THE GAMESTOP FRENZY: LESSONS AND CONSEQUENCES

The Redditors' Revenge on Hedge Funds

The Rest of the (Market) Story!

- The Big Story: The last few days have been filled with news stories of how small investors, brought together on online forums, have not only pushed up the stock prices of the stocks that they have targeted (GameStop, AMC, BB etc.), but in the process, driven some of the hedge funds that have sold short on these companies to edge of oblivion.
- David vs Goliath? The story resonates because it has all of the elements of a David versus Goliath battle, and given the low esteem that many hold Wall Street in, it has led to sideline cheerleading. As with everything in life, this story has also acquired political undertones, as populists on all sides, have found a new cause.
- My perspective: I don't have an axe to grind in this fight, since I don't own GameStop or care much about hedge funds, but I am interested in how this episode will affect overall markets and whether I need to change the ways in which I invest and trade.

Short Sales: A Quick Introduction

The Long: When most of look at investing, we think of stocks that we believe (based upon research, instinct or innuendo) will go up in value and buying those stocks.

In investing parlance, if you do this, you have a "long" position.

- And Short of it: But what if you think a stock is too highly priced and is likely to go down? If you already own the stock, you can sell it, but if you don't have a position in the stock and want to monetize your pessimistic point of view, you can borrow shares in the stock and sell them, with an obligation to return the shares at a specified point in time in the future.
 - This is a "short" sale, and if you are right and the stock price drops, you can buy the shares at the now "discounted" price, return them to the original owner and keep the difference as your profit.

Short Sellers: A Much Maligned Breed!

- Short sellers have never been popular in markets, and that dislike is widely spread, not just among small investors, but also among corporate CEOs, and many institutional investors. In fact, this dislike shows up not only in restrictions on short selling in some markets, but outright bans in others, especially during periods of turmoil.
- I don't believe that there is anything inherently immoral about being a pessimist on markets, and that short selling serves a purpose in well-functioning markets, as a counterbalance to relentless and sometimes baseless optimism.
- In fact, mathematically, all that you do in a short sale, relative to a conventional investment, is reverse the sequence of your actions, selling first and buying back later.


A Short Squeeze

- It is true that short sellers face a problem that their long counterparts generally do not, and that is they have far less control over their time horizons.
- While you may be able to sell short on a very liquid, widely traded stock for a longer period, on most stocks, your short sale comes with a clock that is ticking from the moment you initiate your short sale.
 - Short sellers often try to speed the process along, going public with their reasons for why the stock is destined to fall, and they sometimes step over the line.
 - While short sellers wait for the correction, they face multiple threats, some coming from shifts in fundamentals and some from investors with a contrary view on the stock, buying the stock and pushing the stock price up.
 - There stock price increases force them to buy back shares in the market to cover their short position, in the process pushing prices up. In a short squeeze, this cycle speeds up to the point that short sellers have no choice but to exit the position.


A Short History of Short Squeezes

- <u>Its not new</u>: In 1862, Cornelius Vanderbilt squeezed out short sellers in Harlem Railroad, and used his power to gain full control of the New York railroad business.
- And not just the US: The short sale with the largest dollar consequences was the one on Volkswagen in 2008, when Porsche bought enough shares in Volkswagen to squeeze short sellers in the stock, and briefly made Volkswagen the highest market cap company in the world.
- With large players as squeezers: Until this decade, though, most short squeezes were initiated and carried through by large investors on the other side of short sellers, with enough resources to force capitulation.
- Until the last decade: The game has changed, and the company where this changed dynamic has played out most effectively has been Tesla. In the last decade, there have been at least three and perhaps as many as five short squeezes on Tesla, with the most recent one occurring at the start of 2020. With Tesla, individual investors who love the company have been at the front lines in squeezing short sellers, but they have had help from institutional investors, either true believers in the company, or too greedy not to jump on the bandwagon.


The GameStop Story




The COVID Effect..



The Congregation of Short Sellers..



And the last two weeks...



A Value Play?

			GameStop: A	Best (Lase Scenario				Jan-21	
						The Story				
However, the compan to close to nothing. In 2019 levels, and subse	y's trou thia va quent ge, and	ubles pred aluation, I growth p	late 2020, with rever look at a an upbeat a rimarily in online sal	iues d and pe es mo ssmer	ropping and s erhaps close to re than makin nt of their banl	utdown, with a tores being clos best-case valua g up for fewer st	ed fo ition ores	or much of the prior five ye of the company, with sal b. In addition, I assume tha	tting the lost sales from closed stores. Ears, and operating margins dropping down es recovering quickly in 2021 to close to t the company's margins will move towards optimistic) are correct (the Ba1 rating drives Link to story Quicky 2021 recovery + Growth to pre-	
Revenues (a)	es (a) \$ 5,162 15.0%		3.00% 2.00%			2.00%	crisis revenues			
Operating margin (b)	· ·	4.20% 2.0%				→ 5.74%			Move towards online retail margins	
Tax rate	5 6 ()				→ 25.00%	1	25.00%	NOL of \$730 million buffers tax impac		
Reinvestment (c)	nt (c) Sales to Capital =		Sales to Capital =	4.96		4.96		29.76%	Net decrease in stores, more tech investme	
Return on capital	-2	0.80%	Marginal ROIC =			136.16%		6.72%	Margin expansion and stagnant revenues	
Cost of capital (d)					6.23%	6.72%		6.72%	Cost of capital relatively stable, but failure probability based on Ba1 bond rating	
						e Cash Flows	_			
		nues	Operating Margin	EBIT		EBIT (1-t)	-	investment	FCFF	
1	\$	5,936	2.00%	\$	119	\$ 119		156	\$ (37)	
2 3	\$	6,114	3.50%	\$	214	\$ 214 \$ 267	\$ \$	36	\$ 178	
4	\$ \$	6,298 6,487	4.24%	\$ \$	267 324	\$ 267		37	\$ 230 \$ 238	
5	\$	6,681	5.74%	\$ \$	384	\$ 288		39		
6	\$	6,868	5.74%	\$	394	\$ 296		33	\$ 258	
7	\$	7.047	5.74%	\$	404	\$ 303	- ·		\$ 267	
8	\$	7,216	5.74%	\$	414	\$ 311	,	34		
9	\$	7,375	5.74%	\$	423	\$ 317	- ·	32	\$ 285	
10	\$	7,522	5.74%	\$	432	\$ 324	+	30	\$ 294	
Terminal year	\$	7,673	5.74%	\$	440	\$ 330	\$	98	\$ 232	
						The Value				
Terminal value				\$	4,915					
PV(Terminal value)				\$	2,649					
PV (CF over next 10 years)				\$	1,531					
Value of operating assets =				\$	4,180					
Adjustment for distress				\$	401	Probability of failure =				
- Debt & Minority Interests				\$	1,155		Ва	sed on Ba1 rating from M	loody's	
+ Cash & Other Non-operating assets				\$	446					
Value of equity				\$	3,069					
- Value of equity options				\$	-					
Number of shares					65.10					
Value per share				\$	47.14			Stock was trading at =	\$240.00	

Price Justification!

=1	GameStop: Value per Share today									
-			Revenues in 2031 in \$ billions (Revenues in 2020 = \$5.2 b)							
_	31		\$	5.00	\$	7.50	\$	10.00	\$	12.50
	1 2031	2.50%	\$	11.78	\$	14.44	\$	17.07	\$	19.71
-	Operating Margin in	5.00%	\$	29.82	\$	40.14	\$	50.43	\$	60.84
	Operati Margin	7.50%	\$	47.79	\$	65.79	\$	83.76	\$	101.94
	d0 No	10.00%	\$	65.76	\$	91.44	\$	117.07	\$	143.02

And Back Story to the Redditor Pushback..

- A loss of faith in experts (economic, scientific, financial, government): During the 20th century, advances in education and increasing specialization created expert classes in almost every aspect of human activity, who we trusted to take the right actions, and when they were wrong, we were kept in the dark. That pact has been shattered by a combination of arrogance on the part of experts and catastrophic policy failures, with the 2008 banking crisis acting as a wake-up call.
- An unquestioning worship of crowd wisdom, combined with an <u>empowering of crowds</u>: We have also seen the rise of big data and the elevation of "crowd" judgments over expert opinions, and it shows up in our life choices. Social media has made it easier to get crowd input (online), and precipitate crowd actions.
- A conversion of disagreements in every arena into the personal and the political: While we can continue to debate the reasons, it remains inarguable that public discourse has coarsened, with the almost every debate, no matter in what realm, becoming personal and political.

What's the end game?

- It is a good value: It is possible that you believe that the company is a good value, and that you can hold on to it as an investment. That may be a viable path, if you bought GameStop at \$40 or \$50, but I don't see how this works if you paid \$200 or \$300 a share
- It is a good trade: It is more likely that you believe that you can sell the stock to someone else at a higher price, but to whom? You may get lucky and be able to exit before everyone else tries to, but the risk that you will be caught in a stampede is high, as everyone tries to rush the exit doors at the same time.
- It is to do damage to hedge funds: I don't think much of hedge funds either, and view most of them as fee-earning machines, run by managers who bring nothing to the investment table. That said, driving a hedge fund or two out of business will not do serious damage to that business, since others will quickly fill the void.
- It is to help the targeted companies: How has any of what's happened in the last two weeks help these companies? Their stock prices may have soared, but their financial positions are just as precarious as they were two weeks ago. In a perverse way, you might have made it more difficult for GameStop and AMC to find a pathway to survive as parts of larger companies, by pushing up stock prices, and making them more expensive as targets

Market Lessons

- Flattening of the Investment World: I believe that the investment world has flattened over the last few decades, as access to data and powerful tools widens, and trading eases. Portfolio managers and market gurus are no longer are the arbiters of whether markets are cheap or expensive, and their path of least resistance might come from following what individual investors do.
- Emptiness of Investment Expertise: Professional money management has always sold its wares (mutual funds, hedge funds, investment advice) as the products of deep thinking and serious analysis, and as long as the processes stayed opaque and information was scanty, they were able to preserve the delusion. In the last few decades, as we have stripped away the layers, we have discovered how little there is under the surface.
- Value and Price: Almost everything that is being talked about (the rising power of the individual investor, the ease of trading, social media investing forums) are about price, not value. It does mean that increasing access to data and easing trading may have the perverse effect of causing price to vary more, relative to value, and for longer periods.

A Danger to the Market?

Valuing the S&P 500 on January 1, 2021

Expected earnings in 2021 & 2022 represent consensus estimates for earnings on the S&P 500 from analysts. After 2022, earnings grow at the same rate as the riskfree rate.

Assume that the **10-year T.Bond rate** will rise garudally over the next 5 years to 2%.

Intrinsic Value Estimate (based on your choice of ERP)											
	2020	1	2	3	4	5	Terminal Year				
Expected Earnings	\$138.12	169.18	197.20	200.36	203.96	208.04	212.20				
Expected cash payout as % of earnings	70.00%	75.00%	78.16%	81.33%	84.49%	87.65%	87.65%				
Expected Dividends + Buybacks =	\$96.68	\$126.89	\$154.14	\$162.94	\$172.33	\$182.36	186.00				
Expected Terminal Value =						\$ 3,720.08					
Riskfree Rate	1.00%	1.20%	1.40%	1.60%	1.80%	2.00%	2.00%				
Required Return on Stocks	6.00%	6.20%	6.40%	6.60%	6.80%	7.00%	7.00%				
Present Value =		\$ 119.48	\$ 136.41	\$ 135.27	\$ 133.96	\$ 2,835.03					
Intrinsic Value of Index =	3360.14	Present value of expected cash flows & terminal value									
Intrinsic Trailing PE =	24.33	4.33 Based upon estimated earnings for 2020									
Intrinsic Forward PE =	19.86	Based upon expected earnings in 2021									
Intrinsic CAPE =	28.50 Based upon 10-year average earnings, adjusted for inflation										
Level of the Index (1/1/21)	3756.07										
% Under or Over Valuation	11.78%										

Expected cash payout of 75% in 2021 is well below the 93% returned in 2019 & the 88% ten-year average but a step above the 70% returned in 2020. Over 2022-25, it moves to the payout in the terminal year, which is based upon a growth rate = risk freee rate and a ROE of 16.20% (2019 estimate for the S&P 500): Payout ratio = 1 - g/ ROE

Required Return = T.Bond Rate + ERP. I am using a 5% ERP, higher than the 4.21% average from 1960-2020, but lower than the 5.5% average in the last decade.