar/Land Rover: Tata acquired both firms, catering to luxury markets.

What effect will these investments have on Tata Motor's beta?

## IV. And the past is not always a good indicator of the future

- It is standard practice to use historical premiums as forward looking premiums. :

	Arithmetic Average		Geometric Average	
	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds
1928-2011	7.55%	5.79%	5.62%	4.10%
	2.22%	2.36%		
1962-2011	5.38%	3.36%	4.02%	2.35%
	2.39%	2.68%		
2002-2011	3.12%	-1.92%	1.08%	-3.61%
	6.46%	8.94%		

- An alternative is to back out the premium from market prices:

*In the trailing 12 months, the cash returned to stockholders was 74.17. Using the average cash yield of 4.71% for 2002-2011 the cash returned would have been 59.29.*

Analysts expect earnings to grow 9.6% in 2012, 11.9% in 2013, 8.2% in 2014, 4.5% in 2015 and 2% thereafter, resulting in a compounded annual growth rate of 7.18% over the next 5 years. We will assume that dividends & buybacks will grow 7.18% a year for the next 5 years.

After year 5, we will assume that earnings on the index will grow at 1.87%, the same rate as the entire economy (= riskfree rate).


	63.54	68.11	73.00	78.24	83.86	
January 1, 2012 S&P 500 is at 1257.60 Adjusted Dividends & Buybacks for 2011 = 59.29	$1257.60 = \frac{63.54}{(1+r)} + \frac{68.11}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{73.00}{(1+r)^3} + \frac{78.24}{(1+r)^4} + \frac{83.86}{(1+r)^5} + \frac{83.86(1.0187)}{(r-.0187)(1+r)^5}$					
	Expected Return on Stocks (1/1/12)		= 7.91%			
	T.Bond rate on 1/1/12		= 1.87%			
	Equity Risk Premium = 8.03% - 3.29%		= 6.04%			

### Data Sources:


*Dividends and Buybacks last year: S&P  
Expected growth rate: News stories, Yahoo! Finance, Bloomberg*

# Implied Premiums in the US: 1960-2011

*Implied Premium for US Equity Market*



# The Anatomy of a Crisis: Implied ERP from September 12, 2008 to January 1, 2009



## Implied Premium for India using the Sensex: April 2010

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- Level of the Index = 17559
- FCFE on the Index = 3.5% (Estimated FCFE for companies in index as % of market value of equity)
- Other parameters
  - Riskfree Rate = 5% (Rupee)
  - Expected Growth (in Rupee)
    - Next 5 years = 20% (Used expected growth rate in Earnings)
    - After year 5 = 5%
- Solving for the expected return:
  - Expected return on Equity = 11.72%
  - Implied Equity premium for India =  $11.72\% - 5\% = 6.72\%$

## An updated implied ERP for India: May 2012

*In the trailing 12 months, the FCFE for the companies in the Sensex amounted to about 6% of the market capitalization of these stocks.*

Analysts expect earnings to grow 14.03% in 2012, 13.84% in 2013, 7.5% in 2014 and at 6.5% thereafter, resulting in a compounded annual growth rate of 9.62% over the next 5 years. We will assume that FCFE will grow 9.62% a year for the next 5 years.

After year 5, we will assume that earnings on the index will grow at 6.50%, the same rate as the entire economy (= riskfree rate).

May 15, 2012  
The Sensex was trading at 16,200.

976.60	1070.65	1173.63	1286.52	1410.26
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$$16200 = \frac{976.60}{(1+r)} + \frac{1070.65}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{1173.63}{(1+r)^3} + \frac{1286.52}{(1+r)^4} + \frac{1410.26}{(1+r)^5} + \frac{1410.26(1.065)}{(r-.065)(1+r)^5}$$

Expected Return on Stocks 5/15/12	= 13.27%
Indian Rs riskfree rate on 5/15/12	= 6.50%
Equity Risk Premium = 13.27% - 6.50%	= 6.77%

## V. There is a downside to globalization...

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- Emerging markets offer growth opportunities but they are also riskier. If we want to count the growth, we have to also consider the risk.
- Two ways of estimating the country risk premium:
  - *Default spread on Country Bond*: In this approach, the country equity risk premium is set equal to the default spread of the bond issued by the country.
    - Equity Risk Premium for mature market = 4.5%
    - Equity Risk Premium for India = 4.5% + 3% = 7.5%
  - *Adjusted for equity risk*: The country equity risk premium is based upon the volatility of the equity market relative to the government bond rate.
    - Country risk premium = Default Spread \*  $\sigma_{\text{Country Equity}} / \sigma_{\text{Country Bond}}$
    - Standard Deviation in Sensex = 21%
    - Standard Deviation in Indian government bond = 14%
    - Default spread on Indian Bond = 2%
    - Additional country risk premium for India = 2% (21/14) = 3%
    - Total equity risk premium = US equity risk premium + CRP for India = 6% + 3% = 9%

## Country Risk Premiums January 2012

Canada	6.00%
United States of America	6.00%

Argentina	15.00%
Belize	15.00%
Bolivia	12.00%
Brazil	8.63%
Chile	7.05%
Colombia	9.00%
Costa Rica	9.00%
Ecuador	18.75%
El Salvador	10.13%
Guatemala	9.60%
Honduras	13.50%
Mexico	8.25%
Nicaragua	15.00%
Panama	9.00%
Paraguay	12.00%
Peru	9.00%
Uruguay	9.60%
Venezuela	12.00%

Austria [1]	6.00%
Belgium [1]	7.05%
Cyprus [1]	9.00%
Denmark	6.00%
Finland [1]	6.00%
France [1]	6.00%
Germany [1]	6.00%
Greece [1]	16.50%
Iceland	9.00%
Ireland [1]	9.60%
Italy [1]	7.50%
Malta [1]	7.50%
Netherlands [1]	6.00%
Norway	6.00%
Portugal [1]	10.13%
Spain [1]	7.28%
Sweden	6.00%
Switzerland	6.00%
United Kingdom	6.00%

Angola	10.88%
Botswana	7.50%
Egypt	13.50%
Mauritius	8.63%
Morocco	9.60%
Namibia	9.00%
South Africa	7.73%
Tunisia	9.00%

Albania	12.00%
Armenia	10.13%
Azerbaijan	9.60%
Belarus	15.00%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	13.50%
Bulgaria	8.63%
Croatia	9.00%
Czech Republic	7.28%
Estonia	7.28%
Georgia	10.88%
Hungary	9.60%
Kazakhstan	8.63%
Latvia	9.00%
Lithuania	8.25%
Moldova	15.00%
Montenegro	10.88%
Poland	7.50%
Romania	9.00%
Russia	8.25%
Slovakia	7.28%
Slovenia [1]	7.28%
Ukraine	13.50%

Bahrain	8.25%
Israel	7.28%
Jordan	10.13%
Kuwait	6.75%
Lebanon	12.00%
Oman	7.28%
Qatar	6.75%
Saudi Arabia	7.05%
Senegal	12.00%
United Arab Emirates	6.75%

Bangladesh	10.88%
Cambodia	13.50%
China	7.05%
Fiji Islands	12.00%
Hong Kong	6.38%
India	9.00%
Indonesia	9.60%
Japan	7.05%
Korea	7.28%
Macao	7.05%
Malaysia	7.73%
Mongolia	12.00%
Pakistan	15.00%
Papua New Guinea	12.00%
Philippines	10.13%
Singapore	6.00%
Sri Lanka	12.00%
Taiwan	7.05%
Thailand	8.25%
Turkey	10.13%
Vietnam	12.00%

Australia	6.00%
New Zealand	6.00%

## VI. And it is not just emerging market companies that are exposed to this risk..

- If we treat country risk as a separate risk factor and allow firms to have different exposures to country risk (perhaps based upon the proportion of their revenues come from non-domestic sales)

$$E(\text{Return}) = \text{Riskfree Rate} + \beta (\text{US premium}) + \lambda (\text{Country ERP})$$

- The easiest and most accessible data is on revenues. Most companies break their revenues down by region. One simplistic solution would be to do the following:

$$\lambda = \% \text{ of revenues domestically}_{\text{firm}} / \% \text{ of revenues domestically}_{\text{avg firm}}$$

Consider two firms – Tata Motors and Tata Consulting Services. In 2008-09, Tata Motors got about 91.37% of its revenues in India and TCS got 7.62%. The average Indian firm gets about 80% of its revenues in India:

$$\lambda_{\text{Tata Motors}} = 91\% / 80\% = 1.14$$

$$\lambda_{\text{TCS}} = 7.62\% / 80\% = 0.09$$

- There are two implications
  - A company's risk exposure is determined by where it does business and not by where it is located
  - Firms might be able to actively manage their country risk exposures

## Estimating lambdas: Tata Motors, Dr. Reddy's and TCS


	<i>Tata Motors</i>	<i>Dr. Reddy's</i>	<i>TCS</i>
% of production/ operations in India	High	High	High
% of revenues in India	91.37% (in 2009) Estimated 70% (in 2010)	Low (13%)	7.62%
Lambda	0.80	0.30	0.20
Flexibility in moving operations	Low. Significant physical assets.	High.	High. Human capital is mobile.

## VII. Discount rates can (and often should) change over time...

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- The inputs into the cost of capital - the cost of equity (beta), the cost of debt (default risk) and the debt ratio - can change over time. For younger firms, they should change over time.
- At the minimum, they should change when you get to your terminal year to inputs that better reflect a mature firm.

## VIII. Growth has to be earned (not endowed or estimated)



Adjust EBIT for

- Extraordinary or one-time expenses or income
- Operating leases and R&D
- Cyclical in earnings (Normalize)
- Acquisition Debris (Goodwill amortization etc.)

Use a marginal tax rate to be safe. A high ROC created by paying low effective taxes is not sustainable

$$\text{ROC} = \frac{\text{EBIT (1 - tax rate)}}{\text{Book Value of Equity + Book value of debt - Cash}}$$

Adjust book equity for


- Capitalized R&D
- Acquisition Debris (Goodwill)

Adjust book value of debt for

- Capitalized operating leases


Use end of prior year numbers or average over the year but be consistent in your application

## IX. All good things come to an end..And the terminal value is not an ATM...



## Terminal Value and Growth

Stable growth rate	Amgen	Tata Motors
0%	\$150,652	435,686Rs
1%	\$154,479	435,686Rs
2%	\$160,194	435,686Rs
3%	\$167,784	435,686Rs
4%	\$179,099	435,686Rs
ROIC	10%	10.39%
Cost of capital	8.08%	10.39%



# The loose ends in valuation...

## The loose ends matter...

<b>Value of Operating Assets</b>	Since this is a discounted cashflow valuation, should there be a real option premium?
<b>+ Cash and Marketable Securities</b>	Operating versus Non-operating cash Should cash be discounted for earning a low return?
<b>+ Value of Cross Holdings</b>	How do you value cross holdings in other companies? What if the cross holdings are in private businesses?
<b>+ Value of Other Assets</b>	What about other valuable assets? How do you consider under utilized assets?
<b>Value of Firm</b>	Should you discount this value for opacity or complexity? How about a premium for synergy? What about a premium for intangibles (brand name)?
<b>- Value of Debt</b>	What should be counted in debt? Should you subtract book or market value of debt? What about other obligations (pension fund and health care)? What about contingent liabilities? What about minority interests?
<b>= Value of Equity</b>	Should there be a premium/discount for control? Should there be a discount for distress
<b>- Value of Equity Options</b>	What equity options should be valued here (vested versus non-vested)? How do you value equity options?
<b>= Value of Common Stock</b>	Should you divide by primary or diluted shares?
<b>/ Number of shares</b>	
<b>= Value per share</b>	Should there be a discount for illiquidity/ marketability? Should there be a discount for minority interests?

# 1. The Value of Cash

## An Exercise in Cash Valuation


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	<i>Company A</i>	<i>Company B</i>	<i>Company C</i>
Enterprise Value	\$ 1 billion	\$ 1 billion	\$ 1 billion
Cash	\$ 100 mil	\$ 100 mil	\$ 100 mil
Return on Capital	10%	5%	22%
Cost of Capital	10%	10%	12%
Trades in	US	US	Argentina

In which of these companies is cash most likely to trade at face value, at a discount and at a premium?

# Cash: Discount or Premium?

*Market Value of \$ 1 in cash:  
Estimates obtained by regressing Enterprise Value against Cash Balances*



## 2. Dealing with Holdings in Other firms

---

- Holdings in other firms can be categorized into
  - Minority passive holdings, in which case only the dividend from the holdings is shown in the balance sheet
  - Minority active holdings, in which case the share of equity income is shown in the income statements
  - Majority active holdings, in which case the financial statements are consolidated.
- We tend to be sloppy in practice in dealing with cross holdings. After valuing the operating assets of a firm, using consolidated statements, it is common to add on the balance sheet value of minority holdings (which are in book value terms) and subtract out the minority interests (again in book value terms), representing the portion of the consolidated company that does not belong to the parent company.

## How to value holdings in other firms.. In a perfect world..

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
- In a perfect world, we would strip the parent company from its subsidiaries and value each one separately. The value of the combined firm will be
  - Value of parent company + Proportion of value of each subsidiary
- To do this right, you will need to be provided detailed information on each subsidiary to estimated cash flows and discount rates.

## Two compromise solutions...

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- The market value solution: When the subsidiaries are publicly traded, you could use their traded market capitalizations to estimate the values of the cross holdings. You do risk carrying into your valuation any mistakes that the market may be making in valuation.
- The relative value solution: When there are too many cross holdings to value separately or when there is insufficient information provided on cross holdings, you can convert the book values of holdings that you have on the balance sheet (for both minority holdings and minority interests in majority holdings) by using the average price to book value ratio of the sector in which the subsidiaries operate.

## Tata Motor's Cross Holdings



### 3. Other Assets that have not been counted yet..

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- **Unutilized assets:** If you have assets or property that are not being utilized (vacant land, for example), you have not valued it yet. You can assess a market value for these assets and add them on to the value of the firm.
  - **Overfunded pension plans:** If you have a defined benefit plan and your assets exceed your expected liabilities, you could consider the over funding with two caveats:
    - Collective bargaining agreements may prevent you from laying claim to these excess assets.
    - There are tax consequences. Often, withdrawals from pension plans get taxed at much higher rates.
- Do not double count an asset. If you count the income from an asset in your cashflows, you cannot count the market value of the asset in your value.**

## 4. A Discount for Complexity: An Experiment

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	<i>Company A</i>	<i>Company B</i>
Operating Income	\$ 1 billion	\$ 1 billion
Tax rate	40%	40%
ROIC	10%	10%
Expected Growth	5%	5%
Cost of capital	8%	8%
Business Mix	Single Business	Multiple Businesses
Holdings	Simple	Complex
Accounting	Transparent	Opaque

■ *Which firm would you value more highly?*

## Measuring Complexity: Volume of Data in Financial Statements

<i>Company</i>	<i>Number of pages in last 10Q</i>	<i>Number of pages in last 10K</i>
General Electric	65	410
Microsoft	63	218
Wal-mart	38	244
Exxon Mobil	86	332
Pfizer	171	460
Citigroup	252	1026
Intel	69	215
AIG	164	720
Johnson & Johnson	63	218
IBM	85	353

# Measuring Complexity: A Complexity Score

Item	Factors	Follow-up Question	Answer	Weighting factor	Gerdau Score	GE Score
Operating Income	1. Multiple Businesses	Number of businesses (with more than 10% of revenues) =	1	2.00	2	30
	2. One-time income and expenses	Percent of operating income =	10%	10.00	1	0.8
	3. Income from unspecified sources	Percent of operating income =	0%	10.00	0	1.2
	4. Items in income statement that are volatile	Percent of operating income =	15%	5.00	0.75	1
Tax Rate	1. Income from multiple locales	Percent of revenues from non-domestic locales =	70%	3.00	2.1	1.8
	2. Different tax and reporting books	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	3
	3. Headquarters in tax havens	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	0
	4. Volatile effective tax rate	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=2	2	0
Capital Expenditures	1. Volatile capital expenditures	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=2	2	2
	2. Frequent and large acquisitions	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=4	4	4
	3. Stock payment for acquisitions and investments	Yes or No	No	Yes=4	0	4
Working capital	1. Unspecified current assets and current liabilities	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	0
	2. Volatile working capital items	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=2	2	2
Expected Growth rate	1. Off-balance sheet assets and liabilities (operating leases and R&D)	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	3
	2. Substantial stock buybacks	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	3
	3. Changing return on capital over time	Is your return on capital volatile?	Yes	Yes=5	5	5
	4. Unsustainably high return	Is your firm's ROC much higher than industry average?	No	Yes=5	0	0
Cost of capital	1. Multiple businesses	Number of businesses (more than 10% of revenues) =	1	1.00	1	20
	2. Operations in emerging markets	Percent of revenues=	50%	5.00	2.5	2.5
	3. Is the debt market traded?	Yes or No	No	No=2	2	0
	4. Does the company have a rating?	Yes or No	Yes	No=2	0	0
	5. Does the company have off-balance sheet debt?	Yes or No	No	Yes=5	0	5
No-operating assets	Minority holdings as percent of book assets	Minority holdings as percent of book assets	0%	20.00	0	0.8
Firm to Equity value	Consolidation of subsidiaries	Minority interest as percent of book value of equity	63%	20.00	12.6	1.2
Per share value	Shares with different voting rights	Does the firm have shares with different voting rights?	Yes	Yes = 10	10	0
	Equity options outstanding	Options outstanding as percent of shares	0%	10.00	0	0.25
Complexity Score =					48.95	90.55

# Dealing with Complexity

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## In Discounted Cashflow Valuation

- The Aggressive Analyst: Trust the firm to tell the truth and value the firm based upon the firm's statements about their value.
- The Conservative Analyst: Don't value what you cannot see.
- The Compromise: Adjust the value for complexity
  - Adjust cash flows for complexity
  - Adjust the discount rate for complexity
  - Adjust the expected growth rate/ length of growth period
  - Value the firm and then discount value for complexity


## In relative valuation

In a relative valuation, you may be able to assess the price that the market is charging for complexity:

With the hundred largest market cap firms, for instance:

$PBV = 0.65 + 15.31 ROE - 0.55 \text{ Beta} + 3.04 \text{ Expected growth rate} - 0.003 \# \text{ Pages in 10K}$

## 5. The Value of Synergy



## Valuing Synergy

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- (1) the firms involved in the merger are **valued independently**, by discounting expected cash flows to each firm at the weighted average cost of capital for that firm.
- (2) the **value of the combined firm, with no synergy**, is obtained by adding the values obtained for each firm in the first step.
- (3) The **effects of synergy are built into expected growth rates and cashflows**, and the combined firm is re-valued with synergy.

Value of Synergy = Value of the combined firm, with synergy - Value of the combined firm, without synergy

## Valuing Synergy: P&G + Gillette

	P&G	Gillette	Piglet: No Synergy	Piglet: Synergy	
Free Cashflow to Equity	\$5,864.74	\$1,547.50	\$7,412.24	\$7,569.73	Annual operating expenses reduced by \$250 million
Growth rate for first 5 years	12%	10%	11.58%	12.50%	Slightly higher growth rate
Growth rate after five years	4%	4%	4.00%	4.00%	
Beta	0.90	0.80	0.88	0.88	
Cost of Equity	7.90%	7.50%	7.81%	7.81%	Value of synergy
Value of Equity	\$221,292	\$59,878	\$281,170	\$298,355	<b>\$17,185</b>

## 6. Brand name, great management, superb product ... Are we short changing the intangibles?

---

- There is often a temptation to add on premiums for intangibles. Among them are
  - Brand name
  - Great management
  - Loyal workforce
  - Technological prowess
- There are two potential dangers:
  - For some assets, the value may already be in your value and adding a premium will be double counting.
  - For other assets, the value may be ignored but incorporating it will not be easy.

## Valuing Brand Name

	Coca Cola	With Cott Margins
Current Revenues =	\$21,962.00	\$21,962.00
Length of high-growth period	10	10
Reinvestment Rate =	50%	50%
Operating Margin (after-tax)	15.57%	5.28%
Sales/Capital (Turnover ratio)	1.34	1.34
Return on capital (after-tax)	20.84%	7.06%
Growth rate during period (g) =	10.42%	3.53%
Cost of Capital during period =	7.65%	7.65%
Stable Growth Period		
Growth rate in steady state =	4.00%	4.00%
Return on capital =	7.65%	7.65%
Reinvestment Rate =	52.28%	52.28%
Cost of Capital =	7.65%	7.65%
<b>Value of Firm =</b>	<b>\$79,611.25</b>	<b>\$15,371.24</b>

## 7. Be circumspect about defining debt for cost of capital purposes...

---

- **General Rule:** Debt generally has the following characteristics:
  - Commitment to make fixed payments in the future
  - The fixed payments are tax deductible
  - Failure to make the payments can lead to either default or loss of control of the firm to the party to whom payments are due.
- **Defined as such, debt should include**
  - All interest bearing liabilities, short term as well as long term
  - All leases, operating as well as capital
- **Debt should not include**
  - Accounts payable or supplier credit

## But should consider other potential liabilities when getting to equity value...

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- If you have under funded pension fund or health care plans, you should consider the under funding at this stage in getting to the value of equity.
  - If you do so, you should not double count by also including a cash flow line item reflecting cash you would need to set aside to meet the unfunded obligation.
  - You should not be counting these items as debt in your cost of capital calculations....
- If you have contingent liabilities - for example, a potential liability from a lawsuit that has not been decided - you should consider the expected value of these contingent liabilities
  - Value of contingent liability = Probability that the liability will occur \* Expected value of liability


## 8. The Value of Control

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
- The value of the control premium that will be paid to acquire a block of equity will depend upon two factors -
  - **Probability that control of firm will change:** This refers to the probability that incumbent management will be replaced. this can be either through acquisition or through existing stockholders exercising their muscle.
  - **Value of Gaining Control of the Company:** The value of gaining control of a company arises from two sources - the increase in value that can be wrought by changes in the way the company is managed and run, and the side benefits and perquisites of being in control

Value of Gaining Control = Present Value (Value of Company with change in control - Value of company without change in control) + Side Benefits of Control

*Increase Cash Flows*




*Reduce the cost of capital*




**Firm Value**

*Increase Expected Growth*



*Increase length of growth period*



# Adris Grupa (Status Quo): 4/2010

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t) : 436 HRK  
 - Nt CpX 3 HRK  
 - Chg WC -118 HRK  
 = FCFF 551 HRK  
 Reinv Rate = (3-118)/436 = -26.35%;  
 Tax rate = 17.35%  
 Return on capital = 8.72%

Average from 2004-09  
70.83%

Reinvestment Rate  
70.83%

**Expected Growth from new inv.**  
 $.7083 \times .0969 = 0.0686$   
 or 6.86%

Average from 2004-09  
9.69%

Return on Capital  
9.69%

Stable Growth  
 $g = 4\%$ ; Beta = 0.80  
 Country Premium = 2%  
 Cost of capital = 9.92%  
 Tax rate = 20.00%  
 ROC = 9.92%;  
 Reinvestment Rate =  $g/ROC = 4/9.92 = 40.32\%$

Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> =  $365 / (.0992 - .04) = 6170$  HRK

Op. Assets 4312  
 + Cash: 1787  
 - Debt 141  
 - Minority int 465  
 = Equity 5,484  
 (Common + Preferred shares)  
 Value non-voting share 335 HRK/share

Year	1	2	3	4	5	
EBIT (1-t)	HRK 466	HRK 498	HRK 532	HRK 569	HRK 608	
- Reinvestment	HRK 330	HRK 353	HRK 377	HRK 403	HRK 431	
FCFF	HRK 136	HRK 145	HRK 155	HRK 166	HRK 177	
						612 246 365


Discount at \$ Cost of Capital (WACC) = 10.7% (.974) + 5.40% (0.026) = 10.55%

**Cost of Equity 10.70%**

**Cost of Debt**  
 $(4.25\% + 0.5\% + 2\%)(1 - .20) = 5.40\%$

**Weights**  
 E = 97.4% D = 2.6%

On May 1, 2010  
 AG Pfd price = 279 HRK  
 AG Common = 345 HRK



# Adris Grupa: 4/2010 (Restructured)

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t) : 436 HRK  
 - Nt CpX 3 HRK  
 - Chg WC -118 HRK  
 = FCFF 551 HRK  
 Reinv Rate =  $(3-118)/436 = -26.35\%$ ;  
 Tax rate = 17.35%  
 Return on capital = 8.72%

Average from 2004-09  
 70.83%

Reinvestment Rate  
 70.83%

**Expected Growth from new inv.**  
 $0.7083 \times 0.1054 = 0.0746$   
 or 6.86%

**Increased ROIC to cost of capital**

Return on Capital  
 10.54%

Stable Growth  
 $g = 4\%$ ; Beta = 0.80  
 Country Premium = 2%  
 Cost of capital = 9.65%  
 Tax rate = 20.00%  
 ROC = 9.94%;  
 Reinvestment Rate =  $g/ROC = 4/9.65 = 41.47\%$

Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> =  $367 / (.0965 - .04) = 6508$  HRK

HKR Cashflows

Op. Assets 4545  
 + Cash: 1787  
 - Debt 141  
 - Minority int 465  
 = Equity 5,735  
  
 Value/non-voting 334  
 Value/voting 362

Year	1	2	3	4	5	
EBIT (1-t)	HRK 469	HRK 503	HRK 541	HRK 581	HRK 623	628
- Reinvestment	HRK 332	HRK 356	HRK 383	HRK 411	HRK 442	246
FCFF	HRK 137	HRK 147	HRK 158	HRK 169	HRK 182	367

Discount at \$ Cost of Capital (WACC) = 11.12%  $(.90) + 8.20\% (0.10) = 10.55\%$

**Changed mix of debt and equity to optimal**

On May 1, 2010  
 AG Pfd price = 279 HRK  
 AG Common = 345 HRK

**Cost of Equity 11.12%**

**Cost of Debt**  
 $(4.25\% + 4\% + 2\%)(1 - .20) = 8.20\%$

**Weights**  
 E = 90 % D = 10 %

**Riskfree Rate:**  
 HRK Riskfree Rate = 4.25%

+

**Beta**  
 0.75

x

**Mature market premium**  
 4.5%

+

**Lambda**  
 0.68  
  
**Lambda**  
 0.42

x

CRP for Croatia (3%)  
  
 CRP for Central Europe (3%)

Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 0.68

Firm's D/E Ratio: 11.1%

Country Default Spread 2%

x

Rel Equity Mkt Vol 1.50

## Value of Control and the Value of Voting Rights

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- The value of control at Adris Grupa can be computed as the difference between the status quo value (5469) and the optimal value (5735).
- The value of a voting share derives entirely from the capacity you have to change the way the firm is run. In this case, we have two values for Adris Grupa's Equity.

Status Quo Value of Equity = 5,469 million HKR

All shareholders, common and preferred, get an equal share of the status quo value.


Value for a non-voting share =  $5469 / (9.616 + 6.748) = 334$  HKR/share

Optimal value of Equity = 5,735 million HKR

Value of control at Adris Grupa =  $5,735 - 5469 = 266$  million HKR

Only voting shares get a share of this value of control


Value per voting share =  $334 \text{ HKR} + 266 / 9.616 = 362$  HKR



# The Dark Side of Valuation:

## Valuing difficult-to-value companies

## The fundamental determinants of value...



## The Dark Side of Valuation...

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- Valuing stable, money making companies with consistent and clear accounting statements, a long and stable history and lots of comparable firms is easy to do.
- The true test of your valuation skills is when you have to value “difficult” companies. In particular, the challenges are greatest when valuing:
  - Young companies, early in the life cycle, in young businesses
  - Companies that don’t fit the accounting mold
  - Companies that face substantial truncation risk (default or nationalization risk)


## Difficult to value companies...

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- Across the life cycle:
  - Young, growth firms: Limited history, small revenues in conjunction with big operating losses and a propensity for failure make these companies tough to value.
  - Mature companies in transition: When mature companies change or are forced to change, history may have to be abandoned and parameters have to be reestimated.
  - Declining and Distressed firms: A long but irrelevant history, declining markets, high debt loads and the likelihood of distress make them troublesome.
- Across sectors
  - Financial service firms: Opacity of financial statements and difficulties in estimating basic inputs leave us trusting managers to tell us what's going on.
  - Commodity and cyclical firms: Dependence of the underlying commodity prices or overall economic growth make these valuations susceptible to macro factors.
  - Firms with intangible assets: Accounting principles are left to the wayside on these firms.
- Across the ownership cycle
  - Privately owned businesses: Exposure to firm specific risk and illiquidity bedevil valuations.
  - VC and private equity: Different equity investors, with different perceptions of risk.
  - Closely held public firms: Part private and part public, sharing the troubles of both.

# I. The challenge with young companies...

*Making judgments on revenues/ profits difficult because you cannot draw on history. If you have no product/ service, it is difficult to gauge market potential or profitability. The company;s entire value lies in future growth but you have little to base your estimate on.*






## Upping the ante.. Young companies in young businesses...

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- When valuing a business, we generally draw on three sources of information
  - The firm's current financial statement
    - How much did the firm sell?
    - How much did it earn?
  - The firm's financial history, usually summarized in its financial statements.
    - How fast have the firm's revenues and earnings grown over time?
    - What can we learn about cost structure and profitability from these trends?
    - Susceptibility to macro-economic factors (recessions and cyclical firms)
  - The industry and comparable firm data
    - What happens to firms as they mature? (Margins.. Revenue growth... Reinvestment needs... Risk)
- It is when valuing these companies that you find yourself tempted by the dark side, where
  - “Paradigm shifts” happen...
  - New metrics are invented ...
  - The story dominates and the numbers lag...

### 9a. Amazon in January 2000

*Sales to capital ratio and expected margin are retail industry average numbers*



Terminal Value =  $1881 / (.0961 - .06) = 52,148$

Value of Op Assets	\$ 14,910
+ Cash	\$ 26
= Value of Firm	\$14,936
- Value of Debt	\$ 349
= Value of Equity	\$14,587
- Equity Options	\$ 2,892
Value per share	\$ 34.32

Revenues	\$2,793	5,585	9,774	14,661	19,059	23,862	28,729	33,211	36,798	39,006
EBIT	-\$373	-\$94	\$407	\$1,038	\$1,628	\$2,212	\$2,768	\$3,261	\$3,646	\$3,883
EBIT (1-t)	-\$373	-\$94	\$407	\$871	\$1,058	\$1,438	\$1,799	\$2,119	\$2,370	\$2,524
- Reinvestment	\$559	\$931	\$1,396	\$1,629	\$1,466	\$1,601	\$1,623	\$1,494	\$1,196	\$736
FCFF	-\$931	-\$1,024	-\$989	-\$758	-\$408	-\$163	\$177	\$625	\$1,174	\$1,788

Term. Year

\$41,346
10.00%
35.00%
\$2,688
\$ 807
\$1,881

*All existing options valued as options, using current stock price of \$84.*

Cost of Equity	12.90%	12.90%	12.90%	12.90%	12.90%	12.42%	12.30%	12.10%	11.70%	10.50%
Cost of Debt	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	7.80%	7.75%	7.67%	7.50%	7.00%
AT cost of debt	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	6.71%	5.20%	5.07%	5.04%	4.98%	4.88%	4.55%
Cost of Capital	12.84%	12.84%	12.84%	12.83%	12.81%	12.13%	11.96%	11.69%	11.15%	9.61%

**Cost of Equity 12.90%**


*Used average interest coverage ratio over next 5 years to get BBB rating.*

**Cost of Debt 6.5%+1.5%=8.0%**  
Tax rate = 0% -> 35%


**Weights Debt= 1.2% -> 15%**

Amazon was trading at \$84 in January 2000.

*Pushed debt ratio to retail industry average of 15%.*



# Lesson 1: Don't trust regression betas....




## Lesson 2: Work backwards and keep it simple...

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Year	Revenues	Operating Margin	EBIT
Tr12m	\$1,117	-36.71%	-\$410
1	\$2,793	-13.35%	-\$373
2	\$5,585	-1.68%	-\$94
3	\$9,774	4.16%	\$407
4	\$14,661	7.08%	\$1,038
5	\$19,059	8.54%	\$1,628
6	\$23,862	9.27%	\$2,212
7	\$28,729	9.64%	\$2,768
8	\$33,211	9.82%	\$3,261
9	\$36,798	9.91%	\$3,646
10	\$39,006	9.95%	\$3,883
<b>TY(11)</b>	<b>\$41,346</b>	<b>10.00%</b>	<b>\$4,135</b>
<b>Average</b>			<b>Industry</b>

## Lesson 3: Scaling up is hard to do...

Typically, the revenue growth rate of a newly public company outpaces its industry average for only about five years.



Source: Andrew Metrick

The New York Times

## Lesson 4: Don't forget to pay for growth...

Year	Revenue Growth	Chg in Revenue	Reinvestment	Chg Rev/ Chg Reinvestment	ROC
1	150.00%	\$1,676	\$559	3.00	-76.62%
2	100.00%	\$2,793	\$931	3.00	-8.96%
3	75.00%	\$4,189	\$1,396	3.00	20.59%
4	50.00%	\$4,887	\$1,629	3.00	25.82%
5	30.00%	\$4,398	\$1,466	3.00	21.16%
6	25.20%	\$4,803	\$1,601	3.00	22.23%
7	20.40%	\$4,868	\$1,623	3.00	22.30%
8	15.60%	\$4,482	\$1,494	3.00	21.87%
9	10.80%	\$3,587	\$1,196	3.00	21.19%
10	6.00%	\$2,208	\$736	3.00	20.39%

## Lesson 5: There are always scenarios where the market price can be justified...

	6%	8%	10%	12%	14%
30%	\$ (1.94)	\$ 2.95	\$ 7.84	\$ 12.71	\$ 17.57
35%	\$ 1.41	\$ 8.37	\$ 15.33	\$ 22.27	\$ 29.21
40%	\$ 6.10	\$ 15.93	\$ 25.74	\$ 35.54	\$ 45.34
45%	\$ 12.59	\$ 26.34	\$ 40.05	\$ 53.77	\$ 67.48
50%	\$ 21.47	\$ 40.50	\$ 59.52	\$ 78.53	\$ 97.54
55%	\$ 33.47	\$ 59.60	\$ 85.72	\$ 111.84	\$ 137.95
60%	\$ 49.53	\$ 85.10	\$ 120.66	\$ 156.22	\$ 191.77

## Lesson 6: Don't forget to mop up...

---

- Watch out for “other” equity claims: If you buy equity in a young, growth company, watch out for other (often hidden) claims on the equity that don't take the form of common shares. In particular, watch for options granted to managers, employees, venture capitalists and others (you will be surprised...).
  - Value these options as options (not at exercise value)
  - Take into consideration expectations of future option grants when computing expected future earnings/cash flows.
- Not all shares are equal: If there are differences in cash flow claims (dividends or liquidation) or voting rights across shares, value these differences.
  - Voting rights matter even at well run companies

## Lesson 6: You will be wrong 100% of the time... and it really is not (always) your fault...

---

- No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and how well structured your model is, your estimate of value will change both as new information comes out about the company, the business and the economy.
- As information comes out, you will have to adjust and adapt your model to reflect the information. Rather than be defensive about the resulting changes in value, recognize that this is the essence of risk.
- *A test: If your valuations are unbiased, you should find yourself increasing estimated values as often as you are decreasing values. In other words, there should be equal doses of good and bad news affecting valuations (at least over time).*

### 9b. Amazon in January 2001

**Reinvestment:**  
Cap ex includes acquisitions  
Working capital is 3% of revenues

**Stable Growth**

Stable Revenue Growth: 5%	Stable Operating Margin: 9.32%	Stable ROC=16.94% Reinvest 29.5% of EBIT(1-t)
---------------------------	--------------------------------	--

Current Revenue \$ 2,465  
Current Margin: -34.60%

EBIT -853m

NOL: 1,289 m

Sales Turnover Ratio: 3.02

Revenue Growth: 25.41%

Competitive Advantage

Expected Margin: -> 9.32%

Terminal Value =  $1064 / (.0876 - .05)$   
= \$ 28,310

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Revenues	\$4,314	\$6,471	\$9,059	\$11,777	\$14,132	\$16,534	\$18,849	\$20,922	\$22,596	\$23,726
EBIT	-\$545	-\$107	\$347	\$774	\$1,123	\$1,428	\$1,692	\$1,914	\$2,087	\$2,201
EBIT(1-t)	-\$545	-\$107	\$347	\$774	\$1,017	\$928	\$1,100	\$1,244	\$1,356	\$1,431
- Reinvestment	\$612	\$714	\$857	\$900	\$780	\$796	\$766	\$687	\$554	\$374
FCFF	-\$1,157	-\$822	-\$510	-\$126	\$237	\$132	\$333	\$558	\$802	\$1,057

Term. Year

\$24,912  
\$2,302  
\$1,509  
\$ 445  
\$1,064

Value of Op Assets \$ 8,789  
+ Cash & Non-op \$ 1,263  
= Value of Firm \$10,052  
· Value of Debt \$ 1,879  
= Value of Equity \$ 8,173  
· Equity Options \$ 845  
Value per share \$ 20.83

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Debt Ratio	27.27%	27.27%	27.27%	27.27%	27.27%	24.81%	24.20%	23.18%	21.13%	15.00%
Beta	2.18	2.18	2.18	2.18	2.18	1.96	1.75	1.53	1.32	1.10
Cost of Equity	13.81%	13.81%	13.81%	13.81%	13.81%	12.95%	12.09%	11.22%	10.36%	9.50%
AT cost of debt	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	9.06%	6.11%	6.01%	5.85%	5.53%	4.55%
Cost of Capital	12.77%	12.77%	12.77%	12.77%	12.52%	11.25%	10.62%	9.98%	9.34%	8.76%


Forever

**Cost of Equity 13.81%**

**Cost of Debt 6.5%+3.5%=10.0%**  
Tax rate = 0% -> 35%

**Weights Debt= 27.3% -> 15%**


**Riskfree Rate:**  
T. Bond rate = 5.1%




**Amazon.com**  
**January 2001**  
**Stock price = \$14**

And the market is often “more wrong”....

Amazon: Value and Price



# An “option premium” for some young companies: The option to expand into a new product/market



## An Example of an Expansion Option

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- You have complete a DCF valuation of a small anti-virus software company, Secure Mail, and estimated a value of \$115 million.
- Assume that there is the possibility that the company could use the customer base that it develops for the anti-virus software and the technology on which the software is based to create a database software program sometime in the next 5 years.
  - It will cost Secure Mail about \$500 million to develop a new database program, if they decided to do it today.
  - Based upon the information you have now on the potential for a database program, the company can expect to generate about \$ 40 million a year in after-tax cashflows for ten years. The cost of capital for private companies that provide database software is 12%.
  - The annualized standard deviation in firm value at publicly traded database companies is 50%.
  - The five-year treasury bond rate is 3%.

## Valuing the Expansion Option


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- S = Value of entering the database software market  
= PV of \$40 million for 10 years @ 12% = \$226 million
- K = Exercise price  
= Cost of entering the database software market = \$ 500 million
- t = Period over which you have the right to enter the market  
= 5 years
- s = Standard deviation of stock prices of database firms = 50%
- r = Riskless rate = 3%

**Call Value= \$ 56 Million**

DCF valuation of the firm	= \$ 115 million
Value of Option to Expand to Database market	= \$ 56 million
Value of the company with option to expand	= \$ 171 million

# A note of caution: Opportunities are not options...



## II. Mature Companies in transition..

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- Mature companies are generally the easiest group to value. They have long, established histories that can be mined for inputs. They have investment policies that are set and capital structures that are stable, thus making valuation more grounded in past data.
- However, this stability in the numbers can mask real problems at the company. The company may be set in a process, where it invests more or less than it should and does not have the right financing mix. In effect, the policies are consistent, stable and bad.
- If you expect these companies to change or as is more often the case to have change thrust upon them,

# The perils of valuing mature companies...

Figure 7.1: Estimation Issues - Mature Companies

*Lots of historical data on earnings and cashflows. Key questions remain if these numbers are volatile over time or if the existing assets are not being efficiently utilized.*

*Growth is usually not very high, but firms may still be generating healthy returns on investments, relative to cost of funding. Questions include how long they can generate these excess returns and with what growth rate in operations. Restructuring can change both inputs dramatically and some firms maintain high growth through acquisitions.*

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

*Equity claims can vary in voting rights and dividends.*

What is the value of equity in the firm?

What is the value added by growth assets?

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

*Operating risk should be stable, but the firm can change its financial leverage. This can affect both the cost of equity and capital.*

When will the firm become a mature firm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

*Maintaining excess returns or high growth for any length of time is difficult to do for a mature firm.*

### Hormel Foods: The Value of Control Changing

Hormel Foods sells packaged meat and other food products and has been in existence as a publicly traded company for almost 80 years. In 2008, the firm reported after-tax operating income of \$315 million, reflecting a compounded growth of 5% over the previous 5 years.

#### The Status Quo

Run by existing management, with conservative reinvestment policies (reinvestment rate = 14.34% and debt ratio = 10.4%.

Anemic growth rate and short growth period, due to reinvestment policy

Low debt ratio affects cost of capital

Year	Operating income after taxes	Expected growth rate	ROC	Reinvestment Rate	Reinvestment	FCFF	Cost of capital	Present Value
Trailing 12 months	\$315							
1	\$324	2.75%	14.34%	19.14%	\$62	\$262	6.79%	\$245
2	\$333	2.75%	14.34%	19.14%	\$64	\$269	6.79%	\$236
3	\$342	2.75%	14.34%	19.14%	\$65	\$276	6.79%	\$227
Beyond	\$350	2.35%	7.23%	32.52%	\$114	\$4,840	7.23%	\$3,974
Value of operating assets								\$4,682
(Add) Cash								\$155
(Subtract) Debt								\$491
(Subtract) Management Options								\$53
Value of equity in common stock								\$4,293
Value per share								\$31.91

#### New and better management

More aggressive reinvestment which increases the reinvestment rate (to 40%) and length of growth (to 5 years), and higher debt ratio (20%).

#### Operating Restructuring ①

Expected growth rate =  $ROC \times \text{Reinvestment Rate}$   
 Expected growth rate (status quo) =  $14.34\% \times 19.14\% = 2.75\%$   
 Expected growth rate (optimal) =  $14.00\% \times 40\% = 5.60\%$   
 ROC drops, reinvestment rises and growth goes up.

#### Financial restructuring ②

Cost of capital = Cost of equity (1-Debt ratio) + Cost of debt (Debt ratio)  
 Status quo =  $7.33\% (1-.104) + 3.60\% (1-.40) (.104) = 6.79\%$   
 Optimal =  $7.75\% (1-.20) + 3.60\% (1-.40) (.20) = 6.63\%$   
 Cost of equity rises but cost of capital drops.


Year	Operating income after taxes	Expected growth rate	ROC	Reinvestment Rate	Reinvestment	FCFF	Cost of capital	Present Value
Trailing 12 months	\$315							
1	\$333	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$133	\$200	6.63%	\$187
2	\$351	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$141	\$211	6.63%	\$185
3	\$371	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$148	\$223	6.63%	\$184
4	\$392	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$260	\$235	6.63%	\$182
5	\$414	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$223	\$248	6.63%	\$180
Beyond	\$423	2.35%	6.74%	34.87%	\$148	\$6,282	6.74%	\$4,557
Value of operating assets								\$5,475
(Add) Cash								\$155
(Subtract) Debt								\$491
(Subtract) Management Options								\$53
Value of equity in common stock								\$5,085
Value per share								\$37.80

Probability of management change = 10%  
 Expected value =  $\$31.91 (.90) + \$37.80 (.10) = \$32.50$

# Lesson 1: Cost cutting and increased efficiency are easier accomplished on paper than in practice...

## Cost-synergy estimation is better, but there are patterns emerging in the errors

Mergers achieving stated percentage of expected cost savings, percent  $N = 92$




Typical sources of estimation error

- Underestimating one-time costs
- Using benchmarks from noncomparable situations
- Not sanity-checking management estimates against precedent transactions
- Failing to ground estimates in bottom-up analysis (e.g., location-by-location review of overlaps)

Source: McKinsey (2002) Postmerger Management Practice client survey; client case studies


## Lesson 2: Increasing growth is not always an option (or at least not a good option)

### Modes of organic growth vary in value creation intensity— consumer goods industry



# Lesson 3: Financial leverage is a double-edged sword..

Exhibit 7.1: Optimal Financing Mix: Hormel Foods in January 2009



### III. Dealing with decline and distress...

*Historical data often reflects flat or declining revenues and falling margins. Investments often earn less than the cost of capital.*

*Growth can be negative, as firm sheds assets and shrinks. As less profitable assets are shed, the firm's remaining assets may improve in quality.*

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

*Underfunded pension obligations and litigation claims can lower value of equity. Liquidation preferences can affect value of equity*

What is the value of equity in the firm?

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

*Depending upon the risk of the assets being divested and the use of the proceeds from the divestiture (to pay dividends or retire debt), the risk in both the firm and its equity can change.*

When will the firm become a mature firm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

*There is a real chance, especially with high financial leverage, that the firm will not make it. If it is expected to survive as a going concern, it will be as a much smaller entity.*

## a. Dealing with Decline

---

- In decline, firms often see declining revenues and lower margins, translating in negative expected growth over time.
- If these firms are run by good managers, they will not fight decline. Instead, they will adapt to it and shut down or sell investments that do not generate the cost of capital. This can translate into negative net capital expenditures (depreciation exceeds cap ex), declining working capital and an overall negative reinvestment rate. The best case scenario is that the firm can shed its bad assets, make itself a much smaller and healthier firm and then settle into long-term stable growth.
- As an investor, your worst case scenario is that these firms are run by managers in denial who continue to expand the firm by making bad investments (that generate lower returns than the cost of capital). These firms may be able to grow revenues and operating income but will destroy value along the way.

# 11. Sears Holdings: Status Quo

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t) : 1,183  
 - Nt CpX -18  
 - Chg WC - 67  
 = FCF 1,268  
 Reinvestment Rate = -75/1183  
 = -7.19%  
 Return on capital = 4.99%

Reinvestment Rate  
 -30.00%

**Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)**  
 $-.30 * -.05 = -0.015$   
 -1.5%

Return on Capital  
 5%

Stable Growth  
 $g = 2\%$ ; Beta = 1.00;  
 Country Premium = 0%  
 Cost of capital = 7.13%  
 ROC = 7.13%; Tax rate = 38%  
 Reinvestment Rate = 28.05%

Terminal Value<sub>4</sub> =  $868 / (.0713 - .02) = 16,921$

Op. Assets 17,634  
 + Cash: 1,622  
 - Debt 7,726  
 = Equity 11,528  
 - Options 5  
 Value/Share \$87.29

	1	2	3	4
EBIT (1-t)	\$1,165	\$1,147	\$1,130	\$1,113
- Reinvestment	(\$349)	(\$344)	(\$339)	(\$334)
FCFF	\$1,514	\$1,492	\$1,469	\$1,447

Term Yr  
 \$1,206  
 \$ 339  
 \$ 868


Discount at Cost of Capital (WACC) = 9.58% (.566) + 4.80% (0.434) = 7.50%

**Cost of Equity**  
 9.58%

**Cost of Debt**  
 $(4.09\% + 3.65\%)(1 - .38)$   
 = 4.80%

**Weights**  
 E = 56.6% D = 43.4%

On July 23, 2008,  
 Sears was trading at  
 \$76.25 a share.



## b. Dealing with the “downside” of Distress

---

- A DCF valuation values a firm as a going concern. If there is a significant likelihood of the firm failing before it reaches stable growth and if the assets will then be sold for a value less than the present value of the expected cashflows (a distress sale value), DCF valuations will understate the value of the firm.
- Value of Equity = DCF value of equity (1 - Probability of distress) + Distress sale value of equity (Probability of distress)
- There are three ways in which we can estimate the probability of distress:
  - Use the bond rating to estimate the cumulative probability of distress over 10 years
  - Estimate the probability of distress with a probit
  - Estimate the probability of distress by looking at market value of bonds..
- The distress sale value of equity is usually best estimated as a percent of book value (and this value will be lower if the economy is doing badly and there are other firms in the same business also in distress).

Current Revenue  
\$ 4,390

Current Margin:  
4.76%

EBIT  
\$ 209m

Reinvestment:  
Capital expenditures include cost of new casinos and working capital

Extended reinvestment break, due to investment in past

Industry average

Expected Margin:  
-> 17%

Stable Growth  
Stable Revenue Growth: 3%  
Stable Operating Margin: 17%  
Stable ROC=10%  
Reinvest 30% of EBIT(1-t)

Terminal Value =  $758 \cdot (0.0743 - 0.03)$   
= \$ 17,129

Value of Op Assets \$ 9,793  
+ Cash & Non-op \$ 3,040  
= Value of Firm \$ 12,833  
- Value of Debt \$ 7,565  
= Value of Equity \$ 5,268  
  
Value per share \$ 8.12

Revenues	\$4,434	\$4,523	\$5,427	\$6,513	\$7,815	\$8,206	\$8,616	\$9,047	\$9,499	\$9,974
Oper margin	5.81%	6.86%	7.90%	8.95%	10%	11.40%	12.80%	14.20%	15.60%	17%
EBIT	\$258	\$310	\$429	\$583	\$782	\$935	\$1,103	\$1,285	\$1,482	\$1,696
Tax rate	26.0%	26.0%	26.0%	26.0%	26.0%	28.4%	30.8%	33.2%	35.6%	38.00%
EBIT * (1 - t)	\$191	\$229	\$317	\$431	\$578	\$670	\$763	\$858	\$954	\$1,051
- Reinvestment	-\$19	-\$11	\$0	\$22	\$58	\$67	\$153	\$215	\$286	\$350
FCFF	\$210	\$241	\$317	\$410	\$520	\$603	\$611	\$644	\$668	\$701
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Beta	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.14	2.75	2.36	1.97	1.59	1.20
Cost of equity	21.82%	21.82%	21.82%	21.82%	21.82%	19.50%	17.17%	14.85%	12.52%	10.20%
Cost of debt	9%	9%	9%	9%	9%	8.70%	8.40%	8.10%	7.80%	7.50%
Debt/ratio	73.50%	73.50%	73.50%	73.50%	73.50%	68.80%	64.10%	59.40%	54.70%	50.00%
Cost of capital	9.88%	9.88%	9.88%	9.88%	9.88%	9.79%	9.50%	9.01%	8.32%	7.43%

Term. Year  
\$10,273  
17%  
\$ 1,746  
38%  
\$1,083  
\$ 325  
\$758

Forever

Cost of Equity  
21.82%

Cost of Debt  
3%+6%= 9%  
9% (1-.38)=5.58%

Weights  
Debt= 73.5% ->50%

Riskfree Rate:  
T. Bond rate = 3%

+ Beta  
3.14-> 1.20

X Risk Premium  
6%

Casino  
1.15

Current  
D/E: 277%

Base Equity  
Premium

Country Risk  
Premium

Las Vegas Sands  
February 2009  
Trading @ \$4.25

## Adjusting the value of LVS for distress..

- In February 2009, LVS was rated B+ by S&P. Historically, 28.25% of B+ rated bonds default within 10 years. LVS has a 6.375% bond, maturing in February 2015 (7 years), trading at \$529. If we discount the expected cash flows on the bond at the riskfree rate, we can back out the probability of distress from the bond price:


$$529 = \sum_{t=1}^{t=7} \frac{63.75(1 - \pi_{\text{Distress}})^t}{(1.03)^t} + \frac{1000(1 - \pi_{\text{Distress}})^7}{(1.03)^7}$$

- Solving for the probability of bankruptcy, we get:

$$\pi_{\text{Distress}} = \text{Annual probability of default} = 13.54\%$$

- Cumulative probability of surviving 10 years =  $(1 - .1354)^{10} = 23.34\%$
- Cumulative probability of distress over 10 years =  $1 - .2334 = .7666$  or 76.66%
- If LVS is becomes distressed:
  - Expected distress sale proceeds = \$2,769 million < Face value of debt
  - Expected equity value/share = \$0.00
- Expected value per share =  $\$8.12 (1 - .7666) + \$0.00 (.7666) = \$1.92$

# The “sunny” side of distress: Equity as a call option to liquidate the firm



## Application to valuation: A simple example

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
- Assume that you have a firm whose assets are currently valued at \$100 million and that the standard deviation in this asset value is 40%.
- Further, assume that the face value of debt is \$80 million (It is zero coupon debt with 10 years left to maturity).
- If the ten-year treasury bond rate is 10%,
  - how much is the equity worth?
  - What should the interest rate on debt be?





## Equity value persists .. As firm value declines..

Value of Equity as Firm Value Changes



# Real World Approaches to Valuing Equity in Troubled Firms: Getting Inputs

Input	Estimation Process
Value of the Firm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cumulate market values of equity and debt (or)</li> <li>• Value the <u>assets in place</u> using FCFF and WACC (or)</li> <li>• Use cumulated market value of assets, if traded.</li> </ul>
Variance in Firm Value	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If stocks and bonds are traded,  <math display="block">\sigma_{\text{firm}}^2 = w_e^2 \sigma_e^2 + w_d^2 \sigma_d^2 + 2 w_e w_d \rho_{ed} \sigma_e \sigma_d</math>                     where <math>\sigma_e^2</math> = variance in the stock price  <math>w_e</math> = MV weight of Equity  <math>\sigma_d^2</math> = the variance in the bond price      <math>w_d</math> = MV weight of debt</li> <li>• If not traded, use variances of similarly rated bonds.</li> <li>• Use average firm value variance from the industry in which company operates.</li> </ul>
Value of the Debt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If the debt is short term, you can use only the face or book value of the debt.</li> <li>• If the debt is long term and coupon bearing, add the cumulated nominal value of these coupons to the face value of the debt.</li> </ul>
Maturity of the Debt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Face value weighted duration of bonds outstanding (or)</li> <li>• If not available, use weighted maturity</li> </ul>

## Valuing Equity as an option - Eurotunnel in early 1998

- Eurotunnel has been a financial disaster since its opening
  - In 1997, Eurotunnel had earnings before interest and taxes of -£56 million and net income of -£685 million
  - At the end of 1997, its book value of equity was -£117 million
- It had £8,865 million in face value of debt outstanding
  - The weighted average duration of this debt was 10.93 years

Debt Type	Face Value	Duration
Short term	935	0.50
10 year	2435	6.7
20 year	3555	12.6
Longer	1940	18.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>£8,865 mil</i>	<i>10.93 years</i>

## The Basic DCF Valuation

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- The value of the firm estimated using projected cashflows to the firm, discounted at the weighted average cost of capital was £2,312 million.
- This was based upon the following assumptions –
  - Revenues will grow 5% a year in perpetuity.
  - The COGS which is currently 85% of revenues will drop to 65% of revenues in yr 5 and stay at that level.
  - Capital spending and depreciation will grow 5% a year in perpetuity.
  - There are no working capital requirements.
  - The debt ratio, which is currently 95.35%, will drop to 70% after year 5. The cost of debt is 10% in high growth period and 8% after that.
  - The beta for the stock will be 1.10 for the next five years, and drop to 0.8 after the next 5 years.
  - The long term bond rate is 6%.

## Other Inputs

---

- The stock has been traded on the London Exchange, and the annualized std deviation based upon  $\ln$  (prices) is 41%.
- There are Eurotunnel bonds, that have been traded; the annualized std deviation in  $\ln(\text{price})$  for the bonds is 17%.
  - The correlation between stock price and bond price changes has been 0.5. The proportion of debt in the capital structure during the period (1992-1996) was 85%.
  - Annualized variance in firm value  
 $= (0.15)^2 (0.41)^2 + (0.85)^2 (0.17)^2 + 2 (0.15) (0.85)(0.5)(0.41)(0.17) = 0.0335$
- The 15-year bond rate is 6%. (I used a bond with a duration of roughly 11 years to match the life of my option)

## Valuing Eurotunnel Equity and Debt

- Inputs to Model
  - Value of the underlying asset =  $S$  = Value of the firm = £2,312 million
  - Exercise price =  $K$  = Face Value of outstanding debt = £8,865 million
  - Life of the option =  $t$  = Weighted average duration of debt = 10.93 years
  - Variance in the value of the underlying asset =  $\sigma^2$  = Variance in firm value = 0.0335
  - Riskless rate =  $r$  = Treasury bond rate corresponding to option life = 6%
- Based upon these inputs, the Black-Scholes model provides the following value for the call:
  - $d1 = -0.8337$                        $N(d1) = 0.2023$
  - $d2 = -1.4392$                        $N(d2) = 0.0751$
- Value of the call =  $2312 (0.2023) - 8,865 \exp^{(-0.06)(10.93)} (0.0751) = \text{£}122$  million
- Appropriate interest rate on debt =  $(8865/2190)^{(1/10.93)} - 1 = 13.65\%$

## IV. Valuing Financial Service Companies

*Existing assets are usually financial assets or loans, often marked to market. Earnings do not provide much information on underlying risk.*

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

*Preferred stock is a significant source of capital.*

What is the value of equity in the firm?

*Defining capital expenditures and working capital is a challenge. Growth can be strongly influenced by regulatory limits and constraints. Both the amount of new investments and the returns on these investments can change with regulatory changes.*

What is the value added by growth assets?

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

*For financial service firms, debt is raw material rather than a source of capital. It is not only tough to define but if defined broadly can result in high financial leverage, magnifying the impact of small operating risk changes on equity risk.*

When will the firm become a mature firm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

*In addition to all the normal constraints, financial service firms also have to worry about maintaining capital ratios that are acceptable to regulators. If they do not, they can be taken over and shut down.*


## 2b. Goldman Sachs: August 2008

### Rationale for model

Why dividends? Because FCFE cannot be estimated

Why 3-stage? Because the firm is behaving (reinvesting, growing) like a firm with potential.

Left return on equity at 2008 levels. well below 16% in 2007 and 20% in 2004-2006.



## Lesson 1: Financial service companies are opaque...

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- With financial service firms, we enter into a Faustian bargain. They tell us very little about the quality of their assets (loans, for a bank, for instance are not broken down by default risk status) but we accept that in return for assets being marked to market (by accountants who presumably have access to the information that we don't have).
- In addition, estimating cash flows for a financial service firm is difficult to do. So, we trust financial service firms to pay out their cash flows as dividends. Hence, the use of the dividend discount model.

## Lesson 2: For financial service companies, book value matters...

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- The book value of assets and equity is mostly irrelevant when valuing non-financial service companies. After all, the book value of equity is a historical figure and can be nonsensical. (The book value of equity can be negative and is so for more than a 1000 publicly traded US companies)
- With financial service firms, book value of equity is relevant for two reasons:
  - Since financial service firms mark to market, the book value is more likely to reflect what the firms own right now (rather than a historical value)
  - The regulatory capital ratios are based on book equity. Thus, a bank with negative or even low book equity will be shut down by the regulators.
- From a valuation perspective, it therefore makes sense to pay heed to book value. In fact, you can argue that reinvestment for a bank is the amount that it needs to add to book equity to sustain its growth ambitions and safety requirements:
  - $FCFE = \text{Net Income} - \text{Reinvestment in regulatory capital (book equity)}$

## 2d. Deutsche Bank: March 2009

### Last 2 years

	2007	2008
Net Income	3,954 m	-3,855m
Dividends	2,146 m	285 m
Risk adjusted assets =	312,882m	
Book Equity =	31,914 m	
Regulatory Capital =		

Normalized  
Net Income  
for base year  
3,000 m  
Normalized  
ROE = 9.4%

Expected  
growth in  
asset base  
4%

Target capital  
ratio 10%  
  
Target ROE  
10.2%

Stable Growth  
g = 3%; Beta = 1.00  
Cost of equity = 10.20%  
Return on equity = 10.20%;  
Reinvestment Rate =  $g/ROE$   
=  $3/10.20\% = 29.41\%$

### Cashflows

	1	2	3	4	5
Asset Base	325,398 €	338,414 €	351,950 €	366,028 €	380,669 €
Capital ratio	10.16%	10.12%	10.08%	10.04%	10.00%
Regulatory Capital	33,060 €	34,247 €	35,477 €	36,749 €	38,067 €
Change in capital	1,146 €	1,187 €	1,229 €	1,273 €	1,318 €
ROE	9.56%	9.72%	9.88%	10.04%	10.20%
Net Income	3,161 €	3,329 €	3,505 €	3,690 €	3,883 €
-Reinvestment	1,146 €	1,187 €	1,229 €	1,273 €	1,318 €
FCFE	2,014 €	2,142 €	2,276 €	2,417 €	2,565 €

Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> =  $2,823 / (.102 - .03) = 39,209$  m

3,999  
1,176  
2,823

PV of CF = 31,383 m  
/ # shares 581.85  
Value/Share 53.94 €

Discount at Cost of equity =  $3.60\% + 1.162 * 6\% + -0.60\% = 11.172\%$

In March 2009  
Deutsche Bank price = 48  
Euros/share (down from 89  
Euros in early 2008)

Riskfree Rate:  
Euro Riskfree Rate =  
3.6%

+

Beta  
1.162

X

Mature market  
premium  
6%

+

Beta for commercial &  
investment banking

Region	Lambda	CRP
Western Europe	0.68	0.00%
United States	0.42	0.00%
Latin America	0.01	4.50%
Africa & Middle East	0.01	7.00%
Asia	0.11	3.50%
Eastern Europe	0.04	3.00%
Deutsche Bank		0.60%

## V. Valuing Companies with “intangible” assets

*operating expenses, it becomes very difficult to assess how much a firm is reinvesting for future growth and how well its investments are doing.*

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

*The capital expenditures associated with acquiring intangible assets (technology, human capital) are mis-categorized as operating expenses, leading to incorrect accounting earnings and measures of*

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

*It can be more difficult to borrow against intangible assets than it is against tangible assets. The risk in operations can change depending upon how stable the intangible asset is.*

When will the firm become a mature firm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

*Intangible assets such as brand name and customer loyalty can last for very long periods or dissipate overnight.*

## Lesson 1: Accounting rules are cluttered with inconsistencies...

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- If we start with accounting first principles, capital expenditures are expenditures designed to create benefits over many periods. They should not be used to reduce operating income in the period that they are made, but should be depreciated/amortized over their life. They should show up as assets on the balance sheet.
- Accounting is consistent in its treatment of cap ex with manufacturing firms, but is inconsistent with firms that do not fit the mold.
  - With pharmaceutical and technology firms, R&D is the ultimate cap ex but is treated as an operating expense.
  - With consulting firms and other firms dependent on human capital, recruiting and training expenses are your long term investments that are treated as operating expenses.
  - With brand name consumer product companies, a portion of the advertising expense is to build up brand name and is the real capital expenditure. It is treated as an operating expense.

*Exhibit 11.1: Converting R&D expenses to R&D assets - Amgen*

**Step 1: Determining an amortizable life for R & D expenses.** ①

How long will it take, on an expected basis, for research to pay off at Amgen? Given the length of the approval process for new drugs by the Food and Drugs Administration, we will assume that this amortizable life is 10 years.

**Step 2: Capitalize historical R&D expense**

Year	R&D Expense	Unamortized portion	Amortization this year
Current	3030.00	1.00	3030.00
-1	3266.00	0.90	2939.40
-2	3366.00	0.80	2692.80
-3	2314.00	0.70	1619.80
-4	2028.00	0.60	1216.80
-5	1655.00	0.50	827.50
-6	1117.00	0.40	446.80
-7	864.00	0.30	259.20
-8	845.00	0.20	169.00
-9	823.00	0.10	82.30
-10	663.00	0.00	0.00
		\$13283.60	\$1,694.10

④

Current year's R&D expense = Cap ex = \$3,030 million  
 R&D amortization = Depreciation = \$ 1,694 million  
 Unamortized R&D = Capital invested (R&D) = \$13,284 million

**Step 3: Restate earnings, book value and return numbers**

	Unadjusted	Adjusted for R&D	Comments
Net Income	\$4,196	$4,196 + 3030 - 1694 = \$ 5,532$	Add current year's R&D and subtract R&D amortization
Book value of equity	\$17,869	$17,869 + 13,284 = \$ 31,153$	Add unamortized R&D from prior years
Return on Equity	$\frac{4196}{17869} = 23.48\%$	$\frac{5532}{31153} = 17.75\%$	Return on equity drops when book equity is augmented by R&D, even though net income rises.
Pre-tax Operating Income	\$5,594	$5,594 + 3030 - 1694 = \$ 6,930$	Add current year's R&D and subtract R&D amortization
Book value of invested capital	\$21,985	$\$21,985 + \$13,284 = \$35,269$	Add unamortized R&D from prior years
Pre-tax Return on Capital	$\frac{5594}{21985} = 25.44\%$	$\frac{6930}{35269} = 19.65\%$	Return on capital drops when capital is augmented by R&D, even though operating income rises.

⑤


## Lesson 2: And fixing those inconsistencies can alter your view of a company and affect its value

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	No R&D adjustment	R&D adjustment
EBIT	\$5,071	\$7,336
Invested Capital	\$25,277	\$33,173
ROIC	14.58%	18.26%
Reinvestment Rate	115.68%	106.98%
Value of firm	\$58,617	\$95,497
Value of equity	\$50,346	\$87,226
Value/share	\$42.73	\$74.33

## VI. Valuing cyclical and commodity companies

*Company growth often comes from movements in the economic cycle, for cyclical firms, or commodity prices, for commodity companies.*



## Valuing a Cyclical Company - Toyota in Early 2009

Year	Revenues	Operating Income	EBITDA	Operating Margin
FY1 1992	¥10,163,380	¥218,511	¥218,511	2.15%
FY1 1993	¥10,210,750	¥181,897	¥181,897	1.78%
FY1 1994	¥9,362,732	¥136,226	¥136,226	1.45%
FY1 1995	¥8,120,975	¥255,719	¥255,719	3.15%
FY1 1996	¥10,718,740	¥348,069	¥348,069	3.25%
FY1 1997	¥12,243,830	¥665,110	¥665,110	5.43%
FY1 1998	¥11,678,400	¥779,800	¥1,382,950	6.68%
FY1 1999	¥12,749,010	¥774,947	¥1,415,997	6.08%
FY1 2000	¥12,879,560	¥775,982	¥1,430,982	6.02%
FY1 2001	¥13,424,420	¥870,131	¥1,542,631	6.48%
FY1 2002	¥15,106,300	¥1,123,475	¥1,822,975	7.44%
FY1 2003	¥16,054,290	¥1,363,680	¥2,101,780	8.49%
FY1 2004	¥17,294,760	¥1,666,894	¥2,454,994	9.64%
FY1 2005	¥18,551,530	¥1,672,187	¥2,447,987	9.01%
FY1 2006	¥21,036,910	¥1,878,342	¥2,769,742	8.93%
FY1 2007	¥23,948,090	¥2,238,683	¥3,185,683	9.35%
FY1 2008	¥26,289,240	¥2,270,375	¥3,312,775	8.64%
FY 2009 (Estim)	¥22,661,325	¥267,904	¥1,310,304	1.18%
		¥1,306,867		7.33%

### Normalized Earnings ①

As a cyclical company, Toyota's earnings have been volatile and 2009 earnings reflect the troubled global economy. We will assume that when economic growth returns, the operating margin for Toyota will revert back to the historical average.

Normalized Operating Income = Revenues in 2009 \* Average Operating Margin (98--09)  
 = 22661 \* .0733 = 1660.7 billion yen

In early 2009, Toyota Motors had the highest market share in the sector. However, the global economic recession in 2008-09 had pulled earnings down.

### Normalized Return on capital and Reinvestment ②

Once earnings bounce back to normal, we assume that Toyota will be able to earn a return on capital equal to its cost of capital (5.09%). This is a sector, where earning excess returns has proved to be difficult even for the best of firms.

To sustain a 1.5% growth rate, the reinvestment rate has to be:

$$\text{Reinvestment rate} = 1.5\% / 5.09\% = 29.46\%$$

Operating Assets	19,640
+ Cash	2,288
+ Non-operating assets	6,845
- Debt	11,862
- Minority Interests	583
Value of Equity	
/ No of shares	/3,448
Value per share	¥4735

$$\text{Value of operating assets} = \frac{1660.7 (1.015) (1 - .407) (1 - .2946)}{(.0509 - .015)} = 19,640 \text{ billion}$$

### Normalized Cost of capital ③


The cost of capital is computed using the average beta of automobile companies (1.10), and Toyota's cost of debt (3.25%) and debt ratio (52.9% debt ratio). We use the Japanese marginal tax rate of 40.7% for computing both the after-tax cost of debt and the after-tax operating income

$$\text{Cost of capital} = 8.65\% (.471) + 3.25\% (1 - .407) (.529) = 5.09\%$$

### Stable Growth ④

Once earnings are normalized, we assume that Toyota, as the largest market-share company, will be able to maintain only stable growth (1.5% in Yen terms)

## Valuing a commodity company - Exxon in Early 2009



Regressing Exxon's operating income against the oil price per barrel from 1985-2008:

$$\text{Operating Income} = -6,395 + 911.32 (\text{Average Oil Price}) \quad R^2 = 90.2\%$$

(2.95)      (14.59)

Exxon Mobil's operating income increases about \$9.11 billion for every \$ 10 increase in the price per barrel of oil and 90% of the variation in Exxon's earnings over time comes from movements in oil prices.

### Estimate normalized income based on current oil price ①

At the time of the valuation, the oil price was \$ 45 a barrel. Exxon's operating income based on this price is

$$\text{Normalized Operating Income} = -6,395 + 911.32 (\$45) = \$34,614$$

### Estimate return on capital and reinvestment rate based on normalized income ②

This operating income translates into a return on capital of approximately 21% and a reinvestment rate of 9.52%, based upon a 2% growth rate.

$$\text{Reinvestment Rate} = g / \text{ROC} = 2 / 21\% = 9.52\%$$

$$\text{Value of operating assets} = \frac{34,614(1 - .38)(1 - .0952)}{(.0818 - .02)} = \$320,472 \text{ million}$$

### Exxon's cost of capital ④

Exxon has been a predominantly equity funded company, and is expected to remain so, with a debt ratio of only 2.85%. Its cost of equity is 8.35% (based on a beta of 0.90) and its pre-tax cost of debt is 3.75% (given AAA rating). The marginal tax rate is 38%.

$$\text{Cost of capital} = 8.35\% (.9715) + 3.75\% (1 - .38) (.0285) = 8.18\%$$

### Expected growth in operating income ③

Since Exxon Mobile is the largest oil company in the world, we will assume an expected growth of only 2% in perpetuity.

## Lesson 1: With “macro” companies, it is easy to get lost in “macro” assumptions...

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
- With cyclical and commodity companies, it is undeniable that the value you arrive at will be affected by your views on the economy or the price of the commodity.
- Consequently, you will feel the urge to take a stand on these macro variables and build them into your valuation. Doing so, though, will create valuations that are jointly impacted by your views on macro variables and your views on the company, and it is difficult to separate the two.
- The best (though not easiest) thing to do is to separate your macro views from your micro views. Use current market based numbers for your valuation, but then provide a separate assessment of what you think about those market numbers.

## Lesson 2: Use probabilistic tools to assess value as a function of macro variables...


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- If there is a key macro variable affecting the value of your company that you are uncertain about (and who is not), why not quantify the uncertainty in a distribution (rather than a single price) and use that distribution in your valuation.
- That is exactly what you do in a Monte Carlo simulation, where you allow one or more variables to be distributions and compute a distribution of values for the company.
- With a simulation, you get not only everything you would get in a standard valuation (an estimated value for your company) but you will get additional output (on the variation in that value and the likelihood that your firm is under or over valued)

## Exxon Mobil Valuation: Simulation



# The optionality in commodities: Undeveloped reserves as an option



## Valuing Gulf Oil

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- Gulf Oil was the target of a takeover in early 1984 at \$70 per share (It had 165.30 million shares outstanding, and total debt of \$9.9 billion).
  - It had estimated reserves of 3038 million barrels of oil and the average cost of developing these reserves was estimated to be \$10 a barrel in present value dollars (The development lag is approximately two years).
  - The average relinquishment life of the reserves is 12 years.
  - The price of oil was \$22.38 per barrel, and the production cost, taxes and royalties were estimated at \$7 per barrel.
  - The bond rate at the time of the analysis was 9.00%.
  - Gulf was expected to have net production revenues each year of approximately 5% of the value of the developed reserves. The variance in oil prices is 0.03.

## Valuing Undeveloped Reserves

- Inputs for valuing undeveloped reserves
  - Value of underlying asset = Value of estimated reserves discounted back for period of development lag =  $3038 * (\$ 22.38 - \$7) / 1.05^2 = \$42,380.44$
  - Exercise price = Estimated development cost of reserves =  $3038 * \$10 = \$30,380$  million
  - Time to expiration = Average length of relinquishment option = **12 years**
  - Variance in value of asset = Variance in oil prices = **0.03**
  - Riskless interest rate = **9%**
  - Dividend yield = Net production revenue/ Value of developed reserves = **5%**
- Based upon these inputs, the Black-Scholes model provides the following value for the call:
  - d1 = 1.6548      N(d1) = 0.9510
  - d2 = 1.0548      N(d2) = 0.8542
- Call Value =  $42,380.44 \exp^{(-0.05)(12)} (0.9510) - 30,380 (\exp^{(-0.09)(12)} (0.8542))$   
= **\$ 13,306 million**

## The composite value...

- In addition, Gulf Oil had free cashflows to the firm from its oil and gas production of \$915 million from already developed reserves and these cashflows are likely to continue for ten years (the remaining lifetime of developed reserves).
- The present value of these developed reserves, discounted at the weighted average cost of capital of 12.5%, yields:
  - Value of already developed reserves =  $915 (1 - 1.125^{-10}) / .125 = \$5065.83$
- Adding the value of the developed and undeveloped reserves

Value of undeveloped reserves	= \$ 13,306 million	
Value of production in place	= \$ 5,066 million	
Total value of firm	= \$ 18,372 million	
Less Outstanding Debt	= \$ 9,900 million	
Value of Equity	= \$ 8,472 million	
Value per share	= \$ 8,472/165.3	= \$51.25

## VII. Valuing Companies across the ownership cycle

*Reported income and balance sheet are heavily affected by tax considerations rather than information disclosure requirements. The line between the personal and business expenses is a fine one.*

What are the **cashflows from existing assets**?  
- Equity: Cashflows after debt payments  
- Firm: Cashflows before debt payments

*Reversing investment mistakes is difficult to do. The need for and the cost of illiquidity has to be incorporated into current*

What is the **value added** by growth assets?  
Equity: Growth in equity earnings/ cashflows  
Firm: Growth in operating earnings/ cashflows

How **risky are the cash flows** from both existing assets and growth assets?  
Equity: Risk in equity in the company  
Firm: Risk in the firm's operations

*Different buyers can perceive risk differently in the same private business, largely because what they see as risk will be a function of how diversified they are. The fall back positions of using market prices to extract risk measures does not*

When will the firm become a **mature firm**, and what are the potential roadblocks?

*Many private businesses are finite life enterprises, not expected to last into perpetuity*

# Kristin's Kandy: Valuation in March 2006

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t) : 300  
 - Nt CpX 100  
 - Chg WC 40  
 = FCFF 160  
 Reinvestment Rate = 46.67%

**Reinvestment Rate**  
 46.67%

**Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)**  
 $.4667 * .1364 = .0636$   
**6.36%**

**Return on Capital**  
 13.64%

**Stable Growth**  
 $g = 4\%$ ;  $\text{Beta} = 3.00$ ;  
 $\text{ROC} = 12.54\%$   
 Reinvestment Rate = 31.90%

**Terminal Value<sub>5</sub>** =  $289 / (.1254 - .04) = 3,403$

**Firm Value:** 2,571  
 + Cash 125  
 - Debt: 900  
 = Equity 1,796  
 - Illiq Discount 12.5%  
 Adj Value 1,571

Year	1	2	3	4	5	Term Yr
EBIT (1-t)	\$319	\$339	\$361	\$384	\$408	425
- Reinvestment	\$149	\$158	\$168	\$179	\$191	136
=FCFF	\$170	\$181	\$193	\$205	\$218	289

**Discount at Cost of Capital (WACC)** =  $16.26\% (.70) + 3.30\% (.30) = 12.37\%$

**Cost of Equity**  
 16.26%

**Cost of Debt**  
 $(4.5\% + 1.00)(1 - .40) = 3.30\%$   
 Synthetic rating = A-

**Weights**  
 E = 70% D = 30%

**Riskfree Rate:**  
 Riskfree rate = 4.50%  
 (10-year T.Bond rate)

**Total Beta**  
 2.94

**Risk Premium**  
 4.00%

+  
 1/3 of risk is market risk

Adjusted for ownrer non-diversification


Market Beta: 0.98

Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 0.78

Firm's D/E Ratio: 30/70

Mature risk premium 4%

Country Risk Premium 0%



# Lesson 1: In private businesses, risk in the eyes of the “beholder” (buyer)

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Private business owner with entire wealth invested in the business

Venture capitalist, with multiple holdings in the sector.

Public company investor with diversified portfolio


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Exposed to all risk in the company. Total beta measures exposure to total risk. Total Beta = Market Beta/ Correlation of firm with market

Partially diversified. Diversify away some firm specific risk but not all. Beta will fall between total and market beta.

Firm-specific risk is diversified away. Market or macro risk exposure captured in a market beta or betas.

## Private Owner versus Publicly Traded Company Perceptions of Risk in an Investment



## Total Risk versus Market Risk

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- Adjust the beta to reflect total risk rather than market risk. This adjustment is a relatively simple one, since the R squared of the regression measures the proportion of the risk that is market risk.  
Total Beta = Market Beta / Correlation of the sector with the market
- To estimate the beta for Kristin Kandy, we begin with the bottom-up unlevered beta of food processing companies:
  - Unlevered beta for publicly traded food processing companies = 0.78
  - Average correlation of food processing companies with market = 0.333
  - Unlevered total beta for Kristin Kandy =  $0.78/0.333 = 2.34$
  - Debt to equity ratio for Kristin Kandy =  $0.3/0.7$  (assumed industry average)
  - Total Beta =  $2.34 ( 1 - (1-.40)(30/70)) = 2.94$
  - Total Cost of Equity =  $4.50\% + 2.94 (4\%) = 16.26\%$

## Three assessment tools when the buyer falls in the middle...

---

- **Build up**: Start with cost of equity for a “diversified” investor and add premiums (based upon historical data) for other variables that capture the additional risk borne by “typical” buyer of a private business.
  - Strength: Numbers seem strong because they are backed up by data
  - Weakness: (1) Premiums are all from public markets (2) Double counting
- **Total Beta plus**: Look at potential buyer (what else the buyer has in his or her portfolio), assess the correlation of that portfolio with the market and estimate a “customized” total beta.
  - Strength: Ties the cost of equity to the buyer, as it should.
  - Weaknesses: (1) Buyers are under no obligation to give you this information (2) Treats private markets as extensions of public ones
- **Survey**: Find out what buyers of private businesses are demanding as a rate of return when they value private businesses.
  - Strength: Agnostic on risk and return models
  - Weakness: (1) Wide differences in what “required” means across survey respondents (2) Circular logic (3) Works if private capital markets are separate and unconnected to public markets.

## Lesson 2: With financials, trust but verify..

---

- **Different Accounting Standards:** The accounting statements for private firms are often based upon different accounting standards than public firms, which operate under much tighter constraints on what to report and when to report.
- **Intermingling of personal and business expenses:** In the case of private firms, some personal expenses may be reported as business expenses.
- **Separating “Salaries” from “Dividends”:** It is difficult to tell where salaries end and dividends begin in a private firm, since they both end up with the owner.
- **The Key person issue:** In some private businesses, with a personal component, the cashflows may be intertwined with the owner being part of the business.

## Lesson 3: Illiquidity is a clear and present danger..

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- In private company valuation, illiquidity is a constant theme. All the talk, though, seems to lead to a rule of thumb. The illiquidity discount for a private firm is between 20-30% and does not vary across private firms.
- But illiquidity should vary across:
  - *Companies*: Healthier and larger companies, with more liquid assets, should have smaller discounts than money-losing smaller businesses with more illiquid assets.
  - *Time*: Liquidity is worth more when the economy is doing badly and credit is tough to come by than when markets are booming.
  - *Buyers*: Liquidity is worth more to buyers who have shorter time horizons and greater cash needs than for longer term investors who don't need the cash and are willing to hold the investment.

## The “standard” approaches to estimating illiquidity discounts...


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- Restricted stock: These are stock issued by publicly traded companies to the market that bypass the SEC registration process but the stock cannot be traded for one year after the issue.
- Pre-IPO transactions: These are transactions prior to initial public offerings where equity investors in the private firm buy (sell) each other's stakes.
- In both cases, the discount is estimated to be the difference between the market price of the liquid asset and the observed transaction price of the illiquid asset.
  - $\text{Discount}_{\text{Restricted stock}} = \text{Stock price} - \text{Price on restricted stock offering}$
  - $\text{Discount}_{\text{IPO}} = \text{IPO offering price} - \text{Price on pre-IPO transaction}$

## The “alternative” approaches

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- Bid-ask spreads: All traded assets are illiquid. The bid ask spread, measuring the difference between the price at which you can buy and sell the asset at the same point in time is the illiquidity measure. If we can extrapolate what we know about bid ask spreads with public companies into the private company space, we could have a more dynamic, complete measure of illiquidity.
  - $\text{Spread} = 0.145 - 0.0022 \ln(\text{Annual Revenues}) - 0.015 (\text{DERN}) - 0.016 (\text{Cash/Firm Value}) - 0.11 (\text{\$ Monthly trading volume/ Firm Value})$
- Option pricing: Liquidity can be viewed as a put option, where you get the right to sell at the prevailing market price. Illiquidity can therefore be viewed as the loss of this put option.



# Relative Valuation

## The Essence of relative valuation?

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- In relative valuation, the value of an asset is compared to the values assessed by the market for similar or comparable assets.
- To do relative valuation then,
  - we need to identify comparable assets and obtain market values for these assets
  - convert these market values into standardized values, since the absolute prices cannot be compared This process of standardizing creates price multiples.
  - compare the standardized value or multiple for the asset being analyzed to the standardized values for comparable asset, controlling for any differences between the firms that might affect the multiple, to judge whether the asset is under or over valued

## Relative valuation is pervasive...

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- Most asset valuations are relative.
- Most equity valuations on Wall Street are relative valuations.
  - Almost 85% of equity research reports are based upon a multiple and comparables.
  - More than 50% of all acquisition valuations are based upon multiples
  - Rules of thumb based on multiples are not only common but are often the basis for final valuation judgments.
- While there are more discounted cashflow valuations in consulting and corporate finance, they are often relative valuations masquerading as discounted cash flow valuations.
  - The objective in many discounted cashflow valuations is to back into a number that has been obtained by using a multiple.
  - The terminal value in a significant number of discounted cashflow valuations is estimated using a multiple.

## The Reasons for the allure...

---

“If you think I’ m crazy, you should see the guy who lives across the hall”  
*Jerry Seinfeld talking about Kramer in a Seinfeld episode*

“ A little inaccuracy sometimes saves tons of explanation”

H.H. Munro

“ If you are going to screw up, make sure that you have lots of company”  
Ex-portfolio manager

## The Market Imperative....

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- Relative valuation is much more likely to reflect market perceptions and moods than discounted cash flow valuation. This can be an advantage when it is important that the price reflect these perceptions as is the case when
  - the objective is to sell a security at that price today (as in the case of an IPO)
  - investing on “momentum” based strategies
- With relative valuation, there will always be a significant proportion of securities that are under valued and over valued.
- Since portfolio managers are judged based upon how they perform on a relative basis (to the market and other money managers), relative valuation is more tailored to their needs
- Relative valuation generally requires less information than discounted cash flow valuation (especially when multiples are used as screens)

# The Four Steps to Deconstructing Multiples

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- Define the multiple
  - In use, the same multiple can be defined in different ways by different users. When comparing and using multiples, estimated by someone else, it is critical that we understand how the multiples have been estimated
- Describe the multiple
  - Too many people who use a multiple have no idea what its cross sectional distribution is. If you do not know what the cross sectional distribution of a multiple is, it is difficult to look at a number and pass judgment on whether it is too high or low.
- Analyze the multiple
  - It is critical that we understand the fundamentals that drive each multiple, and the nature of the relationship between the multiple and each variable.
- Apply the multiple
  - Defining the comparable universe and controlling for differences is far more difficult in practice than it is in theory.

## Definitional Tests

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- Is the multiple consistently defined?
  - **Proposition 1: Both the value (the numerator) and the standardizing variable (the denominator) should be to the same claimholders in the firm. In other words, the value of equity should be divided by equity earnings or equity book value, and firm value should be divided by firm earnings or book value.**
- Is the multiple uniformly estimated?
  - The variables used in defining the multiple should be estimated uniformly across assets in the “comparable firm” list.
  - If earnings-based multiples are used, the accounting rules to measure earnings should be applied consistently across assets. The same rule applies with book-value based multiples.

## Example 1: Price Earnings Ratio: Definition

---

$$\text{PE} = \text{Market Price per Share} / \text{Earnings per Share}$$

- There are a number of variants on the basic PE ratio in use. They are based upon how the price and the earnings are defined.
- Price:
  - is usually the current price
  - is sometimes the average price for the year
- EPS:
  - earnings per share in most recent financial year
  - earnings per share in trailing 12 months (Trailing PE)
  - forecasted earnings per share next year (Forward PE)
  - forecasted earnings per share in future year

## Example 2: Enterprise Value /EBITDA Multiple

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- The enterprise value to EBITDA multiple is obtained by netting cash out against debt to arrive at enterprise value and dividing by EBITDA.

$$\frac{\text{Enterprise Value}}{\text{EBITDA}} = \frac{\text{Market Value of Equity} + \text{Market Value of Debt} - \text{Cash}}{\text{Earnings before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation}}$$


- Why do we net out cash from firm value?
- What happens if a firm has cross holdings which are categorized as:
  - Minority interests?
  - Majority active interests?

## Descriptive Tests

---

- What is the average and standard deviation for this multiple, across the universe (market)?
- What is the median for this multiple?
  - The median for this multiple is often a more reliable comparison point.
- How large are the outliers to the distribution, and how do we deal with the outliers?
  - Throwing out the outliers may seem like an obvious solution, but if the outliers all lie on one side of the distribution (they usually are large positive numbers), this can lead to a biased estimate.
- Are there cases where the multiple cannot be estimated? Will ignoring these cases lead to a biased estimate of the multiple?
- How has this multiple changed over time?

# 1. Multiples have skewed distributions...




## 2. Making statistics “dicey”

	Current PE	Trailing PE	Forward PE
Total firms	5891	5891	5891
Number of firms with PE	3456	3375	2311
Average	42.56	33.67	18.28
Median	15.94	14.56	13.74
Minimum	0.1	0.2	0.44
25th percentile	10.11	10	10.34
75th percentile	25.34	22.34	18.69
Maximum	18358	5083	780
Standard deviation	7.26	3.00	0.62
Skewness	33.40	21.86	15.98

### 3. Markets have a lot in common


## PE Ratios: US, Europe, Japan and Emerging Markets – January 2012




### 3a. And India is not exempt...

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#### 4. Simplistic rules almost always break down...6 times EBITDA may not be cheap...



Or it may be...



# Analytical Tests

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- What are the fundamentals that determine and drive these multiples?
  - Proposition 2: Embedded in every multiple are all of the variables that drive every discounted cash flow valuation - growth, risk and cash flow patterns.
  - In fact, using a simple discounted cash flow model and basic algebra should yield the fundamentals that drive a multiple
- How do changes in these fundamentals change the multiple?
  - The relationship between a fundamental (like growth) and a multiple (such as PE) is seldom linear. For example, if firm A has twice the growth rate of firm B, it will generally not trade at twice its PE ratio
  - **Proposition 3: It is impossible to properly compare firms on a multiple, if we do not know the nature of the relationship between fundamentals and the multiple.**

## PE Ratio: Understanding the Fundamentals

- To understand the fundamentals, start with a basic equity discounted cash flow model.
- With the dividend discount model,

$$P_0 = \frac{DPS_1}{r - g_n}$$

- Dividing both sides by the current earnings per share,

$$\frac{P_0}{EPS_0} = PE = \frac{\text{Payout Ratio} * (1 + g_n)}{r - g_n}$$

- If this had been a FCFE Model,

$$P_0 = \frac{FCFE_1}{r - g_n}$$

$$\frac{P_0}{EPS_0} = PE = \frac{(\text{FCFE/Earnings}) * (1 + g_n)}{r - g_n}$$

## Using the Fundamental Model to Estimate PE For a High Growth Firm

- The price-earnings ratio for a high growth firm can also be related to fundamentals. In the special case of the two-stage dividend discount model, this relationship can be made explicit fairly simply:

$$P_0 = \frac{\text{EPS}_0 * \text{Payout Ratio} * (1+g) * \left(1 - \frac{(1+g)^n}{(1+r)^n}\right)}{r-g} + \frac{\text{EPS}_0 * \text{Payout Ratio}_n * (1+g)^n * (1+g_n)}{(r-g_n)(1+r)^n}$$

- For a firm that does not pay what it can afford to in dividends, substitute FCFE/ Earnings for the payout ratio.

- Dividing both sides by the earnings per share:

$$\frac{P_0}{\text{EPS}_0} = \frac{\text{Payout Ratio} * (1+g) * \left(1 - \frac{(1+g)^n}{(1+r)^n}\right)}{r-g} + \frac{\text{Payout Ratio}_n * (1+g)^n * (1+g_n)}{(r-g_n)(1+r)^n}$$

## A Simple Example

- Assume that you have been asked to estimate the PE ratio for a firm which has the following characteristics:


Variable	High Growth Phase	Stable Growth Phase
Expected Growth Rate	25%	8%
Payout Ratio	20%	50%
Beta	1.00	1.00
Number of years	5 years	Forever after year 5

- Riskfree rate = T.Bond Rate = 6%
- Required rate of return = 6% + 1(5.5%)= 11.5%


$$PE = \frac{0.2 * (1.25) * \left(1 - \frac{(1.25)^5}{(1.115)^5}\right)}{(.115 - .25)} + \frac{0.5 * (1.25)^5 * (1.08)}{(.115 - .08) (1.115)^5} = 28.75$$

## a. PE and Growth: Firm grows at $x\%$ for 5 years, 8% thereafter

PE Ratios and Expected Growth: Interest Rate Scenarios




## b. PE and Risk: A Follow up Example



### III. Comparisons of PE across time: PE Ratio for the S&P 500

PE on S&P 500 over time: 1960- 2010




## Is low (high) PE cheap (expensive)?

---

- A market strategist argues that stocks are expensive because the PE ratio today is high relative to the average PE ratio across time. Do you agree?
  - Yes
  - No
- If you do not agree, what factors might explain the higher PE ratio today?

## E/P Ratios , T.Bond Rates and Term Structure



## Regression Results

---

- There is a strong positive relationship between E/P ratios and T.Bond rates, as evidenced by the correlation of 0.69 between the two variables.,
- In addition, there is evidence that the term structure also affects the PE ratio.
- In the following regression, using 1960-2011 data, we regress E/P ratios against the level of T.Bond rates and a term structure variable (T.Bond - T.Bill rate)


$$E/P = 3.16\% + 0.597 \text{ T.Bond Rate} - 0.213 (\text{T.Bond Rate} - \text{T.Bill Rate})$$

(3.98)                      (5.71)                      (-0.92)

$$R \text{ squared} = 40.92\%$$

Given the treasury bond rate and treasury bill rate today, is the market under or over valued today?

# The Determinants of Multiples...



## Application Tests

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- Given the firm that we are valuing, what is a “comparable” firm?
  - While traditional analysis is built on the premise that firms in the same sector are comparable firms, valuation theory would suggest that a comparable firm is one which is similar to the one being analyzed in terms of fundamentals.
  - **Proposition 4: There is no reason why a firm cannot be compared with another firm in a very different business, if the two firms have the same risk, growth and cash flow characteristics.**
- Given the comparable firms, how do we adjust for differences across firms on the fundamentals?
  - **Proposition 5: It is impossible to find an exactly identical firm to the one you are valuing.**

## I. Comparing PE Ratios across a Sector: PE

<i>Company Name</i>	<i>PE</i>	<i>Growth</i>
<i>PT Indosat ADR</i>	<i>7.8</i>	<i>0.06</i>
<i>Telebras ADR</i>	<i>8.9</i>	<i>0.075</i>
<i>Telecom Corporation of New Zealand ADR</i>	<i>11.2</i>	<i>0.11</i>
<i>Telecom Argentina Stet - France Telecom SA ADR B</i>	<i>12.5</i>	<i>0.08</i>
<i>Hellenic Telecommunication Organization SA ADR</i>	<i>12.8</i>	<i>0.12</i>
<i>Telecomunicaciones de Chile ADR</i>	<i>16.6</i>	<i>0.08</i>
<i>Swisscom AG ADR</i>	<i>18.3</i>	<i>0.11</i>
<i>Asia Satellite Telecom Holdings ADR</i>	<i>19.6</i>	<i>0.16</i>
<i>Portugal Telecom SA ADR</i>	<i>20.8</i>	<i>0.13</i>
<i>Telefonos de Mexico ADR L</i>	<i>21.1</i>	<i>0.14</i>
<i>Matav RT ADR</i>	<i>21.5</i>	<i>0.22</i>
<i>Telstra ADR</i>	<i>21.7</i>	<i>0.12</i>
<i>Gilat Communications</i>	<i>22.7</i>	<i>0.31</i>
<i>Deutsche Telekom AG ADR</i>	<i>24.6</i>	<i>0.11</i>
<i>British Telecommunications PLC ADR</i>	<i>25.7</i>	<i>0.07</i>
<i>Tele Danmark AS ADR</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>0.09</i>
<i>Telekomunikasi Indonesia ADR</i>	<i>28.4</i>	<i>0.32</i>
<i>Cable &amp; Wireless PLC ADR</i>	<i>29.8</i>	<i>0.14</i>
<i>APT Satellite Holdings ADR</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>0.33</i>
<i>Telefonica SA ADR</i>	<i>32.5</i>	<i>0.18</i>
<i>Royal KPN NV ADR</i>	<i>35.7</i>	<i>0.13</i>
<i>Telecom Italia SPA ADR</i>	<i>42.2</i>	<i>0.14</i>
<i>Nippon Telegraph &amp; Telephone ADR</i>	<i>44.3</i>	<i>0.2</i>
<i>France Telecom SA ADR</i>	<i>45.2</i>	<i>0.19</i>
<i>Korea Telecom ADR</i>	<i>71.3</i>	<i>0.44</i>

## PE, Growth and Risk

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Dependent variable is: PE

R squared = 66.2%    R squared (adjusted) = 63.1%

Variable	Coefficient	SE	t-ratio	prob
Constant	13.1151	3.471	3.78	0.0010
Growth rate	121.223	19.27	6.29	$\leq 0.0001$
Emerging Market	-13.8531	3.606	-3.84	0.0009


Emerging Market is a dummy: 1 if emerging market  
0 if not

## Is Telebras under valued?


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- Predicted PE =  $13.12 + 121.22 (.075) - 13.85 (1) = 8.35$
- At an actual price to earnings ratio of 8.9, Telebras is slightly overvalued.


## II. Price to Book vs ROE: Largest Market Cap Firms in the United States: January 2010



# Missing growth?



## PBV, ROE and Risk: Large Cap US firms



*al*

## Bringing it all together... Largest US stocks

**Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.819 <sup>a</sup>	.670	.661	1.19253


a. Predictors: (Constant), ROE, Expected Growth in EPS: next 5 years, Regression Beta

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.406	.424		.958	.340
	Regression Beta	-.065	.253	-.015	-.256	.799
	Expected Growth in EPS: next 5 years	9.340	2.366	.228	3.947	.000
	ROE	10.546	.771	.777	13.672	.000

a. Dependent Variable: PBV Ratio

# Updated PBV Ratios – Largest Market Cap US companies Updated to January 2011



### III. Value/EBITDA Multiple: Trucking Companies


Company Name	Value	EBITDA	Value/EBITDA
KLLM Trans. Svcs.	\$ 114.32	\$ 48.81	2.34
Ryder System	\$ 5,158.04	\$ 1,838.26	2.81
Rollins Truck Leasing	\$ 1,368.35	\$ 447.67	3.06
Cannon Express Inc.	\$ 83.57	\$ 27.05	3.09
Hunt (J.B.)	\$ 982.67	\$ 310.22	3.17
Yellow Corp.	\$ 931.47	\$ 292.82	3.18
Roadway Express	\$ 554.96	\$ 169.38	3.28
Marten Transport Ltd.	\$ 116.93	\$ 35.62	3.28
Kenan Transport Co.	\$ 67.66	\$ 19.44	3.48
M.S. Carriers	\$ 344.93	\$ 97.85	3.53
Old Dominion Freight	\$ 170.42	\$ 45.13	3.78
Trimac Ltd	\$ 661.18	\$ 174.28	3.79
Matlack Systems	\$ 112.42	\$ 28.94	3.88
XTRA Corp.	\$ 1,708.57	\$ 427.30	4.00
Covenant Transport Inc	\$ 259.16	\$ 64.35	4.03
Builders Transport	\$ 221.09	\$ 51.44	4.30
Werner Enterprises	\$ 844.39	\$ 196.15	4.30
Landstar Sys.	\$ 422.79	\$ 95.20	4.44
AMERCO	\$ 1,632.30	\$ 345.78	4.72
USA Truck	\$ 141.77	\$ 29.93	4.74
Frozen Food Express	\$ 164.17	\$ 34.10	4.81
Arnold Inds.	\$ 472.27	\$ 96.88	4.87
Greyhound Lines Inc.	\$ 437.71	\$ 89.61	4.88
USFreightways	\$ 983.86	\$ 198.91	4.95
Golden Eagle Group Inc.	\$ 12.50	\$ 2.33	5.37
Arkansas Best	\$ 578.78	\$ 107.15	5.40
Airlease Ltd.	\$ 73.64	\$ 13.48	5.46
Celadon Group	\$ 182.30	\$ 32.72	5.57
Amer. Freightways	\$ 716.15	\$ 120.94	5.92
Transfinancial Holdings	\$ 56.92	\$ 8.79	6.47
Vitrans Corp. 'A'	\$ 140.68	\$ 21.51	6.54
Interpool Inc.	\$ 1,002.20	\$ 151.18	6.63
Intrenet Inc.	\$ 70.23	\$ 10.38	6.77
Swift Transportation	\$ 835.58	\$ 121.34	6.89
Landair Services	\$ 212.95	\$ 30.38	7.01
CNF Transportation	\$ 2,700.69	\$ 366.99	7.36
Budget Group Inc	\$ 1,247.30	\$ 166.71	7.48
Caliber System	\$ 2,514.99	\$ 333.13	7.55
Knight Transportation Inc	\$ 269.01	\$ 28.20	9.54
Heartland Express	\$ 727.50	\$ 64.62	11.26
Greyhound CDA Transn Corp	\$ 83.25	\$ 6.99	11.91
Mark VII	\$ 160.45	\$ 12.96	12.38
Coach USA Inc	\$ 678.38	\$ 51.76	13.11
US 1 Inds Inc.	\$ 5.60	\$ (0.17)	NA
<b>Average</b>			<b>5.61</b>

## A Test on EBITDA

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- Ryder System looks very cheap on a Value/EBITDA multiple basis, relative to the rest of the sector. What explanation (other than misvaluation) might there be for this difference?


## IV: Price to Sales Multiples: Grocery Stores - US in January 2007



Whole Foods: In 2007: Net Margin was 3.41% and Price/ Sales ratio was 1.41

*Predicted Price to Sales =  $0.07 + 10.49 (0.0341) = 0.43$*


# Reversion to normalcy: Grocery Stores - US in January 2009



*Whole Foods: In 2009, Net Margin had dropped to 2.77% and Price to Sales ratio was down to 0.31.*


$$\text{Predicted Price to Sales} = 0.07 + 10.49 (.0277) = 0.36$$

## And again in 2010..



*Whole Foods: In 2010, Net Margin had dropped to 1.44% and Price to Sales ratio increased to 0.50.  
 Predicted Price to Sales =  $0.06 + 11.43 (.0144) = 0.22$*

Here is 2011...




$$PS \text{ Ratio} = -0.585 + 55.50 (\text{Net Margin}) \quad R^2 = 48.2\%$$

$$PS \text{ Ratio for WFMI} = -0.585 + 55.50 (.0273) = 0.93$$

At a PS ratio of 0.98, WFMI is slightly over valued.

## V. Nothing's working!!! Internet Stocks in early 2000



## PS Ratios and Margins are not highly correlated

---

- Regressing PS ratios against current margins yields the following  
$$\text{PS} = 81.36 - 7.54(\text{Net Margin}) \quad R^2 = 0.04$$

(0.49)
- This is not surprising. These firms are priced based upon expected margins, rather than current margins.

## Solution 1: Use proxies for survival and growth: Amazon in early 2000

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- Hypothesizing that firms with higher revenue growth and higher cash balances should have a greater chance of surviving and becoming profitable, we ran the following regression: (The level of revenues was used to control for size)

$$\text{PS} = 30.61 - 2.77 \ln(\text{Rev}) + 6.42 (\text{Rev Growth}) + 5.11 (\text{Cash/Rev})$$

(0.66)                      (2.63)                      (3.49)

R squared = 31.8%

$$\text{Predicted PS} = 30.61 - 2.77(7.1039) + 6.42(1.9946) + 5.11 (.3069) = 30.42$$

Actual PS = 25.63

Stock is undervalued, relative to other internet stocks.

## Solution 2: Use forward multiples

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
- Global Crossing lost \$1.9 billion in 2001 and is expected to continue to lose money for the next 3 years. In a discounted cashflow valuation (see notes on DCF valuation) of Global Crossing, we estimated an expected EBITDA for Global Crossing in five years of \$ 1,371 million.
- The average enterprise value/ EBITDA multiple for healthy telecomm firms is 7.2 currently.
- Applying this multiple to Global Crossing' s EBITDA in year 5, yields a value in year 5 of
  - Enterprise Value in year 5 =  $1371 * 7.2 = \$9,871$  million
  - Enterprise Value today =  $\$ 9,871 \text{ million} / 1.138^5 = \$5,172$  million  
(The cost of capital for Global Crossing is 13.80%)
  - The probability that Global Crossing will not make it as a going concern is 77%.
  - Expected Enterprise value today =  $0.23 (5172) = \$1,190$  million

## Comparisons to the entire market: Why not?

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- In contrast to the 'comparable firm' approach, the information in the entire cross-section of firms can be used to predict PE ratios.
- The simplest way of summarizing this information is with a multiple regression, with the PE ratio as the dependent variable, and proxies for risk, growth and payout forming the independent variables.

## PE versus Expected EPS Growth: January 2012



## PE Ratio: Standard Regression for US stocks - January 2012

**Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.340 <sup>a</sup>	.116	.114	1068.79044

a. Predictors: (Constant), Payout Ratio, 3-yr Regression Beta, Expected Growth in EPS: next 5 years

**Coefficients<sup>a,b</sup>**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	13.477	.760		17.734	.000
	Expected Growth in EPS: next 5 years	40.841	2.627	.354	15.545	.000
	3-yr Regression Beta	-2.006	.499	-.092	-4.023	.000
	Payout Ratio	2.881	.992	.066	2.905	.004

a. Dependent Variable: Current PE

b. Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Market Cap

## The value of growth

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<i>Time Period</i>	<i>PE Value of extra 1% of growth</i>	<i>Equity Risk Premium</i>
January 2012	0.408	6.04%
January 2011	0.836	5.20%
January 2010	0.550	4.36%
January 2009	0.780	6.43%
January 2008	1.427	4.37%
January 2007	1.178	4.16%
January 2006	1.131	4.07%
January 2005	0.914	3.65%
January 2004	0.812	3.69%
January 2003	2.621	4.10%
January 2002	1.003	3.62%
January 2001	1.457	2.75%
January 2000	2.105	2.05%

## Fundamentals hold in every market: PBV regressions across markets- January 2012

Region	Regression – January 2012	R squared
Australia, NZ & Canada	$PBV = 0.90 + 0.92 \text{ Payout} - 0.18 \text{ Beta} + 5.43 \text{ ROE}$	38.6%
Europe	$PBV = 1.14 + 0.76 \text{ Payout} - 0.67 \text{ Beta} + 7.56 \text{ ROE}$	47.2%
Japan	$PBV = 1.21 + 0.67 \text{ Payout} - 0.40 \text{ Beta} + 3.26 \text{ ROE}$	22.1%
Emerging Markets	$PBV = 0.77 + 1.16 \text{ Payout} - 0.17 \text{ Beta} + 5.78 \text{ ROE}$	20.8%
US	$PBV = 1.30 + 0.06 \text{ Payout} - 0.32 \text{ Beta} + 9.56 \text{ ROE}$	52.7%

## Relative Valuation: Some closing propositions

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- Proposition 1: In a relative valuation, all that you are concluding is that a stock is under or over valued, relative to your comparable group.
  - Your relative valuation judgment can be right and your stock can be hopelessly over valued at the same time.
- Proposition 2: In asset valuation, there are no similar assets. Every asset is unique.
  - If you don't control for fundamental differences in risk, cashflows and growth across firms when comparing how they are priced, your valuation conclusions will reflect your flawed judgments rather than market misvaluations.

## Choosing Between the Multiples

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- As presented in this section, there are dozens of multiples that can be potentially used to value an individual firm.
- In addition, relative valuation can be relative to a sector (or comparable firms) or to the entire market (using the regressions, for instance)
- Since there can be only one final estimate of value, there are three choices at this stage:
  - Use a simple average of the valuations obtained using a number of different multiples
  - Use a weighted average of the valuations obtained using a number of different multiples
  - Choose one of the multiples and base your valuation on that multiple

## Picking one Multiple

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- This is usually the best way to approach this issue. While a range of values can be obtained from a number of multiples, the “best estimate” value is obtained using one multiple.
- The multiple that is used can be chosen in one of two ways:
  - Use the multiple that best fits your objective. Thus, if you want the company to be undervalued, you pick the multiple that yields the highest value.
  - Use the multiple that has the highest R-squared in the sector when regressed against fundamentals. Thus, if you have tried PE, PBV, PS, etc. and run regressions of these multiples against fundamentals, use the multiple that works best at explaining differences across firms in that sector.
  - Use the multiple that seems to make the most sense for that sector, given how value is measured and created.

## A More Intuitive Approach

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- Managers in every sector tend to focus on specific variables when analyzing strategy and performance. The multiple used will generally reflect this focus. Consider three examples.
  - In retailing: The focus is usually on same store sales (turnover) and profit margins. Not surprisingly, the revenue multiple is most common in this sector.
  - In financial services: The emphasis is usually on return on equity. Book Equity is often viewed as a scarce resource, since capital ratios are based upon it. Price to book ratios dominate.
  - In technology: Growth is usually the dominant theme. PEG ratios were invented in this sector.

## Conventional usage...

Sector	Multiple Used	Rationale
Cyclical Manufacturing	PE, Relative PE	Often with normalized earnings
Growth firms	PEG ratio	Big differences in growth rates
Young growth firms w/ losses	Revenue Multiples	What choice do you have?
Infrastructure	EV/EBITDA	Early losses, big DA
REIT	P/CFE (where CFE = Net income + Depreciation)	Big depreciation charges on real estate
Financial Services	Price/ Book equity	Marked to market?
Retailing	Revenue multiples	Margins equalize sooner or later

# Reviewing: The Four Steps to Understanding Multiples

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- Define the multiple
  - Check for consistency
  - Make sure that they are estimated uniformly
- Describe the multiple
  - Multiples have skewed distributions: The averages are seldom good indicators of typical multiples
  - Check for bias, if the multiple cannot be estimated
- Analyze the multiple
  - Identify the companion variable that drives the multiple
  - Examine the nature of the relationship
- Apply the multiple

A closing thought...

